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Summary
Ideation is described as the process of generating useful ideas to help reach a specific goal or
outcome. It is one of the task types with the longest standing roles in experimental studies
of creativity. Despite being a well studied concept, many aspects of the cognitive processes
underpinning ideation are poorly understood. A main model of thinking that is referred to
when looking at ideation studies is the concept of Search for Ideas in Associative Memory
(SIAM), which suggests that ideas are generated in semantically related clusters, due to
the way we synthesise these ideas from memory. The SIAM model of thinking is likened to
that of information foraging theories in this thesis, which forms the basis for our studies. In
this thesis we investigate the time-course pattern of idea generation in an ideation task and
ask whether we can find any influences on this. In particular, we look to classic stopping
heuristics to try to explain the time-course of ideas across a continuous single question
ideation task and the giving-up strategies used in a multiple sequential question ideation
task. Throughout the work presented in this thesis, we ran into methodological problems
with inter-rater disagreement between coders rating the sets of ideas on commonly used
metrics such as novelty and value, as well as classifying ideas in semantic categories. The
second area we investigate in this thesis is whether we can support ideation in such a way
that judgement of ideas becomes more reliable.
We ran three ideation studies in order to develop theory in support of applications to assist
in the ideation process. In our first study, we looked at continuous ideation across a single
ideation task. Key findings from this study showed a weak verification of semantic clustering
of ideas generated, however, we were able to replicate main effects others had found using
this method. In the second study, we looked at ideation across multiple questions. Our
key finding directly mirrors that found in other (non-ideation) studies on discretionary
task switching: people combine rate of return and sub-goal completion as strategies for
abandoning a task. In the third study, we addressed the issues of low inter-rater agreement
by performing simple instructional manipulations for ideators. Key findings show a that the
use of thematic roles have a positive effect on judged value of ideas. Novelty judgement
agreement was also positively affected, although this was seen across conditions.
Although a lot more research is required in order to fully understand the cognitive pro-
cesses in ideation, we hope that this work shows that by detailed experimental analysis of
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Creative problem solving plays an important part in our lives. It is not a process that
is isolated to a particular setting. We encounter creative problem solving tasks in all
facets of life: generation of new and competitive strategies in work settings, planning the
perfect holiday in personal settings, or developing plans to make schools safer in community
settings. Indeed, the need for creative thinking has repeatedly been identified as vital to
maintaining a competitive advantage in organisations (Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin, 1993;
Amabile, 1996; Basadur and Hausdorf, 1996).
Creative problem solving is often thought to be split into distinct stages or steps (Basadur,
Graen and Green, 1982; Allen and Thomas, 2011; Sowden, Pringle and Gabora, 2015).
Whilst the suggestions for stages that make up the creative process vary, they often include
similar stages, e.g. problem clarification, problem solving, and implementation (Ochse,
1990). Each of these steps is considered to be an iteration of creative thinking (ideation)
and critical thinking (evaluation) (Basadur, 1995; Dennett, 2017). That is, for each stage
of the creative problem solving process, creative thinking facilitates the generation of new
ideas (ideation) freely and without judgement. Ideation is often presented as a time-boxed
activity, in which problem solvers widen the number of possible solutions to a problem.
Once the ideation phase is complete, critical thinking is applied, facilitating the judgement
(evaluation) of the relevance and value of the ideas generated in the ideation phase (see
figure 1-1) to narrow down the number of viable solutions to the problem.
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
Figure 1-1: The creative problem solving process, made up of stages of
ideation-evaluation. Ideation is facilitated by creative thinking, evaluation fa-
cilitated by critical thinking.
According to Shneiderman (2009), one of the founding fathers of Human Computer In-
teraction (HCI) research, supporting creativity is one of the field’s grand challenges: ”Un-
derstanding creative processes, especially when mediated by user-interfaces, will remain
a continuing challenge.” The significance of support for creativity lies in the process of
ideation in each stage of creative problem solving.
Recognising the need to support creative problem solving, a large amount of psychological
literature has focused on the ideation step of this process (e.g. Diedrich et al., 2015; Diehl,
Munkes and Ziegler, 2002; Dennis and Valacich, 1993; Moss, Kotovsky and Cagan, 2007;
Dugosh et al., 2000). In fact, ideation is one of the task types with the longest standing
roles in experimental studies of creativity. The ideation task itself refers to tasks in which
participants are asked to generate as many ideas as possible in response to a problem most
often stated in the form of an open-ended question. Ideation tasks are often described
as ill-defined problems lacking any specific goal or set of steps to reach this goal (Shah,
Smith and Vargas-Hernandez, 2003; Chrysikou, 2006). It is therefore not uncommon when
investigating support for ideation to look at how to support both divergent and convergent
thinking, that is, thinking styles in which we might make associations to seemingly unrelated
artefacts (e.g. method of analogy) to generate a breadth of novel ideas, and thinking styles
in which we might focus on a specific topic or semantic space in order to generate, combine
and hone in on specific features by exploring the depth of that specific space (e.g. Gabora,
2002; Sowden, Pringle and Gabora, 2015).
Ideation has been studied across a variety of fields: HCI, psychology, engineering and organ-
isational literature. The most popular form of ideation has been identified as brainstorming
(Osborn, 1957). Although this is not the only method of ideation, brainstorming is a well-
studied phenomenon, both in groups as well as individual brainstorming. Nominal groups,
in which people brainstorm separately and ideas are analysed as a pooled group, treated as if
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the individuals generated the ideas together, have often been shown to be more productive
than in-situ group brainstorming (e.g. Taylor, Berry and Block, 1958; Diehl and Stroebe,
1987; Goldenberg, Larson Jr and Wiley, 2013). This focus on individual brainstorming has
brought about studies on a range of technological tools to assist in brainstorming electron-
ically: ideation support systems.
The type of factors tested in ideation support systems spans a wide range. There has
been research on the concept of priming people to think divergently (Dennis, Minas and
Bhagwatwar, 2013), as well as priming people with mood (Sowden and Dawson, 2011) as
well as feelings of social belonging or separation (Ye and Robert Jr, 2017; Perry-Smith,
2006). Support for the creative process is not a new area of study in HCI, and from an
HCI point of view, studies have been done that explore the effects of different tools on the
productivity of ideation. These include, but are not limited to, interface designs that offer
examples and keywords to prompt ideation (e.g. Diehl, Munkes and Ziegler, 2002; Chan
et al., 2017), the effects of different styles of input, such as keyboards versus graphical
pen and paper interfaces (Oviatt et al., 2012), on the fluency and appropriateness of ideas
generated, as well as physical props such as inspiration cards (Golembewski and Selby,
2010).
Unfortunately, despite its long history as an object of scientific study, many aspects of the
cognitive processes underpinning ideation are poorly understood. In more recent years, an
emerging area in HCI focuses on the understanding of the concepts of flow (the free gener-
ation of ideas (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997)) and impasse (feelings of being stuck and unable to
generate more ideas (MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle, 2001)), with a particular interest
in understanding how the state of impasse arises and what can be done to mitigate the
effects of it (e.g. Chan et al., 2017; Chan, Dang and Dow, 2016; Siangliulue et al., 2015).
Indeed, as ideation is often presented with time-constraints, it makes sense that we would
want to minimise the number of impasses in order increase productivity in the ideation
phase. Experimenters in this research area mostly focus on the idea of giving prompts in
the form of examples to ideators either when they are idle (not generating ideas), at set
intervals, or simply when ideators request inspiration. Researchers in this area furthermore
focus on the type of examples given (e.g. from expert or novice facilitators; prompts that
are semantically far from the recently submitted ideas or semantically close) and the timing
of when these examples should be offered.
A main model of thinking that is referred to in many of these studies is the concept of
ideation being similar to Search in Associative Memory – a paradigm in recall studies in
which people have been shown to strongly structure their recall in terms of categories
(Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1981). Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) have developed a model
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of thinking, called Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM), in which they state
that we generate clusters of semantically similar ideas in rapid succession, due to the
way we synthesise these ideas from images in (faster) short-term memory. Ideas that are
semantically different take longer to generate due to the nature of searching for other
images in (slower) long-term memory. In our review of the literature, we briefly discuss
this model and the evidence to suggest its validity. The theory itself closely aligns with the
theories of information foraging (Pirolli and Card, 1999): when searching for information
in a physical space, we move from patch to patch (e.g. books, internet, other people’s
knowledge) looking for information. The decision to give up on a patch in favour of another
is dependent on a range of factors (such as time since the last successful retrieval of a useful
item, number of useful items retrieved) and is widely studied in psychology literatures (e.g.
Wilke et al., 2009; Payne, Duggan and Neth, 2007). If the search for ideas in memory
involves moving from image to image in semantic memory, we would expect that these
same rules that apply to information foraging would apply to ideation1. It is with this link
in mind that we developed our first study, an ideation task in which individual participants
generate a list of ideas in response to a problem. The study replicates that of Nijstad and
Stroebe (2006) as we hope to further study the concept of categorical structuring of ideas,
whether we see evidence that people cluster their ideas into categories, and the time-course
within and between these clusters of ideas.
Our original motivation for the work presented in this thesis was to explore the time-course of
ideas in an ideation task and how people allocate their time between clusters of semantically
similar ideas. We were interested in these concepts with the aim of ultimately developing a
stronger theoretical platform on which to develop and test approaches to ideation support
- with specific focus on mitigating the concept of impasse. However, in the studies that
followed this, we encountered a series of methodological problems. These seemed not to be
particular to our studies but rather to suggest methodological difficulties in the literature
at large. It seemed that fundamental issues in the empirical testing and measurement of
ideation would need to be overcome before any theory based design could be attempted.
First and foremost, we were unable to replicate the findings in Nijstad and Stroebe (2006),
in part due to the difficulty with which two independent coders found categorising the set
of ideas generated in the study. Our analysis of the data showed that people generally
do structure their ideas in semantic categories, however, the low inter-rater agreements
coupled with the noisy nature of the category switches observed (not many sequential ideas
falling into the same category; the data often followed an ABAB structure rather than
1This link has been alluded to in the above-mentioned psychological literatures in relation to accomplish-
ment tasks that have a finite number of solutions. To the best of our knowledge, the link between foraging
theories and ideation has not been explicitly stated yet in other research.
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AABB) presented us with methodological problems. In a second study, in which ideators
were asked to generate ideas in response to a series of sequential questions, we encountered
a similar issue with inter-rater agreements. In this study, coders rated the novelty and value
(two of the measures of quality) of the ideas. The lack of inter-rater agreement in both
categorical coding in study 1 and quality coding in study 2 steered the work into additional
investigations of methodology, somewhat removed from the initial motivations of this work.
1.1 Research questions
What started out as the intention to understand methods of supporting the cognitive state
transitions in ideation and the categorisation of ideas generated ended up being a study on
methodology. To report the research questions as they were formulated when the work for
this thesis first took form would be misleading in terms of content and outcomes of the work
presented. We were interested in understanding the categorical nature of idea generation,
whether information foraging patch-leaving strategies could account for behaviour within a
single and multiple ideation tasks. Our ultimate research question was whether we could
inform interface styles that would support ideators in generation of more, higher quality
ideas. After the failure to replicate results became apparent already in the first study, we
decided to explore the topic from the point of view of the methodology. The research
questions formed throughout the lifespan of this thesis were therefore:
RQ1: What influences the time-course pattern of ideas generated in ideation tasks?
This question relates to the overall time-course of ideas, the concepts of flow and impasse
and whether we are able to see any patterns in the data itself with regards to these con-
cepts. We analyse data from three different studies with the timings, number of ideas
generated and properties of ideas themselves in mind. This question is further split into
four measurable research objectives:
RO1: Assess whether semantic clustering of ideas takes place in continuous indi-
vidual ideation on a single task.
RO2: Analyse whether any semantic clustering of ideas is reflected in the time-
course of idea generation, and where possible relate these time-course effects to
foraging theory heuristics for patch-leaving.
RO3: Test whether the simple foraging theory stopping rules, fixed items, fixed




RO4: Investigate the quality as well as the quantity of ideas, by asking judges to
rate ideas’ novelty and value.
RO1 and RO2 are addressed Chapter 3, in which we attempt to replicate the results of
Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) to show that ideation is indeed semantically clustered. Finding
longer times between clusters would suggest a patch like structure in the way we retrieve
ideas from memory. RO3 and RO4 are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, in which we per-
form an ideation study where participants generate ideas in response to multiple sequential
questions. We analyse the times between ideas and compare these to the giving-up times
(the time between last submitted idea and the decision to move on to another question) in
order to respond to RO3. In addition to finding evidence of any foraging strategies people
may use when deciding to switch, we investigate in Chapter 5 whether the quality of ideas
might have an effect on this decision. The inherent problem with low inter-rater agreements
in both Chapters 3 and 5 have led us to develop the following research question on support
ideation. We hypothesise, based on evidence from Chapter 5, that better formulated ideas
may in fact result in a higher judgement correlation between coders.
RQ2: Can we support ideation in such a way that judgement of ideas becomes
more reliable?
This question relates to the general issues we encountered with disagreements between
coders for the novelty and value judgement metrics of ideas, and also of the disagreement
between coders for the semantic category judgements. We speculate whether specific
qualities of individual ideas, such as length and specificity (detail), could have an impact
on the idea judgements. In order to measure this, we have generated two research objectives:
RO5: Test whether priming ideators with examples or thematic roles improves the
length of the ideas generated.
RO6: Observe whether the specificity of ideas affects the subjectivity of coding
ideas or whether increased specificity improves inter-rater agreements.
Both of these are addressed in Chapter 6, in which we perform a simple prompting manip-
ulation as a way of improving the well-formedness of ideas (RO5). Although we do not
perform any further analyses on the specificity of ideas, the positive effect of the manip-





In this thesis, we empirically explore the time-course of the process of coming up with ideas
with the goal of gaining a stronger understanding of how we can support complex tasks
such as ideation tasks. We furthermore attempt to answer the questions surrounding the
methodological issues encountered. We therefore take a mixed-methods approach drawing
mostly on quantitative techniques but also qualitative techniques.
We performed three ideation experiments (Lab-based: Chapter 3, Chapter 4; Online crowd-
sourcing: Chapter 6) in which we gathered quantitative data for timings and number of
ideas. In our first and last study (Chapters 3 and 6) independent coders qualitatively
analysed the data using a pre-determined set of categories, in order to code the data into
categories for further analysis.
Additionally, in our first and last studies, we looked to independent coders to make judge-
ments on the difference between adjacent ideas. In Chapters 5 and 6, we hired coders to
make judgements on the data from the point of view of novelty and value – again rating
qualitative data in order to facilitate further quantitative analyses. These results were fur-
ther qualitatively coded by the experimenter to look for patterns in the language structure
of individual ideas.
To understand further the concepts of specificity and generalisation of ideas (Chapter 6),
we performed an online crowd-source experiment in which the same metrics (timings and
number of ideas) were measured quantitatively. A sample of the data was coded qualita-
tively by 5 different coders across 3 coding schemes (categories, semantic difference scores
between adjacent ideas, quality of the ideas). For each of the three ideation experiments we
furthermore gathered responses on ideation strategies from participants using likert-scale
questionnaires, reporting their level of feeling stuck.
1.2.1 Research ethics
The work done in this thesis involves asking human participants to engage in an ideation
task, as well as asking human participants to independently code or rate sets of ideas
generated. In order to ensure our studies were within the ethical bounds of the Department
of Computer Science at the University of Bath, we followed the 13-point ethics checklist
(see Appendix D.1) for each study we ran. In every study participants gave full informed
consent and their data was stored safely and separately from consent forms so as to maintain




Current literature in HCI focuses on how to support ideation in a variety of ways. This
includes provision of semantically near and far example ideas to support associative divergent
thinking. Additionally, the timing of delivery of these examples is a topic studied in HCI as
a method of understanding how to overcome the problem of impasse states. In this thesis
we present three studies relating to ideation and the understanding of the time-course of
ideation in relation to foraging theory (RQ1). We make these associations in order to
observe whether classic stopping rules can account for the task-switching behaviour of
ideators when presented with multiple ideation tasks. A stronger theoretical understanding
of the cognitive processes that take place during ideation might highlight potential issues for
the design of support tools. Our contributions to the theoretical understanding of cognitive
processes taking place during ideation are:
• Replication and somewhat weak verification that generated ideas are clustered into
semantic categories, and that the thinking time between category clusters is longer
than thinking times of ideas that fall within category clusters.
• Distribution of giving-up times (the time since last submitted idea and the choice to
move to a new question) (Chapter 4) displays a peak at low times and a long tail
of very high giving-up times. This finding confirms that the decision to give up on
an ideation task (accumulation style task) follows a similar pattern of sensitivity to
the rate of generation plus the probability of switching upon sub-goal completion,
as is found in other types of problem solving tasks in which there is a limited set of
responses (accomplishment style task).
Our studies further found methodological issues in well-established methods of categorising
ideas as well as judging the quality of ideas (through novelty and value). In response to
these methodological issues we performed a series of investigations into the qualities of the
ideas themselves and whether the variation in generalisation and specificity of ideas was to
blame for these problems (RQ2). Our methodological contributions based on this area are:
• A simple instructional manipulation specifying the response format and thematic roles
to include significantly increases the length of the ideas generated.
• An explicit instruction on the steps needed (specification of thematic roles) might
provide higher value ideas, as is found in Chapter 6, as well as lower variation in
value.
• Although no major difference was found in inter-rater agreements on categorisation
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(low agreements), value (low agreements) or novelty (high agreements) between
conditions with no manipulation and those with the thematic role manipulation, our
findings open up the question of whether the visibility of a set of well-formulated ideas
increased the novelty rating agreement levels between coders. This finding requires
additional research.
In addition to the above contributions, we found further contributions resulting from our
first and last studies:
• A more reliable method of measuring thought processes during ideation might be
through analysis of the semantic difference between each idea. In study 1, we show
that the thinking time between semantically close ideas is significantly shorter than the
thinking times between semantically far ideas, loosely underpinning the SIAM model
of thinking by showing that ideas with stronger mental associations are retrieved
faster than those with weaker associations.
1.4 Thesis structure
The rest of this document is structured according to the work done chronologically.
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the rest of the work done in the thesis. We start by defining
ideation, the main concept in this thesis, as a highly studied step in creative problem solving
tasks. Key literatures on ideation support are reviewed leading us to the topics of flow and
impasse. Through the Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM) model of thinking
(Chapter 3), we link ideation behaviour to behaviour found in foraging theories, in which a
set of variables are used to inform the decision to leave the present task. We then review the
metrics and methods of evaluating ideas in ideation tasks in order to inform the methods
used in Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 3 presents an experiment built on the theory covered in Chapter 2, in which
we ask participants to continuously generate ideas in response to a single question (study
performed for two separate questions). The data are analysed for patterns in the time-
course of ideas, specifically informed by the categories that ideas fall into (RO1 and RO2).
We report a low inter-rater agreement on the independent category scores. Despite this,
our findings indicate a categorical structure to thinking when generating ideas. In addition
to the replication study, we offer a novel method of evaluating the relation between ideas
and show that the semantic difference between ideas affects the time-course between ideas.
Chapter 4 presents an empirical experiment addressing the issues found in the noisy cate-
gory switches in Chapter 3. We do this by asking participants to generate ideas in response
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to a sequential series of questions. In this study, we look for evidence of the use of foraging
heuristics as a cue to moving to a new question (RO3). We rule out the use of the simplest
foraging heuristics and show that switching might occur due to a combination of sensitivity
to diminishing returns and the concept of sub-goal completion.
Chapter 5 reports follow-up analyses of the data gathered in Chapter 4, in order to assess
the quality of ideas, either the novelty or value of an idea, and whether the variation in
quality might play a part in the decision to switch (RO4). In this study, three coders rated
the novelty and value on 10-point scales. Inter-rater agreement for both metrics was low.
This result combined with the low agreement on categorisation in Chapter 3 guided the
subsequent analysis, in which we performed a thematic analysis of highest agreed good
ideas, highest agreed bad ideas, and highest disagreement ideas. The thematic analysis
provided the foundations for the study following in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 presents an empirical experiment in which we manipulate prompt type. We do
so in order to affect the specificity with which participants formulate their ideas (RO5).
We report a number of evaluations done on a sample of the data in order to verify whether
the manipulation had an effect on the agreements between coders for all three coding types
(categorisation, quality, and semantic differences) (RO6).
In Chapter 7 we conclude the thesis, summarising the work done and the key findings from
the studies. We identify key limitations in the work done in this thesis and offer directions
for future work this might further our understanding of the cognitive processes taking place




In the previous section we outlined our motivation as well as our initial overall goal of
understanding the time-course of ideation (the creation of new ideas) in order to better
inform ideation support tools, aimed at increasing the number and quality of ideas generated
by diminishing the effects of an impasse occurring. In order to understand the time-course
of ideation, we first look to the literature on creative problem solving in order to fully define
ideation as a problem solving task. We then turn to literature on supporting ideation, both
in the field of Human Computer Interaction as well as, more briefly, in other disciplines
such as Psychology, Engineering and Organisational Management. In this chapter we
will explore the literature that addresses the concept of ideation and current methods of
supporting creativity and increased productivity. We explore the link between problem
solving and theories of information foraging and propose that these theories might be a
stronger method of understanding decision making in ideation. Furthermore, we review
different methods of evaluating ideas.
In section 2.1 we discuss the concept of ideation, as a step in creative problem solving as
well as the process with which we ideate. We review different types of problem solving task
that vary in constraint and level of divergent and convergent thinking needed to solve the
problem. We show that whilst ideation lends itself to the more creative divergent thinking
type of task, the best solutions in ideation tasks are those that draw upon a combination
of convergent and divergent thinking. Several methods of ideation are highlighted, with
brainstorming seemingly being the most popular of these. We discuss electronic brainstorm-
ing as a way of supporting individual ideation; this is the method we will be using for the
studies in this thesis.
Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of literatures that have studied the support of ideation
11
Chapter 2. Literature review
through a variety of different methods such as tangible tools and novel interfaces. Studies in
HCI have focused mainly on priming associative thinking and offering examples as a method
of increasing productivity in ideation. In more recent years, through the aforementioned
studies, the concept of impasse has emerged as being a key factor in ideation productivity.
A few studies have since looked into how to predict an impasse and how to guide ideators
back into a state of flow.
In section 2.3 we discuss the links made between foraging and search in memory and why this
is relevant to the process of ideation. We review the key foraging theories and the studies in
which modified versions of these foraging rules have been shown to apply to internal search
tasks. We draw parallels between these internal search tasks and the notion that ideation is
essentially a search for ideas in associative memory (SIAM model), suggesting that foraging
rules may offer an understanding of the cognitive processes taking place during an ideation
task.
In section 2.4 we review methods of judging the quality of ideas, highlighting the difference
in metrics used, weights these metrics carry as well as what the term quality means in
different types of task such as tests of creativity versus product design.
2.1 Ideation
2.1.1 What is ideation?
Ideation is simply put: the process of coming up with ideas. However, it is not easy to
move toward a more precise definition. Ideation is sometimes described as the process of
coming up with useful ideas that help the ideator reach a specific goal or outcome (Briggs
and Reinig, 2010). Ideation tasks themselves can be described as ill-defined problems, in
which the goal and the steps necessary to solve the problem are ambiguous (Chrysikou,
2006). Shah, Smith and Vargas-Hernandez (2003) highlight the fact that the specification
of ideation tasks varies from task to task. In the famous ’unusual uses’ or ’alternative uses’
tests (Torrance, 1962; Guilford, 1967), the problem is typically expressed as ’think of as
many alternative uses for a shoe’, without any further constraints on the goal or method.
In contrast to this, in design ideation the steps to achieve the goal may well be ill-defined
but the problem and goal itself must adhere to a set of physical constraints and functional
requirements in order to produce usable solutions that are fit for implementation.
This ambiguity in the definition of the goals of an ideation task has resulted in some
disagreement over the years as to whether evaluation is and should be included in the
ideation process (e.g. Peterson and Nemeth, 1996). For the research presented in this
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thesis, we share the views of Basadur (1995) and Dennett (2017): that ideation precedes
evaluation and ideators are therefore advised to withhold any judgment or criticism of their
own ideas and write them down no matter how outrageous they might feel the ideas are.
Ideation and problem solving
Creative problem solving can be divided into two steps: ideation and evaluation (Osborn,
1957; Basadur, Graen and Green, 1982). Ideation is the initial step taken towards solving
a problem, which is performed without the imposition of judgement. The ideation process
can engage either the individual, teams or a whole organisation in the process of coming
up with new ideas. In organisational management, ideation follows the scoping phase of
a project, but precedes any evaluation of the ideas generated (Briggs and Reinig, 2010).
Creativity is the key factor at this stage and evaluation will not occur until initial ideation
has completed. This is often achieved by setting a timer and allowing no criticism until
the time is up. The evaluation stage looks at the ideas generated in the ideation stage of
the problem solving task and judge their suitability as a solution to the problem and its
constraints.
Problem solving tasks differ in scope, definition and solution requirements. On one end of
the scale, we find well-defined tasks that tend towards a specific goal, single solution or set of
solutions (Chrysikou, 2006). These tasks are usually more precisely scoped tasks that require
either a single correct answer or set of answers. Intelligence tests are an example of these,
as these require critical (convergent) thinking rather than creative (divergent) thinking.
Another example of convergent thinking tasks are ’remote associates tasks’ (Mednick,
1962), in which problem solvers are shown three words and asked what the fourth linking
word is (e.g. for ’dream, break, and light’ the linking word is ’day’). In contrast to single-
solution tasks, other convergent thinking tasks include accumulation tasks such as finding
words from a set of letters (anagram task) (Wilke et al., 2009; Payne, Duggan and Neth,
2007). Answers are easily judged as correct or incorrect and the problem solver can continue
to enter words until either the list of possible solutions is exhausted or they fail to generate
more words (cognitive failure). We will revisit these tasks in the Foraging Theories section,
as accumulation tasks such as these, with large pre-determined sets of solutions, have been
relatively widely studied in relation to linking foraging theories with the internal search for
solutions (e.g. Harbison et al., 2009; Wilke et al., 2009; Payne, Duggan and Neth, 2007).
At the other end of the scale we find open-ended, ill-defined tasks with few or no constraints
on the solution space. An example of these tasks is Guilford’s (1967) alternative uses task.
In this task, problem solvers are asked to come up with a list of as many possible uses as
they can for an everyday common item such as a brick or a shoe. These tasks are classified
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as divergent tasks, as the person generating these uses has to think broadly in order to
generate a range of creative ideas, with barely any constraints.
Ideation tasks are often discussed as a key phase in creative problem solving, benefiting
from creative, divergent thinking. Validity and correctness of answers in an ideation process
is not a question of a simple yes or no answer but a matter of degree. However, it has to
be noted that creative thinking, which facilitates ideation, does not always fall in the fully
divergent thinking end of the scale of problem solving (Sowden, Pringle and Gabora, 2015).
Yes, divergent thinking plays a big part in ideation tasks as the process to reach goals is
often unconstrained. However, many ideation tasks will be presented together with some
form of constraint that requires convergent thinking such as honing in on one feature in
order form associations that could generate novel solutions within a specified design space
(Shah, Smith and Vargas-Hernandez, 2003). Among these tasks we find design reasoning
tasks, in which problem solvers are shown images of a specific design and asked to infer
characteristics about that item. In Oviatt et al. (2012) an image of a chimpanzee foot
and a human foot are shown and problem solvers are asked to think about the biological
structure and evolution of these.
As a problem solving task, it is no surprise then that ideation is mentioned in conjunction
with creative thinking but calls for the use of the combination of convergent and divergent
thinking (Brophy, 2001; Runco and Acar, 2012; Kaufman and Sternberg, 2010; Cropley,
2006). Based on the fact that ideation is best solved using a combination of convergent and
divergent thinking, we liken ideation to the general category of knowledge work, in which
workers are not simply performing rote tasks with a well-defined solution space, nor are they
necessarily applying creative thinking at all times. Creative ideation has been identified to
be an important area of research as it is identified as being key to ensuring work-place
effectiveness as well as competitive advantage over other organisations (Woodman, Sawyer
and Griffin, 1993; Amabile, 1996; Basadur and Hausdorf, 1996).
To summarise, ideation tasks present themselves in different ways, such as open-ended
questions, inferential reasoning tasks and unusual uses / alternative uses tasks. In the
work presented in this thesis, we use open-ended questions as a method of representing
ideation, specifically due to the inclusive nature of the types of questions, requiring little
to no subject knowledge. Although ideation might often usefully be considered as the first
or an early stage of a longer problem solving process, it is true to say that in many studies
of ideation this stage is isolated, so that the task for ideators, as studied, is to generate
ideas that are not further developed. This is the method adopted in this thesis. It might
be criticised in that it takes ideation away from its broader context; but in addition to the
standard defences of such an approach (i.e. that it allows careful measurement and analysis
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of ideation), it is worth noting that organisational structures quite often create a similar
divide between ideation and the other problem solving processes that might follow it, for
example in brainstorming meetings of project teams.
2.1.2 The process of ideation
The process of ideation itself, and of recording ideas, can be done in many different ways.
One of the most popular methods of ideating is brainstorming, in which groups of people
engage in the generative part of ideation, leaving the evaluative part until the end of the
brainstorming session (Osborn, 1957).
Other methods include brain-writing (Geschka, Schaude and Schlicksupp, 1976), SCAM-
PER idea prompting method (Eberle, 2008), and mind-mapping (Buzan and Harrison,
2010). Brain-writing offers a group technique in which ideators write down their ideas indi-
vidually to avoid the effects of production blocking and evaluation apprehension (see section
2.1.2 Electronic brainstorming as a method of ideation). Once an ideator feels stuck, they
swap notes with another in order to keep elaborating and synthesising ideas. The SCAM-
PER idea prompting method makes use of 7 prompts (Substitute, Combine, Adapt, Modify,
Put to another use, Eliminate, Reverse) in the form of action verbs in order to come up with
new ideas, in particular in relation to product modification or new product design. Mind-
mapping consists of a graphical representation of the connections between ideas generated
by an individual, although this method can also be used in group brainstorming sessions to
capture ideas according to different categories. This list of ideation methods is of course
not exhaustive, Silverstein, Samuel and DeCarlo (2013) outline more than 50 methods that
can be used for ideation, including analogy to existing systems, categorisation of already
generated ideas as a method of synthesising solutions and De Bono’s (2017) six thinking
hats (a method of approaching a problem by thinking as different stakeholders would).
In the scientific and management literatures, ideation is most often discussed in relation to
brainstorming, as brainstorming is one of the most popular methods of ideating. Traditional
brainstorming takes place in groups, who verbally express ideas. The term brainstorming
was coined by Osborn (1957), as a method of generating ideas over a fixed period of
time without stopping to evaluate the ideas generated. Associated with this method he
developed 4 constraints on the process itself:
1. Set a timer and do not apply criticism or evaluation on any idea until the time is up.
2. Generate as many ideas as possible as many ideas are conducive to combination and
therefore more good ideas will be generated.
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3. Generate ’wild’ ideas, even if they seem irrelevant to the problem space.
4. Expand and elaborate on individual ideas, don’t just see each idea as a separate item.
The concept of rules on brainstorming has at times been criticised for being too constraining
on the creative process. Briggs and Reinig (2010) criticise the ’generate many ideas’ rule as
over-estimating the value of productivity (or fluency), arguing that there is a threshold at
which good ideas are just no longer presented and the quality of ideas decreases. Moreover,
Peterson and Nemeth (1996) argue that these rules may theoretically even prime creative
thinkers into a thought pattern of ’conventionality’, in particular the rule stating ’don’t apply
criticism’, generating ideas that conform rather than offer novelty and value. Nonetheless
these rules are employed in many successful brainstorming studies.
Electronic brainstorming as a method of ideation
Ideation in groups has been under a lot of scrutiny over the years as the concepts of
evaluation apprehension, production blocking and free riding are seen as negative symptoms
of verbal group ideation (Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx, 2003; Diehl and Stroebe, 1991,
1987). Evaluation apprehension is defined as the fear of being judged by others in the
group and therefore refraining from voicing an idea, even though it might be a great idea.
Production blocking occurs on the basis of a few scenarios; (1) if a group member feels
their ideas are not as creative or valuable as others being generated, they will withhold
those ideas; (2) the turn taking nature of group ideation means that at times ideators may
come up with a few ideas before it is their turn and either forget or don’t get the chance
to fully formulate all of their ideas. The final problem with group ideation is free riding, a
phenomenon seen in all types of group work, in which ideators decide to sit back and let
others generate ideas while they do nothing.
A range of studies have shown that nominal group brainstorming produces more ideas (e.g.
Taylor, Berry and Block, 1958; Diehl and Stroebe, 1987; Goldenberg, Larson Jr and Wiley,
2013). Note that these are measured on productivity of the ideators and not the quality
of the ideas themselves. Nominal brainstorming groups are either individuals brainstorming
without seeing anyone else in the group, or ideators generating ideas individually before
discussing the ideas - the term ”nominal group” refers to the pooling of such individuals’
ideas. These findings were also found true for more constrained tasks such as anagram
tasks (Kanekar and Rosenbaum, 1972). Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrich (2010) found that
hybrid group ideation was superior both in the productivity and quality of ideas. Hybrid
group ideation is a method in which ideators first go off to generate their own ideas and
then work together with the rest of the group once they’ve developed their own ideas.
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As a method of supporting individual ideation, computer-mediated electronic brainstorming
has been introduced. Dennis and Valacich (1993) showed that larger groups of 12 members
that communicated electronically performed better than nominal groups of 12 members. For
smaller groups of 6, the electronic communication condition and nominal group condition
did not differ though. They propose that an electronic method of communication offered
group process gains such as ’synergy and avoidance of redundant ideas’ whilst avoiding the
problems of regular face to face ideation (e.g. production blocking).
In summary, electronic brainstorming may be a method of supporting teams and avoiding
the problems of face to face sessions. Kudrowitz and Wallace (2013) used individual
brainstorming as a method of easier evaluation of individual ideators, to avoid the influence
of other people’s ideas on the assessment of quality of ideas of individual ideators.
2.2 Ideation Support Systems
As may be clear from the synthesis of ideation studies from sources such as Management,
Psychology and Engineering, individual ideation is a fairly understudied phenomenon in
Human Computer Interaction. Studies relating to ideation are mostly brainstorming studies
that focus on group work and collaborative work, but little on the individual and computer
mediated ideation (except in that nominal groups are made up of individuals - the emphasis
in these studies is less on the individual’s process than on the total productivity of a group
of individuals). The work that looks at ideation and brainstorming for the most part focus
on what factors help or hinder the ideation process.
Among the factors studied are the effects of social networks and social connection on
ideation. Studies on how ideators see themselves in relation to the other members in
a group ideation task have shown that feeling a part of a group (collectivism) increases
overall fluency in comparison to groups that feel distanced from each other (e.g. Ye and
Robert Jr, 2017; Perry-Smith, 2006). Similarly, positive mood has been shown to have an
effect on ideation fluency. Sowden and Dawson (2011) performed a mood induction study
in which participants watched funny, sad or neutral video clips prior to an ideation task as
a method of priming their mood. They found that positive mood had a positive influence
on the fluency but the mood conditions had no effect on the quality of ideas.
Efforts have been made to support ideation tasks in a variety of different ways. Recall
that ideation and generating ideas comes from a synthesis of a person’s own knowledge
and forming associations in different ways. In Dennis, Minas and Bhagwatwar (2013) they
offer a game to participants prior to the ideation task. The game asks them to link words
presented on the screen together to make funny newspaper headlines. The participants who
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engaged in the fun game prior to the ideation study showed a higher fluency in ideation.
The experimenters suggested this was due to the game priming the participants to form
associations which in turn made ideation easier.
Other types of priming studied are input methods as a prime for the style of communication
of ideas (Oviatt et al., 2012; Oviatt and Cohen, 2010). In these studies, they explored the
effect of interface affordances on ideation and inheritance problem solving. They showed
that, in a comparison of pencil and paper, digital pen and paper interface, pen tablet
interface and graphical tablet interface that the digital pen and paper condition yielded
the fastest problem solving. They furthermore compared ideation in pen interfaces and
keyboard interfaces and found a higher level of linguistic content in keyboard interfaces,
however the responses were not appropriate hypotheses, suffering from over-generalisations
of science inferences. The digital pen condition afforded diagrammatic representation of
solutions and were found to be overall more ’accurate’ than the keyboard-based solutions
for these types of task. The concept of free-form interfaces remains an understudied area
in ideation, with few studies on the benefit of graphical versus textual inputs.
2.2.1 Ideation studies in Human Computer Interaction
Ideation in HCI is, similarly, often focused on brainstorming tasks in groups, such as partic-
ipatory design tasks, and how to mediate these group sessions. Additionally, quite a lot of
the work in ideation has looked at the development of new tools as a method of supporting
creativity (Frich, Mose Biskjaer and Dalsgaard, 2018).
Quite a few of these tools are tangible tools, such as method cards (Wölfel and Merritt,
2013), designed to be used as a method of providing support to ideators and problem
solvers. Golembewski and Selby’s (2010) Ideation decks are a card-based tool that may
help ideators reflect on the concept that is on the card and let it inspire their ideation
process. A freeform spatial interface tool called DataBoard was developed by Kandogan
et al. (2011), as a collaborative freeform tool for capturing ideas. The tool was found to
have a positive influence on the ideators ability to map out a problem solving task, move
elements around, as well as track and execute strategies, however, the board required quite
a lot of effort and involvement and was found to detract from the tasks it was meant to
assist. More pervasive support methods for group ideation in Human Computer Interaction
include Idea Expander (Wang, Cosley and Fussell, 2010), a method which shows images to
ideators based on their currently activated thinking patterns and concepts. This study is a
proof of concept of this type of study where images are selected through wizard of oz method
rather than selected through a developed system. The image is meant to prompt cognitive
inspirations. The study showed higher productivity and quality of ideas. Andolina et al.’s
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(2015) InspirationWall has a similar goal, in cognitively stimulating ideas to avoid slowing
down of production of ideas. InspirationWall processes recognised expressions through
speech recognition in order to present relevant key words on a screen, in the same semantic
domain as the words being spoken. It does this in the background and brainstorming groups
do not have to actively interact with the screen but can choose to look at the screen should
they need inspiration for ideation. Unfortunately, although the InspirationWall was shown
to have an effect on the overall pattern of ideation, it did not in fact increase productivity
in the ideation tasks performed. Perhaps showing that although offering ideas, these might
not be salient enough to offer any help to ideators in a group ideation setting.
As in other fields, the concept of priming has been studied in HCI. Bao et al.’s (2010)
Momentum offers a method of group ideation in which members are first asked questions
related to the words in the ideation task (e.g. ”How to recruit adventurous tourists” will
start the ideators off with the following prompts: ”What is something that reminds you of
tourists?”, ”With whom do you have an adventurous relationship?”). Ideators are asked
to enter their responses by text and group them on a screen, visible to all ideators. All
this is done prior to ideation and acts similarly to that of a prime, in that they are asked
unexpected questions to encourage associations they would not normally make during the
brainstorming session. Whilst the quality and productivity of the brainstorming session
was not improved by the Momentum tool, they did find that ideators expressed a stronger
awareness of the strategies they used in order to generate ideas.
The concept of offering examples and category labels for ideation as a way of inspiring
ideas is not new (Diehl, Munkes and Ziegler, 2002; Dugosh et al., 2000; Nijstad, Stroebe
and Lodewijkx, 2002; Baruah and Paulus, 2011). In other studies, it has been shown that
ideas generated by others led to ideators generating ideas in a broader set of categories,
showing more breadth of thinking. In electronic ideation tasks in which ideators are asked
to generate as many responses as they can that could solve an open-ended, ill-defined
question, examples have been used as prompts to make new associations and therefore
continue to generate novel ideas. Cheatstorm is a phrase used by Faste et al. (2013) as
a way of describing the inclusion of data from previous brainstorming sessions as input to
assist in brainstorming. The ideas generated in an ideation task were found to be related
to the ones in the Cheatstorm data that cued the brainstorming activity responses. The
use of text stimuli during design activities has been shown to help novice ideators generate
more novel ideas, although not more practical ideas (Goldschmidt and Sever, 2011). This
ties in well with the concepts presented by Sosa and Dong (2013) who propose that an
idea from a previous brainstorming session should not be dismissed, but rather used as a
prompt in future brainstorming sessions to be elaborated and refined. Ideas that may have
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originally be seen as bad ideas, may in fact be good in the sense that access to them could
inspire better ideas, making these ’bad’ ideas facilitators of creativity.
In Chan, Dang and Dow’s (2016) study they monitored ideation and had expert facilitators
offer inspiration as a method of guiding productivity. Online ideators were offered the
possibility of pressing the ’inspire me’ button should they feel stuck. This study found that in
conditions where experienced facilitators offered inspirations, ideator fluency and creativity
increased. In conditions where novice facilitators offered inspirations to online ideators, they
decreased the overall productivity and creativity. The investigators hypothesised that this
is due to experts knowing how to analyse the train of thought that ideators are currently
following and therefore offering ideas that are relevant and genuinely helpful to overcome
a state of being stuck.
As can be seen from the previous examples, many studies on the methods of supporting
ideation focus on the support of productivity (number of ideas generated) and quality
of ideas, in particular in group ideation. These studies have a strong focus on tangible
artefacts, methods of priming problem solvers before ideation and a subtle use of hints
as a method of offering inspiration and examples during ideation. The following studies
presented are from the more recent HCI literature. Although they focus on increasing
productivity and quality of ideas, they do so by analysing what is hindering the creative
process in an ideation task; in particular on the concept of stuckness, or impasse. These
studies show a move towards a more empirical analysis of how problem solvers think and
whether there are any specific cues that help or hinder ideators.
2.2.2 Flow versus impasse
Much of the research on ideation in Human Computer Interaction looks at methods for sup-
porting both group and individual ideation. In the literature specifically on idea generation
support methods, the idea of stuckness (or impasse) has emerged. Inspired by Csikszentmi-
halyi’s (1997) flow state, the state in which ideas appear rapidly and freely to the ideators,
a state of impasse (e.g. MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle, 2001) is synonymous with
ideators losing their train of thought or having a moment of inability to come up with more
new ideas1. Forming an understanding of what brings on this state of impasse may be
beneficial to aid in the development of ideation support systems. In order to overcome this
phenomenon, a few studies have estimated the occurrence of impasse states in a pragmatic
way, by relying on ideators to self-report when they feel stuck (Chan et al., 2017; Siangliulue
et al., 2015).
1Also referred to as a failure in research by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Nijstad, Stroebe and
Lodewijkx (2003), and Nijstad and Stroebe (2006).
20
Chapter 2. Literature review
In Siangliulue et al. (2015), the authors focus on a key aspect of supporting ideation,
namely when to intervene. Participants were asked to generate ideas for a period of 15
minutes, in which they would enter their ideas electronically into an online form, with a
list of their own ideas populating a window down the side of the screen. The ideation task
was an open-ended task that required no subject knowledge, just imagination: generating
product ideas for a touch sensitive fabric that could render high resolution images and
videos. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions: (1) on-idle condition, in
which the application assumes that a 30 second idle time means the ideator is experiencing
an impasse and offers example solutions; (2) on-demand condition in which the ideator had
the option of pressing a button saying ’inspire me’ in order to receive example solutions; (3)
on-interval condition in which participants saw a new set of examples every 3 minutes; (4)
no examples condition. The investigators found that in the on-demand condition, ideators
generated more novel ideas, but not more ideas overall. Additionally, they found that the
on-idle condition benefited by generating more ideas than in the other conditions. An
interesting speculation is that although on-idle clearly prompted the continued production
of ideas, the ideator was perhaps not stuck but busy formulating new ideas. Indeed, the
threshold of 30 seconds for predicting an impasse might not have been a good threshold.
They compare this to the longest idle times in the on-demand condition, showing that the
first idle times before requesting examples was shorter at the start of the study but exceeded
1 minute later in the study.
In the above study, examples were offered to the ideator as a method of getting past a
cognitive impasse. It has been shown that the use of examples in ideation tasks might
have a negative effect on the ideation process as it might result in fixation on the topic of
the examples and an inability to generate novel ideas (e.g. Agogué et al., 2014; Jansson
and Smith, 1991). Chan et al. (2011) studied this phenomenon in relation to the type of
examples shown and concluded that the problems of fixation could be overcome by present-
ing examples of ideas that are less common. Semantically distant ideas were also shown
to help avoid fixation and promote ideation by analogy, in which ideators use unrelated
objects as a method of forming novel and unusual connections. This study was followed up
in order to find out whether, despite supporting the generation of novel ideas, semantically
distant ideas would hinder the cognitive state in ideation, specifically in relation to impasse
states (Chan et al., 2017). This study takes a step into cognitive theories of thinking, in
particular it looks at that of Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM), a concept we
will review in more detail in the next section. The SIAM model predicts that we generate
ideas within categories, in such a way that we will continue generating ideas until we can
no longer think of any more within that category. That stage is likened to an impasse, in
which we search for a new category to generate ideas within.
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In Chan et al.’s (2017) study, they asked participants to generate ideas electronically for
8 minutes in response to an open-ended question about themed weddings. The task itself
was semi structured, asking them to write a theme and a prop before typing out their idea.
The theme and prop fields were used by their system to perform simple real-time analyses
of the semantic category in which the participant was ideating. Participants were split into
5 different conditions. For the purpose of this thesis we are mostly interested in the two
’match’-’mismatch’ conditions. In both of these conditions, participants received examples
at regular intervals (although, it is not specified what these intervals are in the study).
Additionally, participants were offered the button ’give me inspiration’, as was used in their
earlier study (Siangliulue et al., 2015), in order to request more inspiration on demand.
The experimenters used this method as a way of assuming ideators were in an impasse
state. This impasse state would remain until the participant submitted another idea, in
which the participant was assumed to have re-entered flow state. They report confidence
in this method of estimating impasse states as they had found in their previous study
that participants were able to notice when they were stuck and through self-reporting,
stated that their motivation for pressing the button really was due to feeling stuck. As
an additional measure, the experimenters verified this by running a short study in which
they used brain sensors (functional near-infrared spectroscopy) which uses changes in blood
oxygen concentration to infer brain activity changes.
In the match condition, participants were shown semantically close ideas at intervals (ideas
that were very related to the current ideas being generated) within flow states and seman-
tically far ideas whenever the ideator pressed ’give me inspiration’. It was hypothesised that
this scheme supported ideation in the category the participant was already ideating within
on flow states, and offering new categories to pursue upon impasse states. In the mismatch
condition, participants were shown semantically far ideas when in the flow state and seman-
tically close ideas when in the impasse state. It was hypothesised that the mismatch state
would block productivity in such a way that participants would generate fewer ideas. The
results were consistent with this hypotheses, showing that the mismatch condition blocked
productivity and left ideators asking for inspiration more often. The results however did
not show that providing ideas such as in the match condition has any benefit over a control
condition where no examples were shown.
In this section we reviewed the literature on ideation support systems, in particular in
relation to methods of supporting ideators in both groups and individually. We found that
many ideation support studies focus on the invention of tangible tools. In more recent
years, the concept of ideation and how to support it from a theoretical standpoint have
come into focus. The concept of impasse has emerged from these studies as a hindrance to
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the creative problem solving process. In the next section, we look to the theory of Search
for Ideas in Associative Memory and its link to foraging theories in order to answer the
question of whether ideation might be better informed by theory.
2.3 Relations of ideation with Foraging Theory
In the previous section we looked at ideation support systems and how experimenters in
Engineering, Management and Human Computer Interaction (HCI) have been building tools
to support ideation. We encountered the concepts of flow and impasse as cognitive states
of ideation. A few recent studies in HCI have studied these states; one of these studies
linked the concept of impasses to the Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM).
In this section, we cover this theory in more detail, linking it to foraging theories, and in
particular the rules for patch leaving that have been identified by researchers in Optimal
Foraging Theory and Information Foraging.
There has been some Psychology research in the field of time allocation in problem solving
for a number of years, although this remains quite an understudied phenomenon. The
studies performed look in depth at ways to understand why people choose to switch away
from a particular problem they are working on. Some strategies and theoretical models are
used to explain switching decisions made by foragers in nature. These are often compared
to human external (physical) or internal (cognitive) switching. Reasons for giving up on a
task are explored in the Psychology literature, in particular in terms of highly constrained
tasks where problem solvers work through sub-tasks or steps toward a clearly defined goal.
Many of these models have been tested in laboratory settings and are often validated with
the use of highly specified problem sets and goals. This section aims to look at these
models for abandoning tasks in more detail.
2.3.1 The Search for Ideas in Associative Memory
In associative theory (Mednick, 1962), there are three main ways of coming up with creative
solutions: serendipity, in which mental images (frames) that help form novel ideas appear
almost by chance; similarity, in which seemingly different elements can be associated in
order to formulate new ideas; mediation, in which common elements are used in order to
form new associations for new ideas. It is in the interest of the creative problem solver in
this case to make far associations, for example in the way of analogies, in order to come
up with increasingly more creative solutions.
The concept of similarity as an idea-generator is considerably elaborated in a cognitive
model of idea generation developed by Nijstad and Stroebe (2006): the Search for Ideas
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in Associative Memory (SIAM). This model suggests that ideation tasks are a result of
repeated searches in memory (knowledge activation) in order to generate ideas. SIAM is
used to explain the process followed when generating ideas, similar to, and derived from,
the Search of Associative Memory model (SAM) (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1981) used for
memory retrieval in free recall tasks. In free recall tasks you might expect a person to
be asked to recall as many animals as possible. In a task like this, SAM proposes that
people will group their responses in specific categories, e.g. animals with fur, ears, or 4
legs. Indeed, empirically, people do have a strong tendency to categorise their responses.
The SIAM model proposes that the search for ideas works in a similar way by following a
2-step process:
1. Knowledge activation - images2 are retrieved from long term memory.
2. The features of the retrieved image are used to make associations and generate ideas.
These steps make the assumption that we have two memory systems: long term memory
(in which images are retrieved) and short-term memory (in which images are temporarily
stored and used to make associations). Images are seen as ’knowledge structures’ which
have a central theme, such as ’hotel’, around which associations are made, such as ’lobby’,
’check-in’, etc.
Through a series of studies focusing on individual and group brainstorming, Nijstad and
Stroebe (2006) showed that people really do tend to generate semantically similar ideas in
clusters. In these studies, participants were allowed 20 minutes to generate as many ideas
to a single open ended question (e.g. ”What can people do to preserve the environment?”).
The resulting ideas were coded into multiple categories (for this particular question, a pre-
determined set of categories developed by Diehl (1991)) and performed an Adjusted Ratio
of Clustering (ARC) analysis on the results. Their findings indicate a high, beyond chance,
level of clustering, suggesting a categorical structure to thinking when generating ideas.
Interestingly, this model supports quite a lot of theories across the creativity literature.
Sternberg (1998) states that people do not blindly activate and deactivate frames in their
minds when problem solving in the domain of creativity. Rather, they apply formal (domain
knowledge) and informal (social knowledge) to the frames they activate in such a way
that one idea will lead to another in a ’contagious’ way, where one idea may lead to
another by association. The process of generating ideas in a creative space is likened
to bringing up existing knowledge and trying to form new knowledge structures within
that conceptual space (Koestler, 1964; Boden, 2004). Rietzschel, Nijstad and Stroebe
2Not to be confused with visuals, images are simply themes or topics that can subsequently possess a
number of features or associations.
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(2007) showed through priming participants to specific categories that ideators generate
more ideas within the categories they have been primed to and that a strong within-
category fluency, that is generating ideas within a single category, led to more novel and
unusual ideas. Recall that in associative theory (Mednick, 1962), the three main ways of
generating creative solutions involve forming associations, either by luck, through analogy
with common elements or analogy with similar elements. Although often represented as
being at odds with each other (associative theory states that generating ideas across several
categories yields a greater number of novel ideas, whereas SIAM states that generating ideas
within the same categories leads to stronger formulation of many good ideas) the concept
of making associations with images is common to both theories.
The findings in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx’s (2002) studies indicate that ideas gen-
erated are semantically organised into categories, and that these are temporally clustered
in such a way that the time between ideas within a semantic category is shorter than the
time between categories. They explain this through the concept of failures. As an ideator
reaches a failure, or impasse, the perceived exhaustion of ideas generated from an image
leads the ideator to give up and activate another image from long term memory, in order
to generate more ideas. In a series of papers by the aforementioned authors, a failure is
defined as either the inability to generate any ideas or the inability to generate new ideas
(i.e. thinking of the same ideas repeatedly). The differences in the timings of between
category items and within category items is hypothesised to be the time it takes to activate
a new image. It is therefore not surprising that their findings confirm a higher number of
ideas generated by ideators whose ideas show high levels of clustering.
Although not explicitly discussed in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Nijstad, Stroebe
and Lodewijkx (2003), or Nijstad and Stroebe (2006), the SIAM model and time-course
across ideas when applying this model resembles the concepts of patches and patch leaving
rules described in foraging theory. In the next section, we are going to be covering the
literature on foraging theory, the basic giving up time rules and how these apply to the
SIAM model, as well as how they might be used to better inform the concepts of flow and
impasse.
2.3.2 Foraging Theory
Most of the theoretical work on why agents give up on tasks or switch between tasks is
informed by foraging theory, where patch leaving has been one of the very central constructs.
This section begins by looking at the patch leaving literature, to highlight how foraging
theory and theories surrounding human information foraging have come about.
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Figure 2-1: Marginal value theorem (adapted from Charnov et al. (1976))
(Wilke et al., 2009)
Information foraging literature from Behavioural Sciences makes an analogy between human
and animal foraging behaviour (Wilke et al., 2009; Hills, Jones and Todd, 2012). Patches
in nature have limited, and varied, resources. As foraging animals search for resources in
a patch, they must decide on the optimal time to leave for another patch, in order to
maintain a high overall level of gain and rate of gain. There is a trade-off in this decision:
at what time does it become more valuable to switch to a new source (patch) rather than
stay and continue foraging in the current patch, keeping in mind the fact that there will
be a travel time (a cost) to the next patch. To make an analogy to human (external)
information foraging: when we look for information (the resource), we will look in a range
of patches, such as physical files, electronic filing systems, search online, ask someone,
etc. Variable amounts of information can be found in each of these patches and switching
between them can take time. The information seeker, as with the foraging animal, must
therefore determine when the value of switching to a new source is higher than trying to
find more information at the current source (Pirolli and Card, 1999; Sandstrom, 1994).
When determining what strategy animal foragers use, an often-mentioned strategy is Charnov
et al.’s (1976) Marginal Value Theorem (MVT). This optimal foraging theory states that
when the momentary (or marginal) rate of return of a resource at the current patch is
equal to the mean return rate for all foraging patches met so far, the patch should be left
in search of another unexplored patch. The rate of return and the time it takes to travel
to the next patch dictates the optimal time to leave the current patch (see figure 2-1).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2-2: Pattern of simplistic patch leaving behaviour theories. (a) Fixed-
Number rule (b) Fixed-Time rule. A vertical jump on both graphs indicate an
item found. The patch is left at the threshold time or threshold number of
items found (denoted by the red line), regardless of patch potential.
Unfortunately, Charnov et al.’s (1976) MVT presents a limitation: current, instantaneous
rate of return must be tracked in addition to the average rate of return so far across all
patches. The theorem is successful empirically but is better thought of as a theory of
what animals are computing than of how they are computing it. It seems implausible that
animals employ this level of cognitive capacities during a simple foraging task. To this
effect, behavioural biologists have come up with a range of simplistic heuristic theories
about how animals behave, which might approximate the marginal value theorem, given
certain assumptions about the nature and distribution of patches. These heuristics have
influenced work on human giving-up rules and are therefore briefly reviewed here.
Simple foraging heuristics
The simplest giving-up heuristics include fixed-number and fixed-time strategies (Iwasa,
Higashi and Yamamura, 1981; Stephens and Krebs, 1986) (see figure 2-2). In the fixed-
number strategy, animals will leave a patch regardless of its quality (number of resources
available) after a predetermined number of resources have been found. In the fixed-time
strategy, animals will leave a patch after a predetermined time has passed. These rules
have very low cognitive demands but suffer from being insensitive to the actual number
of resources on a patch; nevertheless they might be effective in certain environments, for
example when all patches have very similar diminishing returns gain curves that an animal
knows in advance.
More complex rules, using number of items encountered as the information cue are the
incremental or decremental rules (Waage, 1979). In the incremental rule (see figure 2-3b),
the tendency to stay on a patch is a function of the time taken to successfully find a
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(a) (b)
Figure 2-3: Time pattern of patch leaving behaviour theories using items as an
indicator of tendency to stay on patch. (a) Decremental rule (b) incremental
rule. A vertical jump (upwards in incremental rule, downwards in decremental
rule) indicate an item found.
resource. As a resource is found, the tendency to stay increases a small amount. As the
time between successful finds increases, theoretically due to the number of resources left
on the patch, the animal eventually gives up and moves to another patch. Similarly, the
decremental rule is dependent on the time taken to successfully find a resource (see figure
2-3a), however inversely dependent on resources found. Every resource found decreases the
tendency to stay on the patch; whilst a logical rule, this does not take into account the
variation of patches. In the decremental rule, a highly abundant patch might be left before
it has been fully foraged.
Adaptive foraging heuristics
The aforementioned rules suffer the problem of being too simplistic, especially when thinking
about patches that may vary in potential gain. In both human and animal foraging, the
potential (or quality) of a patch is often unknown and variable, leaving the simple heuristics
to fall short as suitable patch leaving rules.
More adaptive heuristics, best used in situations where the quality of a patch is unknown
or variable, are Green’s rule (Green, 1984) and giving-up time rules (Stephens and Krebs,
1986). Green’s rule states that animals may be estimating the potential of a patch by
increasing their perception of the potential every time a resource is successfully found (see
figure 2-4b). The potential decreases as a function of time and successfully finding an
item results in a vertical jump in potential estimation. If no item is found for a while, the
patch potential estimation will continue to drop as a function of time until it drops below a
pre-set threshold, after which the patch is abandoned. As such, Green’s rule predicts that
foragers will have longer visit times at richer patches. In Green’s rule the length of a visit
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is determined by V = T + IG where:
V = visit time at a patch,
T = minimum visit time (e.g. if no items are found),
I = number of items found during the visit,
G = gain in visit time for each item found.
Conversely, giving-up time is the time between the last resource found and the decision to
give up. A prior threshold of patience in terms of time is set for the patch. The number
of successful items found does not have an effect on this, nor does the total time on the
patch. This heuristic relies solely on the time taken since the last successful item found. If
this time increases beyond a set threshold, then the patch is abandoned.
As animal foraging has been likened to external information foraging by humans, external
human foraging has often been likened to that of human internal foraging (e.g. Wilke et al.,
2009; Hills, Jones and Todd, 2012; Payne, Duggan and Neth, 2007). The distinction made
here is that human external foraging follows the same rules as animal foraging, where
patches of resources are external to the forager and they physically have to move between
the patches. Internal foraging relates to free recall, where a problem solver searches their
working memory or long-term memory for information stored. Again, it is interesting to
find that there is no explicit comparison of SIAM to the theories of foraging. However,
looking at the categorical generation of ideas from patch-like images, it is easy to assume
that foraging theories might be applied as a method of understanding ideation tasks. In
particular, we suggest here that flow can be seen as successful patch foraging whereas
impasse can be likened to running out of resources and moving to another patch.
(a) (b)
Figure 2-4: Time pattern of patch leaving behaviour theories (a) giving-up
time rule and (b) Green’s rule. A vertical jump on both graphs indicate an
item found.
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The next section gives an overview of a few studies comparing internal and external foraging
rules. These studies introduce slight modifications to the rules reviewed above as a result
of comparing these rules to the behaviour of problem solvers in tasks such as anagram
tasks, showing that these theories are as valid for internal information foraging as they are
for external foraging.
2.3.3 Internal memory search and giving-up rules
Much of the research looking at internal memory search and giving-up times (e.g. Dougherty
and Harbison, 2007; Harbison et al., 2009; Payne, Duggan and Neth, 2007), refers to
foraging theory to try to explain the same phenomenon: when given the choice, what
makes people stop trying to complete a task or sub-tasks or retrieve information from
memory (internal search) and what factors affect problem solvers decision to abandon one
task in favour of another.
Wilke et al. (2009) ran a series of studies to show the difference in task abandonment
between external (physical) and internal (cognitive) searches. They specifically looked for
the use of any of the foraging heuristics as indicators of the patch leaving rules people use
when abandoning tasks, and whether these rules were different in the two different tasks.
Their first task included an external (electronic) physical search; finding fish in a pond.
This was set up in a virtual landscape with fish appearing at random intervals. When
moving from one pond to the next, extra time was added to mimic the time taken to walk
from one pond to the other, also known as a switch cost. Their second comparison study
included an internal search task, presenting problem solvers with a basic anagram task, a
task in which participants have to form as many words as possible from a string of letters.
An important observation they made was that when performing the external search, there
was a tendency to switch immediately after an item was found, thus the giving-up times
were very low. This suggested that in the external task, the principle of ’just one more’
was applied, a form of sub-goal completion if you will. Surprisingly, they did not find this
in internal searches; these offered much longer giving-up times and rather than switching
upon finding a word, problem solvers switched after long idle times. They speculate that
this could be due to an internal finding potentially giving rise to more ’ideas’ and therefore
an aversion to make an immediate switch. In contrast, they speculate that an external
forager may be aware that they are close to depleting the patch and therefore doesn’t want
to waste any more time.
Dougherty and Harbison (2007) looked at internal search in a free recall word memorisation
task in detail to explain what they call exit latency i.e. the time the participant was willing to
keep trying to retrieve words from memory after their last successful retrieval before giving
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up. In foraging theory this term is better known as giving-up time. The study showed
that for more difficult lists of low-frequency words, the decisiveness scores (an individual
difference measured by a questionnaire) and exit latency were correlated; that is, higher
decisiveness meant a decrease in exit latency. They propose that exit latency is a product
of the motivation of the person performing the task and the difficulty of the task. They
relate their findings to a more classic stopping rule theory by Anderson and Milson (1989)
called the PG-C model. The PG-C model incorporates P, the probability that another item
will be retrieved; G, the gain or value associated with retrieving this new item and C, the
cost of finding this item. Following this model, a person is able to make a prediction on
whether it is worth continuing to search for more items; as PG-C approaches zero, that is,
the cost of finding a new item increases and the probability and gain of finding a new item
decrease, this may act as a mental cue for the person to abandon their search and thus the
task. In a follow up study by Harbison et al. (2009), they showed that the number of items
retrieved in an internal memory search had an increasing effect on time spent on a task and
a decreasing effect on the exit latency. Whilst it seems self-evident that more items result
in increased time spent on a problem, it is interesting to see that more items found leads
to the perception that the probability of finding more items is lowered, thus the patience
threshold after the final item retrieved is lowered too.
An interesting observation in task abandonment is this concept of sub-goal completion. In
a study by Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007), participants were given two anagram tasks
varying in difficulty (easy and hard), and asked to make their own judgement on when
to switch between these tasks. The experimenters were interested in understanding the
underlying strategies that guide the decision to switch away from a task, and whether
these could be attributed to any or multiple of the foraging giving-up heuristics. The
experimenters found that more time was allocated to the easy task than to the hard task.
Whilst this finding shows adaptive allocation of time across the tasks, it also rules out
the two simplest foraging rules: a simple fixed-time rule would have resulted in the same
amount of time being spent on both tasks; the simple fixed-number rule would have resulted
in more time being spent on the hard, less productive task, in order to be able to generate
the same amount of items as in the easy task. The experimenters further observed that
giving-up times were longer for the more difficult task and that some between-item times
were longer than the giving-up times. These findings rule out the use of a simple giving-up
time heuristic. A much better fit to participants’ patch-leaving decisions was offered by
Green’s rule, which essentially computes (in a way that makes few demands on working
memory) the rate of gain since a patch was entered (since a task was started) and quits
when this rate falls below a threshold.
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Analysing the giving-up times more closely, Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) found that
quite a high number of task switches took place immediately after a word was found,
behaviour which Green’s rule allows, but not to the extent that it was observed in the
data. They attributed this behaviour to sub-goal completion, modelling task abandonment
behaviour on this task by extending Green’s rule to include the probability that a switch
would be made upon sub-goal completion. In summary, they found that giving-up decisions
were best thought of as having two probabilistic causes acting in concert: a rate-based
decision, in which quitting happened when rate of gain fell below some threshold (V =
T+IG), and a success-based decision, in which quitting might happen immediately (though
with low probability) after any local success.
Recall from section 2.1.1 that problem solving tasks such as anagram tasks differ from
ideation. Indeed, you would expect these to follow the same pattern as an ideation task
as they draw on a combination of image activation and association, as well as offering an
accumulative solution space. However, they differ from ideation as both the process and
goal is more specified, e.g. generate words from these letters in an anagram task will have
a distinctly correct set of responses, immediately perceived by the problem solver.
As a summary, our interest in the topics of foraging theories lie in trying to understand the
underlying processes that take place during an ideation task, specifically in relation to the
decision to switch to a new patch in semantic memory in a single ideation task, as well as
the decision to switch from question to question in sequential ideation tasks.
2.4 Metrics and Measurements in Ideation Support Systems
The measurement of quality varies and researchers in this area often come up with their own
metrics or suggest new ways of interpreting the metrics (Dean et al., 2006). Historically,
in creativity tasks, the quality of ideas is thought of as the quality of the entire set of
ideas generated within an ideation task, rather than individual ideas, in such a way that the
quality assesses the creativity of the person who generated the ideas. In Guilford’s (1967)
alternative uses tasks, the entire idea-set is scored on four components to judge the level
of creative divergent thinking of the ideator: originality, fluency, flexibility and elaboration.
Each component has a strong associated scale, such that there is little ambiguity when it
comes to rating these. Originality is rated by comparison to all people who gave the test,
and responses given by only 5% or 1% of people are scored points. Fluency is simply the
total number of responses. Flexibility depends on categorisation of the ideas, such that, if
alternative uses for a newspaper were to ’wear it as a top’ and ’wear it as a dress’, these
would fall in the same category. The total number of categories is counted and used in
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the measurement of creativity. Finally, elaboration is scored, giving ’clothing’ 0 points and
’a hat you can wear on your head when it is raining’ 2 points for elaboration of type of
clothing and detail about the circumstances.
In both Torrance (1962) and Guilford’s (1967) tests, the metrics are used as a method of
judging creativity only. This method is however not applicable in all settings. In design
studies and in ideas generated in order to reach a certain goal state in an organisational
setting, the quality of ideas takes on a different meaning. Novelty is desirable but feasibility
and usefulness play a big part in the overall quality and suitability of the idea (e.g. Briggs
and Reinig, 2010; Reinig, Briggs and Nunamaker, 2007; Howard-Jones and Murray, 2003).
Additionally, in organisations specifically, the number of ideas generated is often irrelevant,
only the quality of the ideas themselves. This is due to the fact that the purpose of ideation
in these settings is to generate ideas towards the inherent goals of the organisation and
therefore management are not interested in sub-par ideas but ideas that are actually going to
benefit the company and put them in a strategically competitive position. Bounded ideation
theory challenges the notion set forward by Osborn (1957), that the quantity of ideas
increases the quality of ideas. Instead, bounded ideation theory proposes a model in which
the ratio of good ideas to total ideas depends on a variety of factors such as understanding of
the task, goal congruence, ability of the ideator and openness of the solution space, as well
as the cognitive state of the ideator (mental exhaustion and attentional resources). Reinig,
Briggs and Nunamaker (2007) fully change the metrics in order to judge ideas individually
rather than as a set. They consider instead the economical, technical and political feasibility
to the responses for the question ’What can be done to resolve the problems of the school
of business?’ on a scale of 1-4.
In the majority of the studies we previously reviewed in relation to ideation, experimenters
hire two independent coders to rate ideas on a variety of scales (5, 7, and 10-point scales
are common) (Ye and Robert Jr, 2017; Shah, Smith and Vargas-Hernandez, 2003; Dennis
et al., 1999; De Dreu, Baas and Nijstad, 2008; Diehl and Stroebe, 1987). They do this in
order to generate two sets of independent scores, that can be compared to verify that the
coders agree on these scores. The independent coders will usually rate novelty and value
metrics, whilst the experimenter can simply count the number of ideas to get the fluency
metric. In each of these studies, they make use of one to three quality metrics only, from
the following list of most common measures of quality of ideas:
• Novelty3: how original and surprising an idea is
3Note the split between P-novel (never been thought of by the person before) vs. H-novel (never been
thought of by anyone before) - (Boden, 2004)
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• Value: how useful and practical the idea is, whether it makes sense as a solution to
the problem
• Fluency: how many ideas are generated, also called productivity in a few studies
• Elaboration/Specificity: how well formulated is the idea
Quality can further be used to estimate the quality of the whole set of ideas. Whilst mean
quality (of all ideas generated by a single person) might seem a plausible way of measuring
ideation quality, this does not work as it does not take into account the amount of ideas
generated. If one person has come up with one great idea and another has 4 great but
one bad, the first person will have a higher mean quality rating. The quality of good ideas
paradigm tries to overcome this issue by adding up the quality of ideas that have a quality
rating of (median point of their scale) 3 or more. This aims to reward all ideators for good
ideas and not bad (Diehl and Stroebe, 1987; Dennis et al., 1999).
The concept of generating a composite quality score has been criticised by Shah, Smith
and Vargas-Hernandez (2003) as being nonsensical. The novelty of an idea and the value
of an idea are not measured on a similar scale - it might therefore be more advantageous
to look at the relationship between novelty and variety in a set of ideas rather than build a
composite score of those two metrics. For the work done in this thesis, we make use of the
metrics novelty and value as methods of measuring ideation quality, due to their popularity
as measurements of this in the ideation literature.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we reviewed the literature on ideation, situating ideation tasks in the space
of creative problem solving tasks that are usually ill-defined and loosely constrained (at
least in the HCI literature on this topic). This topic has been identified as being an
important challenge as we perform creative ideation tasks in our everyday lives. In particular,
organisations have identified the need for creative problem solving as a way of gaining
competitive advantage. Ideation makes use of convergent and divergent thinking, activating
frames and making associations in order to generate novel ways of solving a problem. As
a popular method of ideation, if not the most popular, we looked at brainstorming and
studies involving individual electronic brainstorming.
In recent years, literature on understanding the cognitive processes that take place during
ideation has started looking to the concept of impasse in order to develop novel mechanisms
in which we can assist ideators, and support them through the feeling of being stuck. These
studies relate the feeling of being stuck to the exhaustion of an image or category in semantic
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memory from which ideators generate their ideas. Surprisingly, none of the studies explicitly
liken these cognitive processes to foraging theory. The notion that people search for ideas
in semantic memory and choose to retrieve a new image in long term memory when they
run out of ideas seems almost intuitively related to the concept of patch foraging and the
decision to switch patches when potential decreases. These internal search patterns form
the basis of our first study, where we try to replicate SIAM’s main model of thinking:
that people generate ideas within categories, and that production of ideas within categories
occurs at a faster rate than between categories.
Finally, we reviewed the methods of judging the quality of ideas, including the methodology
and metrics used in such an analysis. We make use of these methods in our second study,
in which we attempt to explain the time-pattern of switching between tasks through the
variation in quality of ideas generated. We make use of these methods again in our third
study, in which we perform a simple manipulation on ideation prompting in order to see
whether there are any effects on the agreement scores between coders for quality ratings
and category scoring.
In the next chapter we present our first study, based on the study developed by Nijstad,
Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002). We perform this study as an exploratory approach to
understanding the concept of impasse, as a function of switching between categories (SIAM
model), and if there are any ways we can account for the occurrence of impasse states using
any of the foraging theories.
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Time-course of single ideation tasks
This chapter focuses on the time it takes to come up with ideas on a single problem
or task, and whether any patterns can be found in the time-course of coming up with
ideas. The studies presented in this chapter attempt to replicate the findings of Nijstad
and Stroebe (2006), suggesting that idea generation relies on associative semantic memory
through showing a clear category structure of ideas, with the goal to find a link between
the concepts of flow and impasse, Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM) and
the notion that the search for ideas can be likened to that of external foraging for ideas.
Looking for patterns in the time taken to generate ideas, and specifically the time between
groups of related ideas compared with time within groups of related ideas, may help us
understand whether people generating ideas are applying foraging theory-like stopping rules
on a per-category basis.
In the following section we briefly revisit the relevant theories in literature that are reviewed
in Chapter 2 and which motivate this study.
3.1 Chapter background
An important idea in the HCI literature on ideation support is the notion that we can
support ideator productivity, especially in light of the fact that ideation is often a timebound
process. A recognised hindrance to productivity is when ideators are stuck or suffering from
an impasse. Impasses are commonly defined in contrast to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1997) flow
state, the state in which ideas appear rapidly and freely to the ideators. A state of impasse
is synonymous with ideators losing their train of thought or having a moment of inability
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to come up with more new ideas1. Forming an understanding of what brings on this state
of impasse may be beneficial to aid in the development of ideation support systems.
In the literature, we find studies have been run in which researchers attempt to measure
or identify the occurrence of impasse states in a variety of ways, e.g. brain sensor data
(fMRI), where changes in blood oxygen concentration indicate changes in brain activity
(Chan et al., 2017); eye tracking, where long fixations with no saccades are taken to mean
an impasse (Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney, 2001). Whilst these methods have been shown
to be somewhat accurate, they are not always practical to use in situations where ideation
takes place outside a lab setting. Chan et al. (2017) (and Siangliulue et al. (2015)) use a
pragmatic approach in which they rely on ideators to self-report an impasse by clicking a
button saying ”Give me other inspirations”.
An alternative to such self-reporting is perhaps to simply use time between ideas as a
continuous proxy for impasse states. Indeed, in Siangliulue et al. (2015), the offer of ideas
after 30 seconds of idle time increases the number of ideas generated (in this case, their
measure of success). They highlight though that an analysis of idle times showed that
these were shorter at the start at the study and longer later in the study. The threshold
for idle times in the on-demand condition increased towards the end of the study as well,
an indicator that they were slowing down in the generation of ideas.
In the present study, we intend to measure these between idea times and verify whether
they’re a proxy for impasse states. In order to achieve this, we will be looking at the ideas
generated by individuals over a fixed period of time. Throughout the studies in this thesis,
we record the time-stamps of the start and end of each idea generated by the ideator
participants. This is recorded in order to capture the time between the submission of one
idea and the start of the next (thinking times) and the time it takes the ideator to type
an idea (typing times). The sum of these two timings give us the overall formulation time
of a single idea, also known as response latency (a term used by Nijstad, Stroebe and
Lodewijkx (2002)). Instead of asking whether ideators are in a flow or impasse state, we
look for aspects of ideation behaviour that are associated with longer or shorter thinking
and typing times.
The work presented in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) (and subsequently Nijstad,
Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003) and Nijstad and Stroebe (2006)) presents us with an organ-
ising principle which predicts the time-course of ideation, namely categorical structure. As
reviewed in the literature, their theory of the cognitive model of idea generation called SIAM
1Also referred to as a failure in research by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Nijstad, Stroebe and
Lodewijkx (2003), and Nijstad and Stroebe (2006).
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(Search for Ideas in Associative Memory) resembles that of Search of Associative Memory
(SAM) (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1981) used to model memory retrieval in free recall tasks.
It presents a cognitive model used to explain the process followed when generating ideas,
suggesting that ideas are a result of repeated searches in memory (knowledge activation)
in order to generate ideas. Much like SAM, SIAM makes use of the notion that search
in memory consists of two stages: (1) Knowledge activation - images are retrieved from
long-term memory; (2) The features of the retrieved image are used to make associations
and generate ideas.
SIAM resembles information foraging in the sense that each image brought up in memory
can be likened to a patch. The perceived exhaustion of ideas generated from an image
leads the ideator to give up and activate another image from long-term memory, in order to
generate more ideas. The findings from Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) show that
ideas generated are semantically organised and that these are further temporally clustered,
such that ideation times within a cluster are faster than between clusters. If a categorical
pattern is to be observed during an ideation task, we might suppose that we are able to
gain a stronger understanding of flow of ideation and understand the time management
strategies associated with moving to another image in memory.
As already noted, this general approach is similar but somewhat distinct from the foraging
theory approaches reviewed in Chapter 2. For example, if people choose to move on from a
category of ideas then, according to the threshold in giving-up time models of thinking, this
is clearly related to the concept of impasse-driven switching. However, if instead ideators’
switch decisions are governed by a heuristic such as Green’s rule, which is sensitive to the
rate at which ideas are being generated, then the suggestion is that performance is more
continuously monitored, and discrete states of flow and impasse might be a too simplistic
way of modelling cognitive states during ideation. Whether either of these theories are
correct, foraging theory offers a more refined set of stopping heuristics, and allows us to
make connections and compare with time-management phenomena in very different tasks,
such as accomplishment tasks. For this reason our analysis will include foraging theory’s
heuristics.
In this chapter, we will be replicating the study found in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx
(2002) (and subsequently Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003) and Nijstad and Stroebe
(2006)), hoping to replicate the results found in their individual2 ideator condition - that
is, temporally and semantically clustered ideas generated by an individual. In the afore-
mentioned studies, participants are asked to generate a list of written ideas to respond
2Note that the research in these papers is mostly concerned with group performance. That said, their
studies compare to an individual ideator control condition.
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to an open-ended question. From the point of view of the research in this thesis, this is
an exploratory study, designed to provide empirical data that is aimed to help further our
understanding of the time-course of idea generation in a single question task. The study
is grounded in the literature on SIAM with specific interest in the semantic and temporal
clustering of ideas. Finding a categorical structure in a set of generated ideas would suggest
that ideation tasks do indeed follow the patch-sequence structure of information foraging
theories, often applied to more rote tasks in the literature (RO1). Furthermore, temporal
clustering of idea categories may help us understand the cognitive state of a person as they
are generating ideas, in particular as they slow down and eventually switch to another patch
in memory (RO2).
It is conceivable that as an ideator exhausts the number of ideas they’re able to generate
based on an image in memory, they will employ a switching strategy to switch to another
image in memory. Likely strategies have been covered in detail in the literature survey
and include adaptive rules such as Green’s rule (Green, 1984) or simply fixed-time or fixed-
number rules (Iwasa, Higashi and Yamamura, 1981). These will be studied in more detail
in Chapter 4.
Looking at the timestamps of submitted ideas in a single question ideation task allows us
to ask questions about whether any of these patch-leaving heuristics are being used, but
only in a limited way. One particular difficulty is that the time interval at category switches
cannot be divided: the giving-up time can’t be separated from the time to generate the
next item. A further problem (to anticipate some of our results) is that category boundaries
are likely to be much less distinct to the analyst.
As an addition to the original study by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), we measure
thinking and typing times. In the original study, the experimenters measured solely the
time taken for each idea (response latencies). The typing time for an idea should not
vary according to the categorical structure of idea-generation (or indeed according to any
other cognitive process of ideation), unless ideators continue to formulate an idea after
having begun to type it, indeed we perform this split in the knowledge that this might be
the case, and understand that this might be a fairly crude estimation of thinking time.
However, should we find that typing time does not vary according to categorical structure,
we might also find that separating response latencies into thinking times and typing times
may increase the sensitivity of our analyses. We predict that longer thinking times will arise
when giving up on an image in memory and moving to another.
The rest of this chapter is divided into four parts. The initial study was run with ideators
individually performing a single question ideation task by typing out as many solutions as
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possible to answer the question ”What can the individual do to preserve the environment?”
for 15 minutes.
The ideas generated in response to the initial (environment) question in this study were
analysed and coded by independent coders to find semantic and temporal clustering of
ideas. Analysis of the data for the initial study proved difficult, therefore in the second part
of this chapter, the study-design was repeated using a different question, ”What should a
person do in order to maintain or improve their health?” in order to rule out the possibility
of question-specific problems. Analysis of the data for the second (health) question study
revealed similar issues, indicating the method itself may have limitations in its applicability.
These issues seem to be in relation to the accepted sets of categories used, despite the fact
that these sets have been used successfully in other studies. This will be discussed further
in the chapter summary.
In the third part we combine the results of both studies and perform a follow-up analysis of
the semantic difference between adjacent ideas in the idea sets. This analysis removes the
need for pre-determined categories, and supports a shift from the assumed discrete states
of flow and stuckness, in keeping with the continuous-monitoring aspects of some foraging
theory stopping rules.
The fourth part is a summary of the chapter. We highlight the issues in coding with
semantic categories and show how a focus on the semantic differences between adjacent
pairs of ideas might allow the semantic structuring of ideation performance to more reliably
be analysed.
3.2 Study 1a: Ideation cued by an environment question
In this section, a study is presented in which we attempt to replicate the findings of Nijstad,
Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002). The task used is an open-ended question designed to elicit
a range of ideas from participants in a variety of areas. The task does not require any




A laboratory experiment was conducted. This followed a similar paradigm to that used by
Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002, 2003); Nijstad and Stroebe (2006): each participant
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was given a single ideation task to complete within 15 minutes3 and asked to list as many
ideas as they could that would serve to solve the particular problem given. Participants were
given the same question as in one of the tasks listed in the Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx
(2002) paper:
Ideation task: ”What can the individual do to preserve the environment?”
This question was chosen as it offers a reference point for comparing our data to, as well as
pre-determined list of possible categories, developed by Diehl (1991), consisting of a matrix
of goals and means that can be combined to form categories in which to code ideas. For
the environment question, the pre-determined category system consists of 10 goals (e.g.
reduce water pollution, protect climate and atmosphere) and 5 means (e.g. consumption,
production). In order to determine whether semantic clustering of ideas is occurring, we
will be calculating the Adjusted Ratio of Clustering (ARC) scores for each of the datasets.
This will be discussed further in the analysis section. The study itself aligns closely with
Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) as does the initial part of the analysis. Whilst
Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) did indeed measure timings of consecutive ideas
that fell within a category, and the timings between category groups, they did so with the
intention of showing that categorisation of ideas had an effect solely on response latencies.
A variation we apply to this study is to further analyse whether thinking times (prior to
actually typing - or formulating - the idea) is affected by any possible category switches.
We explore this to see if there is any evidence to suggest impasse states happen during
long thinking (idle) times and whether these correspond with category switches, as per the
SIAM theory as well as foraging theories.
As we are looking to replicate the results from Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), we
will test the same main hypotheses as stated in their studies. Note that Hypothesis 2 is
adapted to reflect our split of response latency into thinking and typing times:
H1 : Semantic clustering is occurring at a higher than chance level.
H2 : Thinking times between semantically related ideas is shorter than that
between semantically unrelated ideas.
H3 : Because categorical structure is an effective generative device, clustering is
positively correlated with the number of ideas generated (overall fluency).
3Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) gave participants 20 minutes. Note that this is a recognised
design flaw in the present study. Diehl and Stroebe (1991) found that in both group and individual ideation
sessions, the length of the session had no effect on productivity levels. That said, we will cover this topic
further in our final Chapter: Discussion, conclusions and implications.
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Participants
Twelve participants (4 female), age range from 24 to 31 (M=27.42, SD=2.40), were re-
cruited from around the University of Bath, consisting of undergraduate and postgraduate
students as well as university staff. Participants were recruited from a variety of disciplines
although predominantly from the department of Computer Science. All participants were
inexperienced ideators, that is, none of the participants performed ideation for a living, nor
were they previously trained in ideation methods. Whilst the majority of these participants
work in Human Computer Interaction, an often design-oriented field, none of the partici-
pants in this study were considered professional designers. No further profiling constraints
were applied to recruitment for this study, due to the difficulty in finding volunteer par-
ticipants. Participants were recruited by word of mouth and mailing lists. No reward was
given for their participation.
Two participants’ data were excluded as they failed to follow instruction. One participant
did not write a list of ideas but a long stream of consciousness; the other generated a total
of 4 ideas and showed no sign of activity after the 9-minute mark. Whilst these types of
data are interesting in themselves, they did not adhere to the instructions and we were
therefore not able to apply the same types of analysis as performed on the remaining 10
participants’ data.
Materials
An application was specifically designed for this study using Visual Studio 2015. The
application interface is illustrated in Figure 3-1. It consists of three screens. The first
screen (figure 3-1a) takes the participant number as an input and uses this to set up a data
file that captures user input. The second screen (figure 3-1b) consists of a simple input
form with a submit button. To submit an idea, participants can either click submit or press
enter. Both are included to allow participants to select the method they are most familiar
with - this should not be a distraction from the ideation task. Above the input form is a
large empty text box. Each time the user submits an idea, this is displayed in the large text
box. As many ideas are expected, the text box is set to scroll to allow users to scroll up to
see all the ideas they’ve submitted. Once ideas are submitted, they cannot be edited.
The input form automatically shuts down after 15 minutes, taking the participant to the
third screen (figure 3-1c), which thanks the participant for their time and ends the ideation
part of the study. The participant also has the possibility of ending the experiment early
themselves by pressing the ”end ideation” button in the bottom right hand corner of the
screen. Data is captured by the environment automatically. Ideas entered as well as
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timestamps for the start of an idea and timestamps for when users press enter are captured
in an excel file. This allows the calculation of the time participants take to think between
ideas entered.
The software was run on a Lenovo Yoga 710-14ISK laptop running Windows 10. To ease
input, a 22” screen, wired mouse and keyboard were attached to the laptop.
Procedure
Each participant attended the study individually. They were led into a quiet room situated
in the University of Bath Computer Science Department. The room itself had no obvious
distractions or décor that could act as a primer for ideas. Participants were handed an
information sheet to read and could ask any question of the experimenter before starting the
study (see appendix A.1 and A.2 for exact wording on information sheet and instructions).
They were then explicitly instructed to generate ideas for 15 minutes according to a modified
version of Osborn’s (1957) brainstorming rules:
1. To generate many ideas
2. To avoid judging their own ideas
3. To generate ’wild’ ideas
4. And to formulate their ideas beyond just a single word
Participants were asked to expand their ideas to incorporate specific behaviours; e.g. instead
of saying ”manage electricity”, they were asked to indicate how they propose you could do
so, e.g. ”don’t overfill a kettle if you are only making a single cup of tea”. Additionally,
they were welcomed to submit the same idea multiple times if they felt they had a better
way of expressing it after submitting it. These instructions were included on the information
sheet, which was placed on the table next to the participant should they wish to review
these instructions. Once consent forms had been signed, participants were situated in front
of the computer and asked to respond to a 3-minute practice task (”How can the number
of tourists visiting the city of Bath be increased?”) in order to familiarise themselves with
the ideation environment. Once participants felt comfortable with the environment, they
were provided with the main ideation task and given 15 minutes to type as many ideas as
they could think of. Whilst participants were aware of the 15-minute time constraint, no
clock was visible, so as to avoid distraction.
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(a) Participant entry screen
(b) Ideation screen
(c) End of experiment screen
Figure 3-1: Developed app for environment question study 1a. (a) Takes in
participant number, (b) is the main ideation screen, showing an input area, a
list of previously entered ideas and the question itself, (c) end of experiment
screen appears automatically after 15 minutes, ending the ideation task.
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Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) developed a short questionnaire, in order to gauge
the ideators self-awareness of failures (impasses). They found that the responses correlated
with overall fluency (number of ideas generated). In line with our goal to replicate their
results, once the ideation task was complete, participants were given this short questionnaire
asking them to rate the following on a scale from 1-10:
• ”How difficult was it to keep on generating ideas?”
• ”How often were you unable to generate ideas?”
• ”How often did an idea you previously generated occur to you again?”
At the end of the study, the participant was debriefed and thanked for their time.
3.2.2 General analytic approach
264 ideas were generated in total by ten participants. No duplicates were found; however,
4 ideas were determined as being afterthoughts to the prior idea rather than ideas in
themselves. These compound ideas were disaggregated into single unique ideas, resulting
in a total of 260 ideas generated by the ten participants (M=26, SD=7.58). Note that
combining these also meant the first key stroke of the original idea was noted as the start
of typing time and the final enter-press of the afterthought was noted as the end of the
typing time.
All 260 ideas were coded by two independent coders4. The independent coders were selected
as they were external to the process and were therefore not familiar with the goals of the
research. The coders were both male, aged 28 and 33 and were graduate students at the
University of Bath in Mechanical Engineering and Computer Science. The coders were
volunteers and received no payment for their participation. Although both coders were
familiar with other methods of analysis, neither coder had experience in coding this type
of data before. Consequently, prior to coding the full datasets, each of the coders received
the following instructions:
They were instructed to classify each idea in a category using the means by goal matrix
developed by Diehl (1991). For the environment question, this consisted of 10 goals and 5
means: 50 categories in total (see table 3.1). These goals and means function as a matrix
of categories, such that when classifying an idea, the coder will match one goal and one
means to create a composite category consisting of a 3-digit code. The idea ”campaign for
an organisation that saves whales” would be Goal 10 and Mean 5 = category 105. Coders
4Note that this coding was originally trialled by the experimenters - however, concern was raised about
possible bias due to familiarity with study hypotheses. It was therefore decided to recruit external coders,
blind to the study hypotheses. This will be discussed further in the conclusion of this chapter.
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were asked to enter the codes into three separate columns in a spreadsheet of ideas; the first
being the goal, the second column the mean and the third column any notes or additional
goals/means they felt an idea could fall into.
Each independent coder was sent the data and the means by goal matrix. They individually
coded 15 ideas each across 2-3 datasets of their choice and then met with the experimenter
to talk through each of the scores. This gave the coder an opportunity to discuss their
reasoning and raise any concerns they might have about the coding. Once the coders had
shown full understanding of the meaning of each of the goals and means in the matrix,
they were asked to categorise the remaining ideas themselves. Coders were not informed of
the study hypotheses upon completion of the coding. This was to ensure that they would
remain suitable candidates for coding possible future datasets.
Means: Goals:
01 Reduce waste 1 Consumption
02 Reduce chemical or toxic substances 2 Production
03 Reduce water pollution 3 Treatment of Waste
04 Reduce air pollution 4 Information
05 Reduce pollution of soil 5 Organization and action
06 Protect climate and atmosphere
07 Reduce use of natural resources
08 Reduce energy use and promote green energy
09 Protect landscape
10 Protect animals and plants
Table 3.1: Category matrix for environment question consisting of 10 means
and 5 goals.
The terms fluency and productivity will be used interchangeably to refer to the total number
of ideas generated by a participant. The diversity (number of categories a participant
covered in their responses) and Adjusted Ratio of Clustering (ARC) were calculated in line
with Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002). The Adjusted Ratio of Clustering (Roenker,
Thompson and Brown, 1971) is an index used to show the occurrence of clustering in a
data set. In ARC scores, chance clustering is shown by zero and perfect clustering is 1.
Note that negative scores are possible and mean a ’less than chance’ level of clustering.
We use this calculation in order to find out if clustering is indeed taking place and to be
able to use the information to verify if time allocation between and within clusters varies.
ARC scores are calculated as follows:
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R = total number of observed category repetitions (i.e. the number of times an
idea in one category follows an idea from the same category),
maxR = maximum possible number of category repetitions, and
E(R) = expected (chance) number of category repetitions.
Note that maxR = N − k where N = total number of ideas generated, and k = number
of categories represented in the ideation protocol. E(R), the chance number of category








where ni = total number of ideas generated in category i, and N the total of all ideas
generated, as before.
When thinking times and typing times were analysed by ANOVA or t-tests they were log-
transformed to normalise the distribution (as is common practice in the analysis of response
times). Statistical analysis of correlations, t-tests and Cohen’s k were done (as throughout
this thesis) using IBM SPSS Statistics version 23. Tables and graphs were generated in
Microsoft Excel for Office 365 Pro.
3.2.3 Results and discussion
We present the data in four parts. First, an overview of the data is presented, and a
summary of the sets of ideas per participant including mean timings of ideas, overall fluency
per participant as well as correlations between these and the responses to the post-study
questionnaire. The second aspect of results covers the category coding, the agreement
scores between our two independent coders and subsequently, results that highlight issues
with the category system and coding method itself. Third, we compute the ARC scores
based on the category coding for each participant (H1). The ARC scores are presented per
participant and are correlated with fluency to see whether these are positively correlated
(H3) Finally, despite the low ARC scores and low coder agreement scores, we present a
tentative analysis of the effect of category switches on thinking times (H2) and typing
times. We repeat this analysis using half category switches (in which adjacent ideas have
47
Chapter 3. Time-course of single ideation tasks
either goal or means in common, but not both). Where possible we will draw lessons about
strategy by comparing category switches with patch-leaving decision strategies.
Participants produced a mean of 26 ideas (SD=7.58) in their 15 minutes ideating (i.e.
1.73 ideas per minute; this compares with a mean productivity of 32.4 (SD=10.54) in 20
minutes, ie. 1.62 ideas per minute on the same task by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx
(2002)). The high variance in fluency can be explained by individual differences in the
ideators. That said, these variances are often found in ideation studies (see e.g. Nijstad,
Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002)). This might incorporate a range of factors, such as ideators
differing levels in motivation, threshold for what they feel is an idea worth writing down
(self-evaluation), threshold for what is an acceptable number of ideas to generate per
minute, etc. Note that individual differences might also account for the high variance in
thinking times, typing times and response latencies.
Data for all 10 participants are shown in table 3.2. Means of thinking times, typing times,
and response latencies have been calculated. These are presented along with the overall
fluency per participant and their questionnaire responses to the three questions: Q1: ”How
difficult was it to keep on generating ideas?”, Q2: ”How often were you unable to generate
ideas?”, and Q3: ”How often did an idea you previously generated occur to you again?”.
All three questionnaire responses were given on a 10-point scale, with higher numbers
indicating ”very difficult” or ”often”, representative of the participant perceiving a failure
or impasse.
As would be expected, fluency and response latencies were highly negatively correlated
(r(8) = −.963 at 0.01 level significance (2-tailed)), as well as fluency and typing times
(r(8) = −.849 at 0.01 level significance (2-tailed)). No correlation was found between
fluency and thinking times. Comparing fluency to post-experiment questionnaire responses,
tests of correlation showed no significant correlations between Q1-fluency and Q3-fluency,
but did show for Q2(”How often were you unable to generate ideas?”)-fluency (Q1-fluency:
r(8) = −.41, p = .24. Q2-fluency: r(8) = .85, p = .002. Q3-fluency: r(8) = .04, p = .92)
No significant internal correlations were found between questionnaire responses, despite the
fact that Q1 and Q2 seem to be asking very similar questions (Q1-Q2: r(8) = .48, p = .16;
Q2-Q3: r(8) = −.24, p = .50; Q1-Q3: r(8) = −.03, p = .93)
These results are interesting as they do not replicate that found in Nijstad, Stroebe and
Lodewijkx (2002), in which they show significant internal correlations between the ques-
tionnaire responses. Following these analyses, and due to the odd correlation encountered,
we are not going to pay further attention to the questionnaire answers in this study. The
questionnaire was used as a subjective measure of failures (impasse). We would expect
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1 30 9.44 (10.30) 20.35 (12.97) 29.79 (16.02) 7 7 3.5
2 20 6.53 (4.12) 36.58 (31.36) 43.11 (32.21) 4 3 7
3 22 17.25 (11.91) 20.37 (13.63) 37.62 (18.22) 6 5 1.5
4 21 2.16 (1.79) 39.83 (21.07) 41.99 (21.18) 2 2 1.5
5 27 11.01 (13.65) 21.80 (14.44) 32.81 (18.12) 3.5 4 4
6 41 10.28 (14.42) 9.94 (7.14) 20.22 (16.68) 3 9 5
7 15 12.78 (13.27) 42.94 (38.67) 55.72 (38.92) 2 4 2
8 24 3.09 (2.35) 34.18 (16.06) 37.27 (16.48) 5 2 7
9 37 7.57 (8.88) 16.44 (9.78) 24.02 (13.62) 8 9 2
10 23 16.11 (15.83) 22.30 (16.70) 38.41 (21.91) 5 4 6
M (10) 26 9.62 26.47 36.09
SD (10) 7.58 4.74 10.48 9.63
Table 3.2: The overall fluency, mean times and questionnaire responses for
participants in environment question study 1a. Mean of means are used for
fluency and timing values. Standard deviations in brackets.
that those who rate ”How often were you unable to generate ideas?” highly to have a lower
fluency. This would show that the subjective and objective measures match up, however,
we have the opposite result. The positive Q2-fluency correlation seems counter-intuitive,
although it is conceivable that people who are generating more ideas perceive themselves
to be stuck more readily than others who generate fewer ideas, in light of the fact that
participants have no comparison other than their own performance.
Cumulative productivity over time per participant is shown in figure 3-2. Notice the shapes
of the curves seem to be much more linear than would be expected if a participant was
running out of ideas. Participant on average generated fewer ideas in the final 3 minutes
(M=4.4, SD=1.78) than they did in the first 3 minutes (M=6.2, SD=4.16), but this
difference was not significant, (t(9) = 1.247, p = .244, d = .39). Overlaying the generally
linear relationship between number of ideas and time spent, there are clear spurts and times
of slowing down, suggesting somewhat differing levels of flow and stuckness.
Figure 3-3 shows the step-wise cumulative productivity per participant. Each vertical hop
indicates a submitted idea and horizontal lines represent response latencies. Although
there does not seem to be a pattern to be seen in all the idea sets, some (e.g. P6, P7 and
P9) show some evidence of clusters of quick successive ideas generated with some longer
thinking times between these spurts - a promising, if informal, finding as it suggests the
category structure of ideation proposed in SIAM may be occurring in these data sets.
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It seems possible that the initial rate of generation of ideas will be slowed by reading the
question, in which case the first idea thinking time will tend to be slow. However, a paired-
samples t-test between first idea thinking time (M=13.84, SD=11.75) and the mean of
subsequent thinking times (M=9.46, SD=4.73) showed no significant difference in means
(t(9) = 1.217, p < .225, d = .385). Mean first typing times (M=23.22, SD=13.53) and
mean of subsequent typing times (M=26.69, SD=11.01) similarly showed no significant
difference in means (t(9) = −.622, p < .550, d = −.197). These analyses justify including
first-idea times in the tables above and in subsequent analyses.
Coding ideas by category
In order to determine whether ideas are generated in semantic category clusters, each idea
had to be coded into a category. The following section contains a summary of the results
of this coding exercise, including how many of the categories each coder used. The two
independent coders (IC) were asked to look at each of the 260 ideas and judge the goals
and means of the ideas according to the category matrix shown in table 3.1 (in the analysis
section of this chapter). IC1 used 33 of the possible 50 categories to code this dataset
(Mean number of ideas per category = 7.88, SD=12.06). IC2 used 27 of the 50 categories
(Mean number of ideas per category = 9.37, SD=10.66).
IC2 left 7 ideas uncoded (blank), with the comment ”not relevant to the schema; not an
environmental topic”. The number of categories coded by each coder per participant is
shown in table 3.3. The category coding gave us the diversity for each participant, that
is, the total number of categories used by a participant in the 15-minute study. Within-
category fluency is calculated by dividing fluency (N) by diversity, indicating how many
ideas fall into the same category. Number of clusters (category repetitions) is calculated
by looking at the number of times an item follows an item from the same category. Cluster
length is calculated by N/(N −R) where R is the number of category repetitions and N is
the fluency, total number of ideas generated by a participant.
Coder agreement
The preliminary results in the previous section show that the overall numbers of categories
used by each coder was fairly similar. Cohen’s k was computed to determine if there was
agreement between the two independent coders in classifying ideas given to the environment
question. Cohen’s k was selected as a suitable test due to the data being categorical
(nominal). The same test was used in Nijstad and Stroebe (2006), giving us a good
reference point for accepted values for this type of data. There was only a ”fair”5 agreement
5Fair according to (Landis and Koch, 1977, p.165).
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Figure 3-2: Cumulative productivity (number of ideas generated) over time for
each participant in environment question study 1a.
Figure 3-3: Cumulative productivity (number of ideas generated) over time for
each participant in environment question study 1a, each vertical jump repre-
sents submitting an idea; horizontal lines represent response latencies.
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Participant Fluency IC1 Category Count IC2 Category Count
1A 30 10 12
2A 20 7 9
3A 22 10 12
4A 21 11 11
5A 27 11 11
6A 41 12 13
7A 15 10 10
8A 24 13 12
9A 37 14 15
10A 23 12 13
Mean Diversity (SD) 11.00 (1.84) 11.80 (1.60)
Mean Within-Category Fluency (SD) 2.37 (.57) 2.18 (.45)
Mean Cluster Length (SD) 1.29 (.10) 1.24 (.14)
Mean Category repetitions (SD) 5.80 (2.82) 5.10 (3.39)
Table 3.3: Total number of categories (diversity) per participant according
to two independent coders (IC) in environment question study 1a. Standard
deviations shown in brackets.
between the two coders, Cohen’s k = .36, p < .00016.
Due to only finding fair agreement, Cohen’s k was calculated for agreement solely on Means
and for agreement solely on Goals, to find whether there are interesting findings based on
those. There was moderate agreement between the two coders, Cohen’s k Means =
.477, p < .0001 and Cohen’s k Goals = .462, p < .0001.
During the coding exercise, coders were encouraged to leave a comment on exceptional
cases indicating if they found the idea too vague and therefore could be classified under
several different categories. Coders left more comments than expected, see table 3.4 which
shows total number of comments left per coder. Almost half of the comments indicated that
the idea commented on could be categorised into more than just one additional category
due to the idea being too vague or non-specific.
IC1 made a series of comments on the overall structure of the matrix coding scheme,
reporting that it felt outdated. It was noted that most goals had some overlap and it was
up to the discretion of the coder to decide which one they felt the idea aligned to the best.
IC2 made further comments on the coding system itself but also on the ideas, indicating
that many assumptions had to be made as to what the ideators meant, and stating that
6Comparison to the values found by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002); Cohen’s k = .87, Cohen’s
k = .89, and by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003): Cohen’s k = .88
52
Chapter 3. Time-course of single ideation tasks
many ideas in themselves were not formulated well enough to ascertain intended meaning
with much confidence. IC2 commented on the duality of the ideas they were coding but
additionally on the ”age” of the coding scheme – e.g. action taken through social media,
would this come under means 4. Information or means 5. Organisation and action? Social
media as well as behavioural change are topics that have rapidly developed, yet these were
not covered fully in the environment topic category system. IC1 noted that although not
wrong, the focus on reduction of use of materials and the treatment of waste materials relies
heavily on the current population thinking about the ozone layer etc, whereas currently the
population thinks more about action they can take through different types of dissemination
of information on multiple media platforms. IC1 indicated that the goals of ”reduce energy
use and promote green energy”, ”to protect climate and atmosphere” were usually tied
together and it was difficult to distinguish whether an idea was more focused on the action
of reduction to protect or protection by reducing.
Overall, verbal feedback from IC1 indicated that they felt they had to make assumptions
about what the ideator meant in order to code the idea into the most appropriate category.
Verbal feedback from IC2 made it clear that they, from the start, found a lot of ambiguity
and room for interpretation in the coding system itself. IC1 and IC2 both indicated that
coding was found to be very subjective and they both felt the need to recheck their coding
to ensure consistency.
Number of unfilled Number of comments
Number of comments with
more than 1 addl. category
IC1 0 99 48
IC2 7 115 61
Table 3.4: Unclassified ideas and comments per independent coder in environ-
ment question study 1a.
Evidence of idea generation in categorical clusters
Here we present the results of the Adjusted Ratio of Clustering calculation (see equation
3.1) performed on the ideation data submitted for the environment question. We do this
to seek evidence of a higher than chance occurrence of categorical clustering of ideas. Due
to the lack of agreement between the two coders, we have been unable to use a compound
score to analyse data, or to solely rely on one of the coding protocols to have been correct.
We therefore treat the category coding from IC1 and IC2 separately and perform ARC score
analysis on both sets. It is worth noting, before presenting the formal calculations, that the
number of categories for all participants is rather high, given their overall fluency.
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Participant Submitted ideas N k maxR R Ni E(R) ARC
1a 30 30 10 20 13 146 3.87 0.566
2a 20 20 7 13 7 88 3.40 0.375
3a 22 22 10 12 7 76 2.45 0.476
4a 21 21 11 10 2 73 2.48 -0.063
5a 27 27 11 16 8 103 2.81 0.393
6a 41 41 12 29 11 313 6.63 0.195
7a 15 15 10 5 3 45 2.00 0.333
8a 24 24 13 11 4 70 1.92 0.229
9a 37 37 14 23 11 173 3.68 0.379
10a 23 23 12 11 6 57 1.49 0.474
Table 3.5: The computation of ARC scores for each participant in environment
question study 1a, using the codings of IC1.
In table 3.5 IC1’s categories were used to test the existence of a categorical structure in
the data. Parameters for the ARC score calculation were calculated for each participant:
N is the total number of ideas included, k is the total number of categories represented in
the set, R is the total number of observed category repetitions, maxR the maximum pos-
sible number of category repetitions (N-k), and ni is the total number of ideas generated
in each category. E(R), the chance number of category repetitions, was calculated using
equation 3.2. ARC scores calculated from IC1’s coding ranged from -0.06 to 0.57. Overall,
the average of these (M=0.336 , SD=0.179)7 was positive and significantly different from
zero (t(9) = 5.927, p < .001, d = 1.877). This is evidence that according to IC1’a cate-
gory judgements, the participants ideas follow some (rather weak) systematic categorical
structure, weakly accepting H1.
There was no significant correlation between submitted ideas and the ARC score (r(8) =
.03, p = .94), showing that we have no evidence in the data that using categories as a
generative device is an effective strategy that affects productivity (H3).
We performed the same analyses using the categorisation done by IC2. The parameters
and ARC scores were again calculated and are presented in table 3.6. Note here that
’submitted ideas’ and ’coded ideas (N)’ differ due to IC2 leaving some entries blank. The
results of this followed somewhat the same pattern as with IC1’s coding. This analysis
returned a much lower mean ARC score although this was still significantly different from
zero. Results ranged from -0.207 to 0.407. The average of these (M=0.180, SD=0.175)8
was positive and significantly different from zero (t(9) = 3.250, p = .010, d = 1.03). This
7Comparable to Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) who had mean ARC scores ranging from 0.20 - 0.41.
8Comparably lower than the 0.20 - 0.41 ARC scores in Nijstad and Stroebe (2006).
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Participant Submitted ideas N k maxR R Ni E(R) ARC
1a 30 29 11 18 9 111 2.83 0.407
2a 20 20 9 11 4 64 2.20 0.205
3a 22 19 11 8 3 39 1.05 0.280
4a 21 21 11 10 4 67 2.19 0.232
5a 27 26 10 16 8 126 3.85 0.342
6a 41 41 13 28 12 317 6.73 0.248
7a 15 14 9 5 0 26 0.86 -0.207
8a 24 24 12 12 4 84 2.50 0.158
9a 37 37 15 22 5 143 2.86 0.112
10a 23 22 12 10 2 62 1.82 0.022
Table 3.6: The computation of ARC scores for each participant in environment
question study 1a, using the codings of IC2 (variation between submitted ideas
and N are due to coder leaving some ideas blank).
is evidence that according to this coder’s categories, the participants’ ideation has some
systematic categorical structure and again lets us weakly accept H1. As with the data from
IC1, there was no significant correlation between submitted ideas (fluency) and the ARC
scores calculated from IC2’s category scores (r(8) = .33, p = .23), again refuting H3.
Effect of category switches on thinking and typing times
Having gained an overall understanding at the data, we can now turn to our primary
question, which is whether the categorical structure of responses is reflected in the time-
course of responses, as one would expect if category switches are analogous to patch leaving
decisions. The following results are based solely on the codings of IC19. All ideas were
grouped into two groups, according to whether they were in the same category as the
preceding idea or in a different category, i.e. after a category switch.
As noted above, the number of ideas per category was low, which might compromise these
analyses. Nonetheless, we analysed the thinking times and typing times of ideas that
were within a category and those that were after a category switch in order to under-
stand whether categorisation has an effect on time to generate and formulate ideas. The
means of the log transformed within category and between category timings were calcu-
lated for each participant. A paired samples t-test showed that the thinking time between
(M=1.75, SD=.62) categories was significantly longer than within (M=1.08, SD=.61)
9In Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), all ideas were categorised by a main coder and a 10% sample
was categorised by a second coder. Further analyses were performed solely using their main coder’s data.
In our study, the selection of the codings from IC1 is solely based on this coder being the first coder. No
further criteria were used in selection of the data from IC1.
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(t(9) = 3.297, p = .009, d = 1.043). This of course meant that the overall response la-
tency between categories (M=3.45, SD=.26) was also significantly longer than the overall
response latency within categories (M=3.17, SD=.45) (t(9) = 3.361, p = .008, d = 1.06),
comparable with the findings in Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). This result shows support for
H2 that thinking times are shorter within categories, indeed suggesting that moving from
one patch to another in semantic memory has an associated time-cost. Not surprisingly, the
typing time within (M=2.86, SD=.49) and between (M=3.01, SD=.46) categories did not
differ significantly. In the studies by Nijstad and Stroebe (2006), they found that response
latency between categories was longer than within categories. These results support our
decision to split thinking and typing times. We extend this finding by showing that it is
the thinking aspect, not the typing aspect, of response latency that is affect by category
switches. This supports the SIAM theory that a switch to a new category requires time to
retrieve a new image from memory.
The effect of half category switches on thinking and typing times
It is plausible that people pivot around central themes when ideating. The concept of full
category switches, combined with the problems we have encountered in the coding process
itself, may be flawed in the sense that it relies too much on discrete states of flow and
impasse. Looking away from the full category switches, we were interested in knowing if
perhaps ideators perform half category switches, letting the goal of one idea inspire another
idea of the same goal but different means. Likewise, the means of one idea could inspire
another of the same means but different goal.
For these analyses, we divided the category coding done by IC1 into three different groups.
Ideas with the same goal and mean as the preceding idea remained in the within category
group as per the previous analysis. Ideas that shared either goal or mean, but not both,
with the preceding idea was marked as a half category switch. Ideas that shared neither goal
nor mean with the preceding idea were marked as full category switches. Log transformed
timings were used again for this analysis, although the same patterns were seen in analyses
on non-transformed data.
We first performed paired samples t-tests to see whether there was a significant difference
between full and half switches. The means of thinking times in full switches (M=1.76,
SD=.63) and thinking times for half category switches (M=1.77, SD=.69) were not found
to be significantly different (t(9) = −.096, p = .925, d = −.03). As expected, the means of
typing times in full switches (M=2.98, SD=.55) and typing times for half category switches
(M=2.99, SD=.42) were also not found to be significantly different (t(9) = −.103, p =
.920, d = −.03).
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Secondly, we performed paired samples t-tests to compare the difference in means of
half switches and within category timings. The means of thinking times in half switches
(M=1.77, SD=.69) were significantly higher than thinking times for within category (M=1.08,
SD=.61) (t(9) = 3.241, p = .010, d = 1.02). No significant difference was found in the
means of typing times in half switches (M=2.99, SD=.42) and typing times for within
categories (M=2.86, SD=.49) (t(9) = .905, p = .389, d = .29).
The typing time results are not surprising as these were not affected in the regular between
and within time analyses. The significant difference between half switches and within
category timings, but not full switches, may be due to the fact that the half switches form
a large subset of the original full switches data. As half-switches were not significantly
different from full switches, it does not seem as if people are pivoting around a central
theme, or the types of central themes stipulated by our goals and means category matrix.
In terms of both full and half-category switches, then, there is some evidence in the time-
course data that these index strategic choices, in that switches take longer than within-
category thinking times. It is not possible to separate giving-up times from next item times
at category breaks, but we might still draw some tentative lessons about heuristics that
underpin the category-switch decisions.
Figure 3-4 shows the untransformed distribution of thinking times identified to be between
categories (note the > 20 overflow bin). The mean of thinking times identified to be within
categories (M=6.43, SD=8.28) is highlighted on the graph. The distribution of thinking
times shows one of the characteristic findings that led Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007)
to propose a two-factor giving up rule. First, most between-category thinking times were
considerably longer than the mean within-category thinking times. This is suggestive of
a patch-leaving decision influenced by the failure to generate an idea, and the decline in
idea-generation rate. Secondly, there are some between-category thinking times that are
considerably quicker than the mean within-category time. This is suggestive of a rarer
success-based patch-leaving decision, leaving a patch immediately after an idea has been
encountered, a kind of sub-goal completion.
3.2.4 Summary and conclusions
Ideation performance and time-course
There was some evidence in the main data that participants found ideas harder to come
by as time progressed, but certainly 15 minutes did not completely exhaust ideators stock
of ideas. Nevertheless, all participants might be described as being ”stuck” sometimes, as
can be seen by the ragged cumulations of ideas over time. Some degree of stuckness is
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Figure 3-4: Distribution of between category thinking times environment ques-
tion study 1a showing a cluster of short thinking times and a long tail of longer
thinking times, compared to mean within category thinking time (orange line).
Note the > 20 overflow bin.
also apparent in the high standard deviation of thinking times that shows that some values
are more than twice the size of the mean. In figures 3-2 and 3-3 the time-course of each
participant’s idea-set, steeper areas of a curve represent a faster ideation rate. These could
be interpreted as representing some kind of flow state. The shallower parts of the curve
represent a slower ideation rate and may be interpreted to represent impasse, although they
could alternatively be interpreted as mini breaks or periods of distraction.
Post-experiment questionnaire responses
The attempt to gain insight into ideation through direct questions was not very successful.
The questions used were shown to successfully correlate subjective perception of failures
and objective measures of failures in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002) but responses
to the questions in our study did not show these correlations. This could possibly be due
to the small number of participants, although the control condition in Nijstad, Stroebe
and Lodewijkx (2002) was comparable in size. We reported an anomalous and surprising
correlation between the question ”How often were you unable to generate ideas?” and
fluency, showing that those who reported they were unable to generate ideas more often,
were also those who generated the most ideas. This is likely a chance effect, but may be
due to the ideators not having anything to compare against. It is conceivable that someone
coming up with many ideas is looking to achieve a high productivity and so may be more
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aware of when they are stuck, in comparison to someone who generates ideas at a more
leisurely pace and takes their time formulating each idea. Individual differences in ideators
like this might be one of the factors leading to the noisiness in the data.
Evidence of clustering in idea generation
We encountered some issues with the category coding itself, which will be covered later
in this section. Due to this, we performed the ARC score calculations on the data twice,
based on both coders’ categorisations of the data. Our mean ARC scores according to IC1
only, are comparable with those of Nijstad and Stroebe (2006), whose ARC scores all fell
between .20 and .41. The ARC scores according to IC2’s coding were somewhat lower.
The mean ARC scores were significantly different from zero, which is the value for a chance
level of clustering, offering support for the hypothesis that ideas are generated in semantic
clusters. However, these results must be treated with caution given fairly low inter-rater
agreements as well as their comments on the category structure.
According to the SIAM model, ARC should be correlated with fluency, because clustering
itself supports the search for ideas (Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006). However, in this study there
was no evidence for the predicted correlation between ARC and fluency. The limitation here
could be due to a range of variables, especially the inherent issue with the categorical coding
system itself, and the low number if ideas per category in all participants’ data according
to either coder’s categories.
Allocation of time within and between clusters
Interestingly, and despite the evident noisiness of our category codings, looking at the tim-
ings between and within categories, we observed a significant difference in the thinking time
(and therefore the overall response latency). This offers some support for the suggestion
that there is, if only small, a pause between categories in which ideators will stop to retrieve
another image.
There is no similar effect on typing time, which further suggests that although the split of
thinking and typing time might have seemed crude (in that participants could continue to
think having initiated typing), in fact the split has been helpful in identifying and locating
ideation impasses that happen between categories. This is a small additional methodological
contribution to the literature on ideation.
Despite the general influence of category boundaries on thinking times, for each of the
participants in this study, the maximum within category thinking time is higher than their
minimum between category thinking time. This perhaps argues against a simple relation
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between thinking time and experienced impasse states. Similarly, Chan et al. (2017) discuss
how idle times might indicate actively formulating the next idea or being distracted by
external stimuli.
Finally, we noted that some between-category switches had very short thinking times. This
finding relates to the theory of task switching rules by Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007),
who suggested that task switches might usually occur when production was difficult, but
occasionally probabilistically occur immediately after a sub-goal success. We explore this
further in study 2 in Chapter 4, in which we analyse the timestamps of explicit switches
between tasks.
Limitations of this study: issues with the category structure and coder agreement
The low agreement between coders’ categorisations was a major nuisance for our initial
research objectives. The agreement between the two coders, Cohen’s k = .365, p < .0001
was far from that of the values found in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Cohen’s
k = .87, and Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003), Cohen’s k = .88. Krippendorff (2018)
states that drawing conclusions from any data that shows a less than 0.67 k value should
not be done.
For these reasons, and in the light of the coders’ comments on their difficulties, a second
version of our first study was run using a different problem. Refinement of the environment
coding scheme was initially considered, however, with the availability of a second question
and associated coding scheme, as well as the possibility of a different approach to analysis
(i.e. semantic distances, see section 3.4), it was decided that this was out of scope of the
research goals. In the next section, we present the results of a similar 15-minute ideation
study cued by a question on personal health rather than the environment. This study was
run in the hope of being better able to replicate the findings of Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewi-
jkx (2003), in particular, with a focus on coder agreement scores for the categorisation of
ideas.
3.3 Study 1b: Ideation cued by a health question
In the study presented in the previous section, we attempted to replicate the findings of
Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002). Our goal was to gain a stronger understanding of
the time-course of coming up with ideas in a single ideation task by studying the link between
Search for Ideas in Associative Memory, the concepts of flow and impasse, and possible
foraging theories that could be applied to explain the patch-like pattern followed when
generating ideas. The basis for our theory that ideation follows a foraging like paradigm lay
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in the clustering of ideas in semantic categories, a phenomenon shown to occur in ideation
(Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx, 2002). Our study included an environment question that
had a verified category system. Unfortunately, although there was fair agreement between
category coders, this was far off that of Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002). The
category structure itself was highlighted as having issues by both coders who complained
that multiple categories could be assigned to a single idea and that some of the categories
were ambiguous. The comment from one coder on the datedness of some of the categories
and the lack of means relating to social media and persuasion brings the environment
category system into question. We found promising results based on the individual coder’s
protocols, showing that there is evidence of clustering of ideas and that there is a significant
difference to be found in the thinking times of between cluster and within cluster ideas.
We therefore repeat this study with a different question, in order to rule out question, and
associated category structure, specific issues.
In this section, we present a study similar to that in section 3.2, in which we attempt
to replicate the findings of Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002). A different task was
chosen from those studied in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003), to explore whether




This study was identical to the first in every respect except for those noted below. The
method, approach and hypotheses were unaltered. Whilst the 15-minute timespan for the
ideation task has been suggested to be too short to exhaust ideators stock of ideas, this
study was intended to follow the same design as the environment question study, this
timespan therefore remains the same for this study. In study 2 in Chapter 4 and study 3 in
Chapter 6 we increase the timespan and discuss the impact this has on the ideation tasks.
The most important change was the ideation task question itself.
Ideation task 2: ”What should a person do in order to maintain or improve their
health?”10
Again, this question was chosen due the existence of a pre-determined category system,
developed by Diehl (1991) and the ability to compare data to that in Nijstad, Stroebe and
Lodewijkx (2003). The category system follows the same matrix of goals and means that
10The wording on this task was changed from ”What can everybody do to improve or maintain one’s own
health?” as this was found to be an awkward translation. Original wording ”
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can be combined. For the health question, the pre-determined category system consists of
11 goals (e.g. avoid physical injuries, maintain healthy teeth) and 9 means (e.g. medication
and treatment, social factors). These will be discussed further in the analysis section.
Participants
Ten participants (3 female), age range from 22 to 31 (M=25.1, SD=3.36), were recruited
from around the University of Bath. The participant pool mostly consisted of undergraduate
and postgraduate students as well as university staff. Participants were recruited from a
variety of disciplines although predominantly from the department of Computer Science.
All participants were inexperienced ideators, that is, none of the participants performed
ideation for a living, nor were they trained in ideation methods. Whilst the majority of
these participants work in Human Computer Interaction, an often design-oriented field,
none of the participants in this study were considered professional designers. No further
profiling constraints were applied to recruitment for this study, due to the difficulty in
finding volunteer participants. Participants were recruited by word of mouth and mailing
lists. No reward was offered for this study.
Analysis by category
The ideas were categorised into the 99 possible categories by two coders and ARC scores
computed in order to see if ideas follow a categorical structure. Timings within and between
category clusters were analysed to see if foraging theory applies to this type of data. Recall
that timestamps were recorded by the software, providing us with thinking times, the time
between submitting an idea and typing the first letter of the next, typing times, the time
between typing the first letter of an idea and pressing enter to submit it, and response
latencies the sum of the two former timings.
199 ideas were generated in total by the ten participants. No duplicates were found, how-
ever, 1 idea was judged as being an afterthought to the prior idea. This was therefore
combined with the prior idea, resulting in a total of 198 ideas generated by the ten partici-
pants (M(10)=19.8, SD=6.06). Note that combining these also meant the first key stroke
of the original idea was noted as the start of typing time and the final enter-press of the
afterthought was noted as the end of the typing time.
In Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003), a coder classified all ideas submitted by all
participants. A random subset of about 10% was then classified by a second coder. Cohen’s
k = .85(p < .001). In our study, all 198 were coded by two new independent coders
(different to the environment question). The independent coders were selected as they
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Means: Goals:
01 Maintain or improve physical fitness 1 Food and substance intake
02 Maintain or improve perception
(sight, hearing, etc)
2 Medication and treatment
03 Optimize metabolism and avoid deficits 3 Clothing
04 Avoid strain on skeleton, improve posture 4 Bodily hygiene
05 Avoid weight problems 5 Environmental factors
06 Avoid physical injuries 6 Physical exercise
07 Maintain or improve psychological health 7 Information
08 Avoid physical strain 8 Life style (health-relevant
behaviors/attitudes)
09 Avoid poisonous substances and radiation 9 Social factors
10 Practice health prevention
11 Maintain healthy teeth
Table 3.7: Category matrix for health question consisting of 11 means and 9
goals.
were external to the process and therefore not familiar with the goals of the research.
Coder 3 was male, aged 30 and a graduate student at the University of Bath in Computer
Science. Coder 4 was female, aged 28 and a graduate student at the University of Bath in
the School of Management. The coders were volunteers and received no payment for their
participation. Although both coders were familiar with other methods of analysis, neither
coder had experience in coding this type of data before. Consequently, prior to coding the
full datasets, each of the coders received the same instructions as coders 1 and 2:
They were instructed to classify each idea in a category using the means by goal matrix
developed by Diehl (1991). For the health question, this consisted of 11 goals and 9 means:
99 categories in total (see table 3.7). Note that not all categories will be used by ideators.
These goals and means function as a matrix of categories, such that when classifying an
idea, the coder matched one goal and one mean to create a composite category consisting
of a 3-digit code. The idea ”eat lots of fish to avoid an omega-3 deficit” would be Goal 03
and Mean 1 = category 031. As done in the environment question, coders were asked to
enter the codes into three separate columns: the first being the goal, the second being the
means and the third column being any notes or additional goals/means they felt an idea
could fall into. Each independent coder was sent the data and the means by goal matrix,
coded a subset individually and met with the experimenter to discuss. Once the coders had
shown full understanding of the meaning of the goals and means in the matrix, they were
asked to categorise the remaining ideas themselves.
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3.3.2 Results and discussion
In the following section we present our data from the follow-up study in four parts. The first
is an overview of the data and a summary of the sets of ideas per participant including mean
timings of ideas, overall fluency per participant as well as correlations between these and
the responses to the post-study questionnaire. We analysed the post-study questionnaire
and show inter-correlation scores as all the questions cover the concept of failure. The
second part of this section covers the category coding for the health question along with
the agreement scores between our two independent coders.
Third, we computed the ARC scores based on the category coding for each participant
(H1). The ARC scores are presented per participant and is correlated with fluency to see
whether these are positively correlated (H3). Finally, despite finding low ARC scores and
low coder agreement scores again in the health question, we present a tentative analysis of
the effect of category switches on thinking times (H2).
Participants produced a mean of 19.8 (SD=6.06) ideas in 15 minutes, equivalent to 1.32
ideas per minute, which is markedly less fluent than Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx’s
(2002) participants’ mean fluency of 45.87 (SD=20.03) in 20 minutes (2.29 ideas per
minute). In an ideation study where participants are asked to generate as many ideas as
possible, generating an average of this few ideas seems odd. We suspect this could perhaps
be related to the lack of financial incentive on the motivation of ideators, however, if this
were to be the case, this result is still surprising given the close match in fluencies in the
first study (which likewise lacked financial incentive) and the comparison study. It seems
likely a matter of chance, given the high variance in fluency in all studies.
Data for all 10 participants are shown in the table 3.8. Means of thinking times, typing
times, and response latencies have been calculated. These are presented along with fluency
and their questionnaire responses to the questions: Q1: ”How difficult was it to keep on
generating ideas?”, Q2: ”How often were you unable to generate ideas?”, and Q3: ”How
often did an idea you previously generated occur to you again?”.
As would be expected, fluency and response latencies are highly negatively correlated
(r(8) = −.973 at 0.01 level significance (2-tailed)), as well as fluency and typing times
(r(8) = −.834 at 0.01 level significance (2-tailed)). No correlation was found between
fluency and thinking times. These results replicate our results for the environment question.
This is an intuitive result as this would be expected in a timebound task – longer response
latencies result in less productivity across the 15-minute time-course.
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1 30 12.55 (10.78) 16.29 (11.91) 28.84 (14.99) 4 7 9
2 19 13.20 (11.09) 33.67 (10.98) 46.87 (14.60) 4 3 2
3 14 25.19 (28.25) 35.22 (18.54) 60.41 (39.60) 5 6 3
4 15 21.28 (20.23) 38.38 (12.21) 59.66 (24.06) 5 6 6
5 20 10.36 (15.89) 34.05 (19.32) 44.41 (26.16) 6 7 9
6 17 2.85 (2.50) 49.63 (17.29) 52.48 (17.57) 2 3 4
7 16 20.53 (19.66) 33.53 (15.21) 54.05 (28.39) 7 5 7
8 21 10.41 (8.92) 31.43 (18.53) 41.84 (23.14) 8 2 7
9 32 6.29 (11.16) 21.27 (9.64) 27.56 (13.81) 2 2 3
10 14 11.76 (7.27) 41.62 (23.09) 53.38 (27.19) 1 2 1
M (10) 19.80 13.44 33.51 46.95
SD (10) 6.06 6.60 8.96 10.96
Table 3.8: The overall fluency, mean times and questionnaire responses for
participants in health question study 1b. Mean of means are used for fluency
and timing values. Standard deviations shown in brackets.
Comparing fluency to post-experiment questionnaire responses, no significant correlations
were found between fluency and any question responses (Q1− fluency : r(8) = −.14, p =
.70. Q2− fluency : r(8) = −.04, p = .90. Q3− fluency : r(8) = .28, p = .43)
Interestingly, significant internal correlations were found between questionnaire responses,
although not between Q1 and Q2, that were essentially asking the same question. Q1-Q2:
r(8) = .37, p = .30; Q2-Q3: r(8) = .65, p = .04; Q1-Q3: r(8) = .66, p = .04.
Cumulative productivity over time, figure 3-5, looks similar to the curve found for the
environment question, if not even more linear. This appears to be a more linear relationship
than you might expect in a situation of diminishing returns. However, participants generated
fewer ideas on average in the final 3 minutes (M=2.9, SD=1.6) than in the first 3 minutes
(M=4.8, SD=1.93) (t(9) = 3.943, p. = 003, d = 1.25).
Figure 3-6 shows the cumulative productivity per participant. Each vertical hop indicates
a submitted idea and the horizontal lines represent response latencies. Quick successive
ideas generated with some longer thinking times were not easily discerned from this dataset,
these were more prominent in the environment question.
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Figure 3-5: Cumulative productivity (number of ideas generated) over time for
each participant in health question study 1b.
Figure 3-6: Cumulative productivity (number of ideas generated) over time
for each participant in health question study 1b, each vertical jump represents
submitting an idea; horizontal lines represent response latencies.
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As in study 1a, the time to generate the first idea was examined. This analysis showed that
first idea thinking times (M=5.71, SD=1.96) were significantly smaller than remaining
thinking times (M=12.82, SD=15.95), (t(9) = −3.557, p = .006, d = −1.12); a result
opposite to what was expected if you take reading of the question into account.
Coding ideas by category
In order to determine whether ideas are generated in semantic category clusters, we needed
to code the data qualitatively. In the environment question, this step proved to be prob-
lematic due to only a fair agreement between coders, as well as an overwhelming amount
of comments on both the vagueness of the pre-set categories themselves and the difficulty
of having to make assumptions about what the participant meant in badly specified ideas.
In the health question for the current study, we hoped to overcome this issue and show
that this disagreement was a question or category specific observation. Two new coders,
coders 3 and 4, were asked to look at each of the 198 ideas and judge the goals and means
if the ideas according to the category matrix shown in table 3.7.
IC3 coded this dataset into 35 of the possible 99 categories (Mean number of ideas per
category = 5.66 SD=7.74). IC4 coded this dataset into 28 of the 99 possible categories
(Mean number of ideas per category = 7.07, SD=8.45). No ideas were left blank by either
coder.
As in the environment question, category coding gives us the following variables: diversity
for each participant, the total number of categories used by a participant in the 15-minute
study; within-category fluency calculated by dividing fluency (N) by diversity ; number of
clusters (category repetitions), calculated by looking at the number of times an item follows
an item from the same category; and finally cluster length, calculated by N/(N–R) where R
is the number of category repetitions and N is the fluency, total number of ideas generated
by a participant (see table 3.9).
Coder agreement
Comparable to the environment question, the summary results show that the overall number
of categories used by each coder was fairly similar, with agreement on the cluster length
and number of clusters. Cohen’s k was run to determine if there was agreement between
the two independent coders in classifying ideas given to the health question. There was a
good11 agreement between the two coders, Cohen’s k = .61, p < .0001, much higher than
the agreement found in the environment question.
11Good according to (Landis and Koch, 1977, p.165)
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Participant Fluency IC3 Category Count IC4 Category Count
1B 30 17 12
2B 19 10 8
3B 14 11 10
4B 15 7 10
5B 20 7 9
6B 17 12 12
7B 16 8 9
8B 21 11 11
9B 32 13 11
10B 14 11 10
Mean Diversity (SD) 10.70 (2.87) 10.20 (1.25)
Mean Within-Category Fluency (SD) 1.90 (.48) 1.94 (.51)
Mean Cluster Length (SD) 1.19 (.15) 1.19 (.15)
Mean Category repetitions (SD) 3.20 (2.56) 3.20 (2.56)
Table 3.9: Total number of categories (diversity) per participant according to
two independent coders (IC) in health question study 1b. Standard deviations
shown in brackets.
As in the environment question, and unsurprisingly given there are fewer ’half categories’,
agreement was higher when measured independently for Goals and Means: Cohen’s k for
Goals was good, Cohen’s k = .77, p < .0001. Cohen’s k for Means was good, Cohen’s
k = .74, p < .0001.
During the coding exercise, coders were encouraged to leave a comment on exceptional
cases indicating if they found ideas or parts of the classification system too vague. For the
health question, coders also left more comments than expected, see table 3.10 which shows
the total number of comments left per coder. In the environment question, almost half of
the comments related to ideas that could be coded into several categories. This number
was much lower in the health question.
Number of unfilled Number of comments
Number of comments with
more than 1 addl. category
IC3 0 56 22
IC4 0 71 11
Table 3.10: Unclassified ideas and comments per independent coder in health
question study 1b.
In discussions with the independent coders after coding, IC3 said ”some seem to clearly
focus around good and bad things to consume, these MUST be in the same category, but
in the category structure you are missing a consume mean. Also consumption hops from
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things that are bad for you to healthy foods to medicine. There is a goal for each one of
these.” ”If the schema is not specific it is hard to code but being specific means that many
single ideas can fit into multiple categories, there is an overlap”. IC4 struggled to select
the correct goal for some as there were clearly multiple goals. Just as IC1 and IC2 in the
environment question, IC3 and IC4 indicated that coding was found to be very subjective.
Evidence of idea generation in categorical clusters
In this section we present the results of the Adjusted Ratio of Clustering calculation (see
equation 3.1) performed on the ideation data submitted for the health question. We did
this analysis to find evidence of a higher than chance occurrence of categorical clustering
of ideas. Although a much higher agreement was found between the two coders for the
health question in relation to the environment question, this still does not compare to the
Cohen’s k = .88 found in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003) for this question. As a
result of this, we treated the category coding from IC3 and IC4 separately and performed
the ARC score analysis on both sets to see if they yielded similar results.
In table 3.11 IC3’s categories were used to calculated the parameters for ARC score calcu-
lations for each participant. ARC scores calculated from IC3’s coding ranged from -0.24 to
0.53. Overall, the average of these (M=0.225, SD=0.209)12 was positive and significantly
different from zero (t(9) = 3.402, p = .008, d = 1.076). This is evidence that according to
IC3’a category judgements, participants’ ideas follow some systematic categorical structure,
accepting H1 for the health question as well as the environment question. We should note
however that the ARC scores are generally low, even if usually positive.
In line with our findings for the environment question, there was no significant correlation
between fluency and the ARC score (r(8) = .38, p = .27), showing that we had no evidence
in the data that using categories as a generative device is an effective strategy that affects
productivity (H3).
We performed the same analyses using the categorisation done by IC4. The parameters and
ARC scores were again calculated and presented in table 3.12. We performed the analyses
in order to see if we could replicate the results of IC1, IC2 and IC3, however for IC4 we were
not able to find an ARC score mean significantly different from zero. Results ranged from
-0.217 to 0.412. Overall, the average of these (M=0.096, SD=0.184) was not significantly
different from zero (t(9) = 1.650, p = .133, d = .52). This is evidence that according to
IC4’s category coding, participants’ ideation do not follow a systematic categorical structure.
As with the data from IC3, there was no significant correlation between submitted ideas
12Comparable to Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) who had mean ARC scores ranging from 0.20 - 0.41.
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(fluency) and the ARC scores calculated from IC4’s category scores (r(8) = .45, p = .07),
again refuting H3.
IC3 submitted feedback commenting on a couple of issues with the coding scheme. In
particular, they found sleep to be a difficult one to code as the ideator was not specifying
why they were recommending more sleep. Additionally, they found overlap in a few of the
goals, e.g. is optimisation of metabolism and avoiding deficits not a method of practising
health prevention?
Participant Submitted ideas N k maxR R Ni E(R) ARC
1b 30 17 13 6 114 2.8 0.31
2b 19 10 9 5 69 2.63 0.37
3b 14 11 3 0 22 0.57 -0.24
4b 15 7 8 3 49 2.27 0.13
5b 20 7 13 7 96 3.80 0.35
6b 17 12 5 3 29 0.71 0.53
7b 16 8 8 4 74 3.63 0.09
8b 21 11 10 3 55 1.62 0.16
9b 32 13 19 8 128 3.00 0.31
10b 14 11 3 1 20 0.43 0.22
Table 3.11: The computation of ARC scores for each participant in health
question study 1b, using the codings of IC3.
Participant Submitted ideas N k maxR R Ni E(R) ARC
1b 30 12 18 7 148 3.93 0.22
2b 19 8 11 6 89 3.68 0.32
3b 14 10 4 0 24 0.71 -0.22
4b 15 10 5 1 33 1.20 -0.05
5b 20 9 11 6 70 2.50 0.41
6b 17 12 5 1 29 0.71 0.07
7b 16 9 7 2 50 2.13 -0.03
8b 21 11 10 2 57 1.71 0.03
9b 32 11 21 6 160 4.00 0.12
10b 14 10 4 1 24 0.71 0.09
Table 3.12: The computation of ARC scores for each participant in health
question study 1b, using the codings of IC4.
Effect of category switches on thinking and typing times
Having gained an understanding of this data and the categorical structure found by IC3 (but
not IC4) allowed us to respond to our primary question for the health task: whether the cat-
egorical structure of responses was reflected in the time-course of responses. The following
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results are based on analyses made solely by IC3 as those by IC4 did not show evidence of
an overall categorical structure to the ideas generated. All ideas were again coded into two
groups, whether they fell in the same category as the preceding idea or in a different category,
i.e. a category switch. These groupings allow us to compare thinking times and typing times
of ideas that fall within the same category, and ideas that are generated at a category switch.
Comparing these gives us a stronger understanding of whether categorisation influences the
time it takes to generate ideas. The means of log transformed within category and between
category timings were calculated for each participant. A paired samples t-test showed that
the thinking times between categories (M=1.96, SD=.69) were significantly larger than the
thinking times within categories (M=1.29, SD=.82) (t(8) = 3.11, p = .014, d = 1.04).
Performing the same analyses on typing times between (M=3.33, SD=.36) and within
(M=3.27, SD=.63) categories showed no significant differences in means.
Both of these findings are in line with our findings in the environment question in study
1a, providing stronger support for accepting H2, that thinking times are shorter within
categories and confirm our suspicion that typing times remain unaffected by generating
ideas within or between categories.
The effect of half category switches on thinking and typing times
In the previous study we discussed the plausibility of ideators pivoting around central themes
when ideating. Full category switches rely on discrete states of flow and impasse when in
fact we may be pivoting around topics, such that ideators are letting the goal of one idea
inspire another idea of the same goal but different means. Likewise, the means of one
idea could inspire another of the same means but different goal. The analyses in study
1a showed that mean timings of half category (either mean or goal) switches were not
significantly different from full category switches, suggesting that either ideators are not
letting a central theme inspire other ideas or this was simply the effect of this specific
pre-set category system. For this reason, we perform the same analysis on the data from
the current health question study.
For these analyses, we divided the category coding done by IC3 into three different groups.
Ideas with the same goal and mean as the preceding idea remained in the within category
group as per the previous analysis. Ideas that shared either goal or mean, but not both,
with the preceding idea was marked as a half category switch. Ideas that shared neither goal
nor mean with the preceding idea were marked as full category switches. Log transformed
timings were used again for this analysis, although the same patterns were seen in analyses
on non-transformed data.
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First, paired samples t-tests between full and half switches were performed on thinking
times and typing times. The means of thinking times in full switches (M=2.01, SD=.70)
and thinking times for half category switches (M=1.98, SD=.92) were not found to be
significantly different (t(8) = .033, p = .975, d = .01). As expected, the means of typing
times in full switches (M=3.34, SD=.39) and typing times for half category switches
(M=3.24, SD=.43) were also not found to be significantly different (t(8) = .718, p =
.493, d = .24).
Secondly, we performed paired samples t-tests to compare the difference in means of
half switches and within category timings. The means of thinking times in half switches
(M=1.98, SD=.92) were significantly higher than thinking times for within category (M=1.29,
SD=.82) (t(8) = 3.256, p = .012, d = 1.09). No significant difference was found in the
means of typing times in half switches (M=3.24, SD=.43) and typing times for within
categories (M=3.24, SD=.66) (t(7) = −.058, p = .956, d = −.02). These results replicate
our findings in study 1a. The typing time results were not surprising as these were not af-
fected in the regular between and within time analyses. The significant difference between
half switches and within category timings, but not full switches, may have been due to
the fact that the half switches form a large subset of the original full switches data. As
half-switches were not significantly different from full switches, half switches may well be
treated as a transition to another patch in semantic memory, just as full switches. Again,
we look at the distribution of between-category thinking times for some tentative insights
into participants’ strategies.
Figure 3-7 shows the untransformed distribution of thinking times identified to be between
categories (again, note the > 20 overflow bin). The mean of thinking times identified to be
within categories (M=9.37, SD=13.52) is highlighted on the graph. Again, the distribution
showed that most between-category thinking times were considerably higher than mean
within-category thinking time, but that there was a number of very fast between-category
thinking times. This pattern mirrors that found by Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) in a
completely different task (a scrabble task) and supports their argument for a two-factor
(failure versus success) based patch-leaving decision.
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Figure 3-7: Distribution of between category thinking times health question
study 1b, compared to mean within category thinking time (orange line). Note
the > 20 overflow bin.
3.3.3 Summary and conclusions
Ideation performance
Participants’ fluency was lower in this study, and there was stronger statistical evidence
of ideas being harder to come by after 15 minutes of ideation. Again, the cumulative
ideas curves (figures 3-5 and 3-6) show some longer thinking times that might indicate
stuckness and short bursts that could be taken to indicate flow, but such mappings are
highly speculative. This further highlights the effects of individual differences on ideation
performance in relation to, for example, the threshold of what they might feel is an idea
worth writing down. This is supported by the fact that some participants generated 14 ideas
within a 15-minute timespan - suggesting a more leisurely pace of ideation than would be
expected from a task in which ideators are asked to generate as many ideas as possible.
Similarly, the lack of financial incentive might have had an impact on the productivity of
ideators. This will be addressed further in study 2, Chapter 4, in which we provide financial
incentives as a means of increasing productivity.
Post-experiment questionnaire responses
In this task, some of the responses to the post-experiment questionnaire were intercorre-
lated. Nevertheless, we were again unable to replicate the fluency-questionnaire correlation.
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Evidence of clustering in idea generation
Agreement between coders was better in this study, as hoped. Despite this, coders raised
problems with the scheme they were asked to use and the ideas they were asked to judge.
Furthermore, and unfortunately, we were only able to replicate the finding of reliably positive
ARC scores using IC3’s coding (not IC4’s). This could be due to the small number of
participants, exacerbated by the fact that for one participant there were no inter-category
ideas at all.
As in study 1a, analysis done on clusters identified by IC3 showed overall means of shorter
thinking times within clusters than between clusters. Results like this suggest that if the
identified clusters are to be likened to patches in memory, switching to another patch does
indeed have an associated time-cost. This might be attributed to a person running out of
ideas within an image and searching for a new image in memory from which further ideas
can be generated. Again, there was no significant difference in thinking times between half
and full category switches.
Limitations of this study: issues with the category structure and coder agreement
The two empirical studies in this chapter were a modest attempt to replicate the study
and analyses of Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx
(2003) and Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). However, despite some encouraging reliable effects
in the data, there were several failures to replicate the cleanliness of their data across two
different questions. In particular coders didn’t agree on category membership of ideas, and
our participants didn’t show as strong ARC scores. The lack of coder agreement and low
ARC scores may not be unrelated, but they point to methodological issues for ideation
research that we will address in later chapters of this thesis. In the next section of this
chapter we attempt a different approach to the semantics of ideas that might allow more
reliable coding and better exhibit participants’ search strategies. Instead of categorising
ideas according to pre-established categories, we inspect the semantic similarity between
adjacent ideas. This approach can still capture a category or patch structure, and still
allows questions about the time-course of idea generation within and between patches, but
it replaces a binary flow-impasse analysis with one based on a continuous notion of semantic
difference.
3.4 Semantic distance between adjacent ideas
In the two versions of the study we’ve just presented, we came across problems with the
method of analysis chosen, despite this being a well-established and verified method. What
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started out being a simple replication study revealed that we were unable to fully replicate
the effects that were expected from the study. We speculate that this could be attributed to
a variety of reasons, such as fundamental problems with the pre-set categories themselves,
the lack of well-formedness of the ideas generated and ultimately a lack of support for the
SIAM model of searching for ideas in memory.
We try to move away from the concept of ideation states as being discrete such as flow
and impasse, generating ideas in categories or switching categories. A continuous marginal
rate of gain may be more in line with foraging theories. To that effect, this section is
dedicated to how semantically related ideas are and what effect this has on the time-
course of the ideation task. We explore this by calculating the difference scores between
adjacent ideas. This was done to understand how closely related ideas were and whether
this was a stronger method of mapping an idea set rather than expecting it to follow a
category structure. This type of analysis was done by Chan et al. (2017), however, this was
automated using Global Vectors for Word Representation (GloVe) (Pennington, Socher and
Manning, 2014). They performed this analysis as verification that within-category ideas are
semantically more closely related with between categories. They did not compare response
latencies or thinking times of semantically similar and semantically different ideas as coded
by GloVe.
The mapping in this section was done to try to understand whether the time-course of an
ideation task could be explained by the semantic differences between ideas. Despite being
primarily an exploratory analysis, we propose the following hypotheses:
H4 : Fluency is negatively correlated with average difference scores, such that
higher average difference scores are seen in smaller datasets
H5 : Higher difference scores result in higher thinking times (and therefore
response latencies) between subsequent ideas.
3.4.1 Method
Two independent coders were asked to rate the difference between adjacent ideas (e.g.
ideas that follow each other) for each idea generated by each participant on a 10-point
scale. This scale was chosen due to the lack of an obvious midpoint, acting as a method to
make the coders think about their choice. One coder was male in his early thirties, one was
female in her late twenties, both graduate students in computer science at the University
of Bath, unaware of any of the research hypotheses. External coders were selected due to
their lack of familiarity with the research goals. The coders were volunteers and received
no payment for their participation. Although both coders were familiar with other methods
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of analysis, neither coder had experience using this approach before.
The first coder was given all 458 responses and the second coder was given a subset of
159 ideas (7 participants, approximately 1/3 of the participant set). Coders were first
explained what the participants had done during the study, then shown the set of ideas
from the health question and the environment question separately. They were then given
the following instructions, including examples, indicating how to apply the ratings (for exact
wording of instructions see appendix A.4).
The following would score a 1 or 2, as they are essentially touching on the same concepts:
recycling and plastic materials.
• Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
• Idea 2: ”recycle plastic bags”
These would score a 5-6 as they have something in common but aren’t quite the same.
• Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
• Idea 2: ”teach people why recycling plastic bottles saves the planet”
The following would score a 10 as they have nothing in common:
• Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
• Idea 2: ”support an organisation that protects pandas”
Coders were asked to individually talk through the first 10 semantic difference ratings
they performed, with the experimenter. Once the coders showed full understanding of the
process, they were asked to complete the remainder of the difference ratings themselves.
As difference score rating of the ideas was done on a scale, not categorically as in the
previous study, inter-rater agreement was calculated using Pearson’s correlation between
the responses of the two coders.
3.4.2 Results and discussion
In the following section we present our results from our follow-up analysis of the data
from both parts of our first study. We present this in four parts. The first presents the
agreement between coders and the characteristics of their coding protocol. In the second
part we look at the mean difference ratings for each idea set and correlate this with fluency
to see whether generating semantically related ideas affects the amount of ideas an ideator
can generate in a timebound task. In the third part we compare the difference scores and
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overall timings of ideas, thinking time, typing time, and response latencies in order to see
if there is a link between difference between two adjacent ideas and the time it takes to
generate ideas that are semantically near or far from the previous idea. Finally, we compare
the timings of top different ideas and top similar ideas using t-tests see whether there is a
significant difference in the means of these.
Coder agreements on difference ratings
Pearson correlation performed on the 152 difference scores revealed a high positive corre-
lation between the ratings of the two coders for difference scores, r(150) = .715, p < .01.
This is a much more promising result than in our category analyses, as it means we are
more confident in the conclusions we draw from these analyses. Figure 3-8 shows the mean
difference ratings submitted by the second coder compared to the ratings submitted by the
main coder. This was calculated by grouping all the ratings of the second coder according
to the main coder’s ratings.
Figure 3-8: Summary correlation of difference ratings for study 1a and 1b:
second coder mean difference ratings against each of the main coder difference
ratings on the 10-point scale.
The coders seemed to use the 10-point scale differently. The main coder seemed very
inclined to use a rating of 10 frequently (see distribution in figure 3-9). Although not
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Figure 3-9: Distribution of ratings for main coder (438 datapoints) and second
coder (152 datapoints) for studies 1a and 1b.
78
Chapter 3. Time-course of single ideation tasks
ideal, this supports the finding in the first two parts of this chapter, in which a very high
number of category switches were identified in comparison to a very small number of within
category ideas. The second coder used mostly the full 10-point scale creating a fairly even
distribution between the 10 points. Note that this was not attributed to the sample itself,
as scores from the main coder from the same sample gave a similar distribution as the main
coder had for the whole set.
Descriptive data
In the following section, we present analyses of N − 1 datapoints per participant, where
N is the number of ideas in the participant’s dataset, or fluency. Difference scores were
given between two adjacent ideas, and not for every idea. The first idea of a dataset did
therefore not have an associated difference score.
Table 3.13 shows the mean difference scores compared to mean fluency for each participant
in the two parts of the study. Pearson correlation between mean difference score and fluency
is r(18) = −.69. Figure 3-10 shows this negative correlation between mean difference
scores of an idea-set and the fluency of that idea-set. This result evidences that there
is a negative correlation between difference scores and the number of ideas generated,
allowing us to accept H4. We also computed the correlation between fluency and variance
of the semantic difference score. We suppose that variance is a kind of proxy for semantic
structure, as it will arise when some adjacent ideas are semantically close (within patch)
and others are distant (between patch). Indeed there was a positive correlation between
variance of semantic difference and fluency, r(18) = .69, p < .01.
Difference score correlations with time-course patterns
In the next section we compare the difference scores to the time span across individual
ideas. In total, we had 438 difference scores between ideas developed by 20 participants
across the two parts of the study. We compared thinking times, which consist of the time
between the two ideas that have been given a similarity score, the typing time of the second
idea and the overall response latency of the second idea in the difference score set.
When looking at the timings of ideas, i.e. thinking times, typing times and response
latencies, we are only looking at ideas following the first idea. As the first idea cannot be
compared to anything before it, it is not possible to include this in the analyses of course.
We calculated the correlation between difference scores and the three timing metrics for
each participant (see table 3.14). We used these to see if there was evidence of a positive
correlation between the time taken to generate an idea and its difference from the previous
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Study 1a Study 2a
Participant Fluency Mean Difference Score Participant Fluency Mean Difference Score
1A 30 6.55 (3.16) 1B 30 7.38 (3.00)
2A 20 7.11 (3.14) 2B 19 8.44 (2.11)
3A 22 6.52 (2.89) 3B 14 9.38 (1.15)
4A 21 8.85 (1.42) 4B 15 9.00 (1.69)
5A 27 6.54 (2.95) 5B 20 8.21 (2.07)
6A 41 7.33 (2.89) 6B 17 8.31 (2.26)
7A 15 8.07 (1.98) 7B 16 8.53 (2.16)
8A 24 8.17 (2.20) 8B 21 8.70 (1.55)
9A 37 6.56 (3.28) 9B 32 7.61 (2.36)
10A 23 7.27 (2.88) 10B 14 9.46 (1.39)
M (10) 26 7.3 19.8 8.5
SD (10) (7.58) (0.78) (6.06) (0.65)
Table 3.13: Mean difference scores per participant compared to their overall
fluency for data from studies 1a and 1b. Standard deviations shown in brackets.
Figure 3-10: Correlation between mean difference scores and the fluency of an
idea set; semantic difference scores calculated in data from studies 1a and 1b.
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idea, in order to answer H5. Thinking time correlations ranged from -0.26 to 0.48. Overall,
the average of these (M=0.19, SD=0.17) was positive and significantly different from zero
(t(19) = 4.933, p < .001, d = 1.12).
Typing time correlations ranged from -0.31 to 0.61. Overall, the average of these (M=0.04,
SD=0.23) was positive but not significantly different from zero (t(19) = .768, p = .452, d =
0.17). Response latency correlations ranged from -0.28 to 0.61. Overall, the average
of these (M=0.17, SD=0.19) was positive and significantly different from zero (t(19) =
3.746, p = .001, d = 0.89).
These positive correlations give us evidence that producing semantically different ideas will
take longer than semantically similar ideas, allowing us to accept H4 and H5. Correlations
between typing times and difference scores is again not surprising and re-enforces the result
found in the category coding sections as well. The positive correlations between thinking
times and difference scores suggest that generating ideas does in fact follow a patch like
structure in memory.
Figure 3-11: Thinking time as a function of semantic difference scores between
adjacent items; semantic difference scores calculated in data from studies 1a
and 1b.
Figure 3-11 shows all data across all participants. The overall scatter plot on which every
thinking time is plotted against its semantic difference score is of particular interest. It
shows that the increase in thinking times with semantic difference is due to some elongated
thinking times, and a greater spread in the distribution at greater semantic differences.
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Correlation between difference score and timing
Participant Thinking Time Typing Time Response Latency
1A 0.36 -0.18 0.06
2A 0.23 0.26 0.28
3A 0.18 -0.17 -0.01
4A 0.11 0.61 0.61
5A 0.16 0.06 0.17
6A 0.39 -0.31 0.21
7A 0.48 0.19 0.36
8A 0.19 0.31 0.32
9A 0.19 0.11 0.20
10A 0.26 -0.18 0.06
1B 0.17 0.19 0.28
2B 0.27 0.17 0.34
3B -0.24 -0.22 -0.28
4B 0.21 -0.26 0.05
5B 0.30 -0.24 0.00
6B 0.30 0.05 0.09
7B 0.24 0.06 0.20
8B -0.26 -0.05 -0.15
9B 0.14 0.17 0.23
10B 0.21 0.25 0.27
Mean (20) 0.19 0.04 0.17
SD (20) 0.17 0.23 0.19
Table 3.14: Correlation between mean semantic difference scores and mean
ideation timing metrics per participant for data from studies 1a and 1b.
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Even at the most extreme semantic difference there are some very quick thinking times.
Informally, this again suggests multiple processes at work – allowing ideas to come to mind
independently of semantic similarity, and/or allowing participants to deliberately shift focus
very soon after an idea has been generated, rather than only in the case of a long idle
interval.
Differences in means timings of highly similar and highly different ideas
In addition to the correlations between difference scores and thinking times, typing times,
and response latencies, we compared the timings of ideas that were rated with the highest
similarity and ideas rated with the highest difference. Data was calculated as averages per
participant and then compared using paired samples t-tests. The data was split into the
following groups:
1. Average thinking times, typing times and response latencies of any idea coded as
having a difference score of 1-2 (high similarity)
2. Average thinking times, typing times and response latencies of any idea coded as
having a difference score of 9-10 (high difference)
Paired samples t-tests conducted on thinking times in the high similarity (M=5.79, SD=5.18)
and high difference (M=12.09, SD=5.25) conditions showed a significant difference in the
two groups t(10) = 3.72, p = .004, d = 1.12.
Paired samples t-tests conducted on typing times in the high similarity (M=19.63, SD=10.53)
and high difference (M=23.68, SD=12.14) conditions unsurprisingly showed no significant
difference in the two groups t(10) = .997, p = .342, d = .30.
Paired samples t-tests conducted on response latencies in the high similarity (M=23.30,
SD=12.95) and high difference (M=35.74, SD=9.58) conditions showed a significant dif-
ference in the two groups t(11) = 3.47, p = .005, d = 1.00.
The same analyses were performed on an even split down the middle of the data based on
difference scores, resulting in the following two groups:
1. Average thinking times, typing times and response latencies of any idea coded as
having a difference score of 1-5, bottom half difference.
2. Average thinking times, typing times and response latencies of any idea coded as
having a difference score of 6-10, top half difference.
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Paired samples t-tests conducted on thinking times in the bottom half difference (M=5.11,
SD=3.12) and top half difference (M=11.93, SD=6.24) conditions showed a significant
difference in the two groups t(17) = 4.86, p = .000, d = 1.15.
Paired samples t-tests conducted on typing times in the bottom half difference (M=24.08,
SD=11.79) and top half difference (M=30.96, SD=13.04) conditions showed no significant
difference in the two groups t(17) = 1.91, p = .073, d = .45.
Paired samples t-tests conducted on response latencies in the bottom half difference (M=29.19,
SD=11.49) and top half difference (M=42.89, SD=15.03) conditions showed a significant
difference in the two groups t(17) = 3.28, p = .004, d = .77.
The results further support our hypotheses that thinking times are affect by the difference
between adjacent ideas (H5) and that typing times remain unaffected.
3.4.3 Summary and conclusions
For semantic difference scores, the inter-rater agreement was within an acceptable range.
Coding difference ratings seems to be a more viable way of approaching data than coding
into pre-set categories. In particular, with data such as ours where there is a varied level of
generalisation and specificity across the ideas, making it difficult at times to discern what
it is the ideator meant specifically. Looking at the distribution of scores, it is clear to see
that the main coder felt willing to view ideas as semantically completely unrelated, seen
in the high number of 10-scores used. The lack of certain confidence in the scale might
be assumed from looking at the low number of 1-scores given by the coder. The overall
average difference scores rated by our coders are in general quite high, showing that ideators
are indeed jumping between fairly different ideas. Despite this, we have still seen interesting
patterns in the data. The negative correlation between fluency and the average difference
ratings between ideas is a promising result as it shows that ideas are thought of as distinctly
different rather than following a train of thought in order to develop better ideas. Similarly,
it seems that smaller datasets do not conform to SIAM. This was difficult to see in the initial
analysis as calculating ARC scores of a small dataset proved problematic. It can be assumed
here that high difference scores are representative of distinct category switches in which
ideators try to think of ideas that are distinctly different from previous ideas. This behaviour
is not in line with the instructions which stated that the ideator must come up with many
wild ideas, and not judge them as they go along. Despite instructions, participants show
that they’re still more interested in generating distinct ”good” ideas rather than type out
their stream of consciousness. Again, this highlights how individual differences might affect
ideation performance; instead of ”simply” ideating, some people may impose thresholds on
what they feel is worth writing down and employ not only creative but critical thinking.
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Indeed, we might expect that all participants in these studies display varying tendencies
and abilities to shift between creative and critical thinking. In order to overcome issues
of varying motivation to generate more ideas rather than self-evaluating ideas, we offer a
financial incentive to generation of many ideas in our next study.
The positive, albeit small, reliable correlations shown between difference scores and all
timings suggest that it does indeed take longer to think of an idea that has a higher
difference from the previous idea than not.
Splitting the data into highest similarity idea timings and highest difference idea timings
showed that more similar ideas have significantly lower thinking times and response la-
tencies, suggesting a faster development of ideas that follow on from similar ideas. This
confirms a prediction of the SIAM theory, but suggests, perhaps, that rather than ideas
being structured according to a series of discrete images in memory, they are generated by
associations with already active ideas.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we presented the results of two studies, with two separate ideation problems,
developed to replicate the findings of Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Nijstad,
Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003), and Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). We performed these
studies in order to verify that ideas are generated in a categorical way, and to test the
distribution of typing times and thinking times within and between categories. This was
done with the goal of building a foundation for the understanding of impasse and flow states
in terms of foraging theory, and the eventual plan of supporting ideators to escape from
impasses. We have reported problems with the methodology of categorising ideas into these
pre-set semantic categories developed by Diehl (1991). There were two separate sources
for these problems, presumably, as indicated in the coders’ comments. One source was the
categorisation schemes – these were those used successfully by Nijstad and Stroebe (2006),
but might no longer be optimal. Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) note that (even) their range of
levels of clustering (.20-.41) was fairly low in comparison to clustering found in free recall
tasks (.60-.70 in Basden et al. (1997)). They attributed this to the category system itself.
The second source of difficulty for category coding was the ideas themselves, as expressed
by the participants. Ideation tasks as usually studied, and as studied in this thesis, until
the final study, are very unconstrained, so that ideas can be expressed at various levels
of generalisation/specificity. This issue was also raised in the coders’ comments. We will
return to this in Chapter 5. A key limitation to highlight here is the use of non-professional
coders. The main researchers originally performed the coding, however, concerns were
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raised about a possible bias towards categorising vague ideas based on the previous idea,
due to the knowledge of the research hypotheses. The decision was therefore made to bring
in external coders. The lack of access to professional coders and financial means meant
that the coders involved were volunteer coders, albeit all familiar with data analysis. It was
ensured that these received instructions and training by going through a part of the dataset
with the main researcher.
Despite these difficulties with category coding, we have reported reliable indices of category
structure, and reliable effects on ideation times. We have found that, overall, within and
between category times vary significantly. Nevertheless, we do not place enough confidence
in these data to go beyond some speculations regarding specific foraging stopping rules.
Arguably, the main success of this chapter and the main novel contribution is an alternative
approach to semantically coding ideas, not in terms of pre-existing categories but in terms
of semantic differences between adjacent ideas. Whilst semantic differences have been
calculated automatically in other studies, it has been done so in order to verify that ideas
within groups are closely related (Chan et al., 2017). We tested the effect of the difference
between two ideas on the thinking times between those ideas and reported a reliable positive
correlation between thinking times and difference scores. This result could, speculatively,
be couched in relation to the SIAM model, which postulates that ideas are generated as
associations made to a particular image retrieved from long-term memory. It seems possible
that generating associations with a retrieved image might not produce well-structured,
perfectly clustered ideas in categories but nonetheless have a semantic relation to the
current image being looked at. As a result of this finding, it was decided not to update
the category scheme. The possibility of an alternative approach, namely semantic distance
between ideas, led to the decision to move on from the use of categorisation schemes as a
way of analysing the time-course of a single question ideation task. Note that we do revisit
the health category scheme in Chapter 5, after performing an instructional manipulation
for ideators, in order to assess whether our manipulation impacts coder agreement.
Our original motivation for these studies was to look at the boundaries between category
switches in order to see if we could explain idea generation using information foraging
theories. The weak categorisation results inhibited this approach. In the next study we
therefore explore a different type of ideation task, in which ideators are given a practically
unlimited number of questions to respond to in a time-bound setting. This approach allows
us to treat the objective sequence of ideation problems as a sequence of patches, and to
investigate the rules that ideators use to switch from one problem to the next.
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Time-course of ideation across
multiple ideation tasks
In the previous chapter, we looked at the time span of ideation across a single ideation
task. The category scheme available for each of the questions presented to participants,
was identified as problematic, resulting in difficulty categorising ideas, yielding a fairly low to
moderate agreement between coders. Comparing this to the study being replicated (Nijstad
and Stroebe, 2006), which had Cohen’s k agreement scores of 0.7-0.9, we questioned the
usefulness of this method for our purposes. Coders indicated they felt they had to assume
what the ideator meant as some ideas were vague and difficult to assess in terms of the
given category structure. The ARC scores and within- and between-category switches did
show interesting patterns in the environment question, however, this was not so apparent
in the health question.
More positively, we found evidence of a small correlation between the judged semantic
difference between two adjacent ideas (an idea pair) and the time it takes to formulate the
second idea in the given idea pair (response latency). Likewise, t-tests showed that our split
of thinking and typing times was valuable as there was a significant difference in thinking
times for highly different and highly similar ideas, but not for typing time, indicative of
the ideator stopping to formulate an idea in their head before writing it down. The higher
time taken to formulate highly different ideas additionally seems to support SIAM, in that
it can be explained by the concept of moving to a different image in long term memory.
Nevertheless, continuously variable semantic difference ratings do not allow us to test the
heuristics that derive from foraging theory concerning how an ideator might choose to
abandon one semantic category in favour of another.
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Therefore, we developed a new study that looks at how ideas are generated when the user
has the freedom to abandon a question for another at their own will. Category switches
were originally considered to represent the switch from one patch of information to another
in semantic memory, likened to information foraging. The switch from one question to
another (unknown before the switch) was in the current study used as a stronger indicator
of giving up and starting information foraging in a new patch. This method does not
require classification based on a pre-determined set of categories as switches are explicitly
seen when the ideator chooses to stop one task and begin another.
This task-sequence design had similar goals to the first study: we were looking for patterns
in the data that could suggest the strategies ideators use and whether they are switching to
new tasks in such a way that they maximise productivity. In the following section, we revisit
the theories discussed in Chapter 3 as well as further theories that relate to this study. The
main aim of this study was to use a discretionary task-switching paradigm to investigate
the time-course of ideation and the decision making of ideators. The study can also be
seen as a contribution to the work on discretionary giving-up, and to the understanding
of multi-tasking in general, because it extends an experimental paradigm that has most
typically been used on simple tasks or highly constrained problem solving tasks to a highly
creative task.
4.1 Chapter background
In our first study, we were particularly interested in the concepts of flow (Csikszentmihalyi,
1997) and impasse (e.g. Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006; Chan et al., 2017; Siangliulue et al.,
2015). Impasse was defined as a failure to produce new ideas and is described in the
literature as being a cause of longer idle times causing ideators to request inspiration. We
posed singular questions in our first study and categorised the responses according to a
pre-determined set of categories. The timings between and within category clusters were
an attempt to address whether ideators might switch topics if stuck for ideas.
In the current study, we wanted to observe more explicit switches which could be analysed
to better understand strategies employed to give up one patch so as to switch to another.
As we were looking at switches made by the ideator themselves, we suppose that they might
be more aware of the strategies they’re using in this study than in our previous single task
study. Rather than simply looking at impasse we refer further to classic stopping rules and
whether these can be used to explain the behaviour of ideators when given the freedom to
switch (RO3).
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The classic switch decisions can be found in the foraging theory sub-chapter of the literature
review. Charnov’s Marginal Value Theorem (MVT) (Charnov et al., 1976) is a proposed
optimal foraging theory in which the forager must use the momentary (or marginal) rate
of return of the current patch and mean rate of return for all patches visited as a method
of estimating if it is worth remaining on the current patch. Calculating the optimal time
to leave the current patch involves taking these rates of return into account as well as the
time it takes to travel to a new patch, Charnov’s Marginal Value Theorem imposes a very a
high cognitive load on the forager. Ware et al. (2016) have shown that during performance
of tasks, strategies employed by problem solvers become less optimal the more demanding
a task is. One simple prediction of Charnov’s Marginal Value Theorem is that patches will
be left sooner if the travel time to the patch (when no successes are achieved by definition)
is shorter. To test this prediction, a delay was imposed every time a participant quit one
ideation task to move to another (see Wilke et al. (2009) for a similar manipulation). In
a between-groups manipulation, this delay was set to 10 seconds for half the participants
and 25 seconds for the remainder.
More simplistic strategies include fixed-number and fixed-time rules (Iwasa, Higashi and
Yamamura, 1981), in which a patch is left based on a predetermined set time or number
of items have been proposed, because they might approximate the optimal strategy under
certain environmental conditions. For ideation, this would mean choosing to give up after
a set amount of time, or after generating a set number of ideas. Another quite simplistic
strategy is the rule which uses a threshold of giving-up time. The giving-up time rule solely
takes into account the time since the last item found, regardless of how many items have
been found before. This rule is based on a giving-up time threshold set by the forager, and
if the time since the last item found increases above this threshold, the patch is abandoned.
This rule leads to foragers spending longer in patches where successes are more frequent.
Another heuristic that adapts to the experienced yield of a patch is Green’s rule (Green,
1984). Green’s rule states that a forager may be estimating the potential of the patch
they are in, using a combination of the number of items found and the time taken between
them. The potential decreases as a function of time until it drops below a threshold at
which the patch is abandoned for another. Finding an item is represented by a positive
increase in the perceived potential. Green’s rule allows a forager to monitor the current
rate of gain of a patch, simply by keeping track of the number of successes. Looking at
strategies for making the decision to switch to a new question, we revisit the studies on
free recall and word search. Multiple tasks in which a person can abandon one for another
has been done in more rote tasks such as recall and anagram tasks (Payne, Duggan and
Neth, 2007; Wilke et al., 2009) but, to our knowledge, not in ideation tasks. These tasks
are different to ideation in the sense that they align more with accomplishment rather than
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accumulation tasks - the responses will be either correct or incorrect and there is a finite
number of responses. Note that in this section we use ’decision to switch’ and ’giving-up’
interchangeable, as a decision to switch is essentially a decision to give up on the current
question. In Harbison et al. (2009), they explore 4 different rules for terminating search
in memory for word lists: (1) fixed-time, (2) time since last successful retrieval of a word
(giving-up time), (3) number of successive failures to retrieve a word and (4) when the
rate of retrieval has reached the participant’s own accepted threshold (Green’s rule). Time
on task and time since last idea generated are two plausible rules for ending an ideation
task. Presumably so would the rate of return threshold rule be as it might well be a signal
to the ideator that their productivity on the current task is dropping. Translating rule (3),
number of successive failures, to an ideation task may be difficult, as the word failures
needs to be redefined. In achievement tasks, measuring a failure is straight forward as this
consists of failing to give a correct response or failing to give any response when prompted
to remember an item. In ideation tasks, classifying a response as a failure is less straight
forward as there are no correct or incorrect ideas. Recall that in Nijstad and Stroebe (2006)
failures are defined as the inability to continue to come up with new ideas, the same as
impasse. A method in which an ideator could be aware of multiple failures would be a
situation in which they fail to generate ideas, or generate new ideas.
In Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007), an anagram task is used in order to see what type of
strategies people use to maximise productivity. The tasks given to participants are in this
study split into easy and hard tasks. When given the chance to switch between tasks freely,
participants were found to spend longer on the harder tasks with lower rates of return, rather
than easier tasks with a higher rate of return and therefore a better score. Giving-up times
were longer in the harder tasks. In addition to this, they found that switching behaviour
could not simply be explained by any one of the above-mentioned rules, but by a composite
of Green’s rule and a new parameter: the probability of switching immediately after finding
an item (sub-goal completion). In the anagram study, the experimenters allowed the use
of task interleaving, letting participants switch back and forth between an easy and a hard
set of letters. In the present study, as we are recording the thinking time and typing time
of each idea, we have to use a different method in order to assess whether participants are
spending their time optimally. If participants would be allowed to switch back and forth
between tasks, this would be a different type of study entirely as they may let the question
sit in the back of their mind whilst performing another task, and then returned once they
could think of more ideas1. In our study we were mostly interested in the task abandonment
1A concept known as incubation. Interestingly, incubation is sometimes considered a key part of creative
problem solving. For the purpose of this study, we avoid the introduction of an incubation period as this
would interfere with our goal of observing flow-impasse states and the use of giving-up strategies.
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paradigm in which, when a participant moves on from a task, they are essentially giving
up.
In Wilke et al. (2009), a similar anagram study was performed in which they liken the word
search task to foraging in the physical world. They introduced a switching cost to their
anagram task: it would cost 25 seconds to switch from one task to another. They did
this in order to compare the results to an electronic ’fishing’ task in which switching to
another pond took 25 seconds. They did not compare a 25 second switch cost to any other
delay time. In their study, they allowed only giving up on a task, not switching back and
forth between tasks as in Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007). They similarly found that the
more simplistic giving-up rules could not explain the participant foraging behaviour in their
study, however, they did find evidence that the time since last item found (and time since
the item found before that) seemed to be the main indicator involved in the decision to
switch. They explain that in most cases, there did not seem to be a threshold time after
which participants would switch, and therefore a simple giving-up time rule would be too
simplistic to explain the decision to give up.
The above strategies for giving up and maximising productivity provide us with a basis of
possible patterns to look for in our current study, in order to determine how people allocate
their time in a multiple problem ideation task. People don’t know the gain curve of a task
prior to starting it and so will need to start the task before they can form an understanding
of the gain curve. Taking into consideration the constantly changing gain curve, we were
interested in finding out how people solve the time allocation problem and how well they
do this. The ideation study in this chapter was run with ideators individually, performing
a multiple question ideation task by typing out as many solutions as possible to a set of
17 questions. No participant managed to complete all 17 questions before time was up.
They could freely skip to another question, however, would either have a 10 second delay
or a 25 second delay. The analysis of the data looks at timings of ideas and responses to a
post-experiment questionnaire in the same way as in the first study. We additionally look
at giving-up times as well as propose a method of estimating how difficult a participant
found each individual question.
4.2 Study 2: Ideation strategy across multiple consecutive
tasks
In this section, we present our second experimental study, aimed at understanding switch
strategies in ideation and whether people use simple switching strategies such as fixed-time
or fixed-number rules, or more complex switching strategies such as Green’s rule (Green,
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1984). This study looks at the span of ideas across multiple ideation tasks and allows
the participant to switch to another question should they feel stuck on the current one.
The study consists of 17 open-ended questions designed to elicit a range of ideas from
participants in a variety of topics (see appendix B.1). A high number of questions were
developed in order to provide a seemingly infinite pool of tasks, allowing participants to




A laboratory experiment was conducted following a broadly similar paradigm to that used
in the previous study in this thesis. However, each participant was given 30 minutes2 to
generate as many ideas as possible across a series of ideation tasks. They were given the
discretion to stay ideating on a single task or to jump to another (unknown) task. To test
the elementary foraging theory prediction that travel times between patches will influence
patch leaving decisions, participants were assigned to one of two conditions, the switch cost
conditions: (1) 10 second delay between tasks or (2) 25 second delay between tasks. To
avoid order effects, the tasks were randomised at the start of each session and participants
were presented the tasks in a random order. Tasks were shown in serial and participants
were not allowed to interleave between them – once a task had been abandoned, participants
moved on to the next one and would not be able to go back to a previously abandoned
task.
The questions were chosen as appropriate tasks for this study as they were open-ended
questions that allowed ideators to think around the topic without requiring any real subject
knowledge. Whilst we did show that there is a difference in the time it takes between and
within groups of semantically related ideas, having multiple questions presents us with a
stronger split, determined by participants’ move from one question to another rather than
being based on the categorisation done by an independent coder, which might suffer from
being subjective rather than objective.
We were interested in the patterns in response latencies and whether these could predict
giving up the current question and switching to the next. In particular, we were looking
to see if we could classify this pattern as a simple fixed-time or fixed-number pattern or
whether there was any evidence of running out of ideas (slower response latencies) before
2The 30 minute time limit was a fairly arbitrary decision as there was no similar ideation study to compare
to. For other types of accomplishment task we find varying lengths, such as Payne, Duggan and Neth’s
(2007) 15-minute Scrabble task, or Wilke et al.’s (2009) 60-minute anagram task.
92
Chapter 4. Time-course of ideation across multiple ideation tasks
a switch is made, in which case a giving-up time heuristic or a rate-sensitive heuristic like
Green’s rule might be a better model of participants’ switch decisions. We compare thinking
times and giving-up times to see if there are any time threshold parameters involved and
look for any other unexpected patterns in the data. We propose the following hypotheses:
H1 : When the time-cost of switching tasks is higher, participants will spend
longer on each task before switching.
H2 : We do not expect participants’ switch decisions to be well explained by
time on task, number of items generated, or giving-up times.
H3 : We predict that switch decisions will exhibit dual processes, with some
switches almost immediately after an idea has been generated, but most
after a considerable giving-up time longer than the mean between-item
time.
Additionally, we look at whether there is any evidence to suggest that people spend longer on
more difficult questions rather than those in which they are more productive (i.e. generating
more ideas). In an ideation task like this, despite the use of questions that should not require
specific subject knowledge, it is to be expected that participants’ individual interests might
have an effect on their motivation and ability to generate ideas for a given question. We
therefore expect that objective difficulty of a question cannot be determined, but subjective
difficulty can. We estimate subjective difficulty using a range of different metrics in order
to assess whether participants indeed do spend longer on more difficult tasks.
Participants
30 participants (10 female), age range 19 to 53 (M=23.93, SD=6.51), were recruited from
around the University of Bath, consisting of undergraduate and postgraduate students, as
well as academic and administrative staff. Participants were recruited from a variety of
disciplines. They were recruited by mailing lists and posters presented around campus.
All participants were inexperienced ideators, that is, none of the participants performed
ideation for a living, nor were they previously trained in ideation methods. No further
profiling constraints were applied to recruitment for this study, due to the difficulty in
sourcing participants, despite being a paid study. In study 1, we discussed the possibility
that the low number of ideas generated by some participants could be due the lack of
financial incentive as a way of motivating the generation of many ideas rather than self-
evaluation and restraint in writing down ideas. We address this in the current study by
offering a reward dependent on productivity. A reward was given for participation – 20p
per coherent idea formed during the experiment (capped at £10) paid within a week of
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the study. This was included as an incentive to maximise productivity, as more ideas would
result in a higher reward. Additionally, participants were entered in a prize draw for two
amazon.co.uk vouchers of £25 each. This study was within the ethical bounds of the
Department of Computer Science at the University of Bath and every participant gave full
informed consent.
Materials
The application from our first study was adapted for this study using Visual Studio 2015.
The application was edited to consist of 4 screens (see figure 4-1). The first screen (figure
4-1a) takes in the participant number as input and uses this to set up the data file that
captures the participants input. When the ”Start Generating Ideas” button is pressed, the
application randomises the 17 questions in the array using the Fisher-Yates shuffle and
saves these back into the array in their new order.
The second screen (figure 4-1b) is the main ideation input screen, split into two main parts.
On the left it displays the first ideation question at the top and contains a simple input
field and a submit button saying: ”Submit Idea”. On the right is a large empty text box
in which submitted ideas are displayed. As in the single task study, the text box is set to
scroll when more ideas are submitted than can be displayed. Under the text box is the
”New Question” button, which participants were instructed to press should they want to
abandon the current task for another question.
If the ”New Question” button is pressed, the third screen is shown (figure 4-1c). This is
the delay screen - it is presented exactly as the second screen, however, it is not possible
to enter any ideas. All ideas submitted for the previous question are saved to the output
file and on-screen text box is cleared, ready for the next question. The ideation question
is replaced with ”Please wait until the next question is displayed”. Participants were made
aware of which delay condition they were in, 10 seconds or 25 seconds, prior to starting the
study. The third screen will be displayed for the specified delay time. Once the delay time
has passed, the input screen is shown again, displaying the next question in the array.
The input form automatically shuts down after 30 minutes, taking the participant to the
fourth screen (figure 4-1d), which thanks them for their time and ends the ideation part
of the study. All data are captured by the environment automatically. Ideas entered, the
question they are associated with, as well as the timestamps for the start of an idea and
the time enter is pressed (i.e idea submitted) are captured.
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(a) Participant entry (b) Ideation screen
(c) Question switching delay screen (d) End of experiment screen
Figure 4-1: Developed app for study 2: multiple sequential ideation.
The delay time condition was selected for each participant according their order of participa-
tion, and had to be adjusted manually. The software was run on a Lenovo Yoga 710-14ISK
laptop running windows 10. To ease input, a 22” screen, wired mouse and keyboard were
attached to the laptop.
Procedure
Each participant attended the study individually in a quiet room situated in the Computer
Science department at the University of Bath. This was done to avoid any distractions
or any items that could act as a prime for certain types of idea. The participants were
handed an information sheet to read and had the chance to ask questions before the study
started (see appendix B.2). They were explicitly instructed to come up with ideas using the
same modified version of Osborn’s (1957) brainstorming rules used in the first study. As
in the first study, they were asked to expand their ideas to incorporate specific behaviours;
instead of saying ”manage electricity”, they were asked to indicate how they propose you
could do so, e.g. ”don’t overfill a kettle if you are only making a single cup of tea”. They
were explained that they could submit the same idea twice should they wish to expand and
elaborate.
Once consent forms had been signed (appendix B.3), participants were situated in front
of the computer and talked through the environment. The three-minute practice task was
started and participants were asked to come up with as many ideas as they could in response
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to ”How can the number of tourists visiting the city of Bath be increased?”
Once participants felt comfortable with the environment, the real experiment application
was started, and participants were left alone in the room to generate as many ideas across
as many or few questions as they decided suitable in the 30 minutes. Participants were
aware of both the 30-minute time constraint and of the delay condition to which they were
assigned. No clock was visible so as to avoid distraction. Once the ideation task was
complete, participants were given a short questionnaire developed specifically for this study
(for full questionnaire, see appendix B.4). The first question asked them to comment on
their strategy and what cues they used to decide to give up on a question. This first open-
ended question was asked before the likert-scale questions, in order to avoid any priming
effects from the wording of the scale questions, allowing the participant to formulate their
own strategy wording before seeing other possible strategies. They were then asked to
respond on a scale of 1-10, how often they used the following cues to switch: number of
ideas, time spent on a question, time interval since previous idea generated and overall
feeling of stuckness. They were then asked to rate, on a scale from 1-10, their level of
agreement to the following questions:
• ”I only pressed ’next question’ when I felt stuck”,
• ”During a question, I continuously switched between the feelings of being stuck and
un-stuck”,
• ”It was very difficult to think of new ideas” and
• ”The same idea occurred to me several times.”
At the end of the study, the participant was debriefed and thanked for their time. Within
a week of participating, the number of unique ideas were counted, and the participant was
compensated (up to a value of £10) for the number of ideas generated.
General analytic approach
With a goal of understanding giving-up decisions and how people allocate their time when
ideating, we analysed the data with a focus on which strategies were used to maximise
productivity. Participants had an extrinsic incentive to generate more ideas, as this would
result in receiving a higher financial reward. As in our first study, the timings were auto-
matically recorded by the experiment application. Note that the last ideation task in some
of the datasets was not ended by the participant but by the application itself as the 30
minutes had elapsed and the participant ran out of time. These final tasks were removed
from the data before analysis as they did not have a giving-up time associated with them
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and therefore could not be included in the analysis comparing giving-up times to between
idea thinking times. This left us with 1264 ideas generated by 30 participants (M=42.10,
SD=15.34) across all 17 questions.
In this chapter we use the same timings as in our previous study, but we introduce a new
dependent variable, the giving-up time. Timings of the ideas generated are defined as
follows:
• First keystroke: the first time a key is pressed, indicating that a letter has been
entered in the answer area.
• Thinking times: the time between submitting the previous idea and the first keystroke
of the subsequent idea. Note that for the first idea, thinking time is the time from
when the question appears until the first keystroke. Thinking times are also referred to
as between-item times for the sake of giving-up time analysis, as seeing any between-
item times larger than giving-up times would rule out a simple giving-up time rule.
• Typing times: the time between the first keystroke of each idea and pressing the
submit button.
• Response latency : as in study 1, this is the time between two submit presses. Re-
sponse latency represents the full time it takes to formulate an idea; it is the sum of
the thinking and typing time of an idea.
• Giving-up time: the time between when the submit button has been pressed on the
last idea and the ”New Question” button has been pressed.
The above acted as our dependent measures. In addition to the time dependent variables,
we also looked at the rate of return (ideas per minute) per task and fluency (total number
of ideas) per task. Analyses to find overall patterns in the time span of the task regardless
of delay condition were done to estimate strategies used by participants to switch to new
questions.
The easy and hard task split in Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) is interesting as it may
give further insight into time allocation and switching strategies. In these ideation tasks,
determining what was considered a hard and an easy task was less straight forward than in
an anagram task as the difficulty of a question is subject to interest in the topic and varies
from person to person. In exploring median splits on a range of metrics, we found that
looking at the number of items generated for a question yielded results, which we report.
Questions that had a higher number of items generated were placed in the ”easy” questions
group and those with a lower number of items generated in the ”hard” questions group.
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Finally, the post-experiment questionnaires were prepared for analysis. The responses to
open-ended question about switching strategy were coded by the experimenter into one of
the following categories: failure (F), time since last idea (t), time on question (Tq), number
of ideas (N), or other (0). This was done simply on analysis of the wording used in the text.
The first four are based on the well-known strategies found in the literature, where failure is
what is also known as an impasse, feeling stuck or generating the same idea; time since last
idea suggests a giving-up time rule; number of ideas and time on question suggest simple
fixed-time or fixed-number rules. The final, other, was used for any strategies that did not
easily fall into the other categories. Correlations were run in order to see if the self-reported
strategies were in line with actual behaviour as well as whether they were correlated with
the likert scale responses on the remainder of the questions on the questionnaire.
Statistical analyses of correlations and t-tests were done in IBM SPSS Statistics version 23.
Tables and graphs were generated in Microsoft Excel for Office 365 Pro.
4.2.2 Results and discussion
The results are presented in three parts. First, we present an overview of the data including
overall fluency per participant, fluency per question and number of questions attempted.
Average thinking times, typing times, response latencies, and giving-up times are reported.
We focus on the effect of the delay-time conditions on the decision to switch by looking
at the number of questions attempted as well as the effect of the differing delay times
on thinking times, typing times, response latencies, and giving-up times. The second part
looks for evidence of the use of particular giving-up or switch strategies. The third covers
self-reported strategies taken from the questionnaire responses and compares the written
responses to those from the likert scales filled in. Additionally, we look at whether the
self-reported strategies are reflected in individuals’ behavioural data.
In the following section we present descriptive statistics of the number of questions at-
tempted per participant, the number of ideas generated per participant and the rates of
return (see table 4.1).
Effect of delay times on switch decisions
Independent t-tests showed that a delay of 10 seconds resulted in a significantly higher
number of questions attempted, in comparison to the 25 second delay. Delay time had a
significant effect on both the number of questions attempted (t(28) = 2.210, p = .035, d =
.807) and the number of questions seen, i.e. attempted and skipped questions (t(28) =
2.288, p = .03, d = .836).
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Questions attempted 8.00 (3.31) 5.73 (1.95) 6.87 (2.94)
Questions unattempted 1.00 (1.26) 0.47 (0.88) 0.73 (1.12)
Questions abandoned 9.00 (4.05) 7.07 (1.98) 7.60 (3.53)
Ideas per attempted
question
5.66 (3.41) 6.14 (2.48) 5.90 (2.99)
Mean ideas generated 43.80 (13.17) 40.40 (17.08) 42.10 (15.34)
Rate of return (ideas per
minute)
1.88 (0.57) 1.63 (0.7) 1.75 (0.65)
Table 4.1: Mean number of questions and ideas (SD) across all participants,
split by delay condition and overall. Questions unattempted are questions
seen and abandoned without generation of any ideas. Questions abandoned
are questions that were abandoned by the ideator and not cut short by the
experiment automatically ending.
It was not possible to see a significant effect of delay time on the decision to skip a
question without attempting to respond to it (t(28) = 1.293, p = .207, d = .472). There
was no significant difference in the mean number of ideas generated per question (t(28) =
−.431, p = .670, d = −.163) as well as total number of ideas generated (t(28) = .590, p =
.560, d = .223) for each of the two delay conditions. No significant difference was found
for average time spent on each task between the two conditions. No significant difference
was found for rate of return between the two conditions3.
The timing data were first natural log transformed in order to normalise the data for t-
tests. Log transformed data was then compared to see if the delay times affected any of
the timings between participants. Independent t-tests comparing means of thinking times
for the first idea of each question showed that in the 10 second delay condition (M=2.12,
SD=.34), the first idea thinking time was significantly lower than that in the 25 second
delay condition (M=2.43, SD=.34) (t(28) = −2.463, p = .020, d = 0.899). No other
timings showed a significant difference between the two conditions.
Giving-up decision strategies: overall patterns in time-course regardless of delay
condition
Paired t-tests were conducted on log transformed data to compare thinking times, typing
times and overall response latencies across both conditions. All comparisons of first idea
3Despite following a slightly different paradigm, that is, allowing participants to abandon a question
for another, it is worth noting here that the mean rate of return of 1.75 ideas per minute in this study is
comparable to that of 1.73 ideas per minute in study 1a. More importantly, this is comparable to other paid
ideation studies, (e.g. Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006), although these are also single question ideation tasks.
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to overall ideas exclude first idea times in the overall idea number. All comparisons of last
idea timings to overall ideas exclude the last idea timings in the overall idea number. All
patterns of significance are the same without log transform, with the exception of those
marked by a star*.
There was a significant difference in the thinking time of the first idea (M=2.28, SD=.37)
and the thinking time of the remainder of the ideas (M=1.61, SD=.56) (t(29) = 6.69, p =
.000, d = 1.22)*. An opposite significant difference was observed for typing time of first
idea (M=2.96, SD=.57) versus typing time of remainder of ideas (M=3.19, SD=.54)
(t(29) = −4.79, p = .000, d = −.87). No significant difference was found for overall
response latency compared to first idea response latency.
There was a significant difference in the thinking time of the last idea (M=2.00, SD=.87)
and mean thinking time for the remainder of the ideas (M=1.71, SD=.48) (t(29) =
2.141, p = .040, d = 0.39). This was also found in the typing time of the last idea (M=3.36,
SD=.61) compared to overall typing time (M=3.11, SD=.52) (t(29) = 4.45, p = .000, d =
.81) and the response latency of the last idea (M=3.75, SD=.55) compared to the overall
response latency of all ideas (M=3.46, SD=.44) (t(29) = 4.79, p = .000, d = .87).
The rate of return (ideas per minute) was calculated for the first 2 and last 2 ideas. In order
to do this, only questions with four or more response ideas were included. This left us with
a sample of 137 questions answered by 29 participants. Analysis of the rate of return for
the first two ideas (M=2.57, SD=1.00) and last two ideas (M=1.77, SD=.84) showed a
significantly higher rate of return in the first two ideas (t(28) = 6.186, p = .000, d = 1.15).
In general these comparisons fit with the idea that participants typically find ideas harder to
generate before choosing to quit a task. We cover this further in the analysis of giving-up
times.
Simple heuristics for switch decisions
The very simplest heuristics suggested in the foraging literature (see Chapter 2) are that
foragers might choose to quit a patch (a task in our case) after a fixed time, or after finding
a fixed number of items (ideas). If tasks are roughly equivalent in difficulty, or if rate of
production is very irregular, so that later performance on a task is not well predicted by
earlier performance, these very simple heuristics will be reasonably efficient. Nevertheless,
they seem, on the basis of the foraging literature, unlikely. The simplest evidence against
them in this study was to inspect the time-course of each participants foraging across tasks
and to look at how variable time and number of items per task are. A visualisation used by
Wilke et al. (2009) for this purpose is shown in figure 4-2 and figure 4-3 (left panel - we will
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discuss the right panel in the next section), for 8 randomly selected participants, 4 in each
delay condition. Inspecting these figures strongly confirms that these simple heuristics are
not operational. All participants quit some tasks much quicker than others, and generate
many fewer ideas for some tasks than others.
Giving-up times and switch decisions
The next simplest foraging heuristic for time allocation across patches (tasks) is a giving-up
time rule, in which foragers quit a patch after a fixed threshold of time without a success.
This is a more flexible and adaptive rule in many situations, as it results in more time being
allocated to more productive tasks.
There are many ways of inspecting giving-up time data to test the explanatory power of
the giving-up time rule in our data. First consider the scatter plots in the right-hand panels
of figures 4-2 and 4-3. A simple giving-up time rule would predict that no thinking times
would be longer than giving-up times. From the scatter plots from 8 randomly chosen
participants (4 in each delay condition), it is clear to see that this was not the case, and
that although giving-up times were generally longer, quite a few between-item thinking
times were found to be longer.
Paired samples t-tests were performed on log transformed data for mean giving-up times
and mean between times per participant. Mean giving-up times (M=2.10, SD=.80) were
found to be significantly larger than mean thinking times (also called between times for the
purpose of our study) (M=1.75, SD=.49) (t(29) = 2.261, p = .031, d = 0.41)4.
Giving-up times and the longest between-item times are shown in figure 4-4. Tasks in which
no ideas had been generated were excluded from this analysis, leaving us with 206 data
points across 30 participants.
Out of the 206 sets of ideas submitted (i.e. participant× task), 32% had longer between
times (thinking times) than giving-up times (36% in the 10 second delay condition, 27%
in the 25 second delay condition). This is simple and strong evidence against the use of
a simple giving-up time heuristic. Figure 4-5 shows the overall distribution of giving-up
times, with the mean between-item thinking time shown for comparison.
4Non-transformed data: Mean giving-up times (M=17.64, SD=11.53) was significantly larger than mean
thinking times for all ideas (M=10.28, SD=5.23) (t(29) = 3.727, p = .001, d = .68). Note these findings
were equally reflected if questions with less than 3 and 4 ideas were removed.
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Figure 4-2: The trajectories of number against time on task of four randomly
chosen participants from study 2, in the 10 second delay condition. Vertical
jumps represent finding an idea, horizontal lines represent thinking times. On
the right, the thinking times (blue) and giving-up times (orange) plotted at
the time during a task they occur for those same four participants. Note the
variation in scales between participants. All scales are linear.
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Figure 4-3: The trajectories of number against time on task of four randomly
chosen participants from study 2, in the 25 second delay condition. Vertical
jumps represent finding an idea, horizontal lines represent thinking times. On
the right, the thinking times (blue) and giving-up times (orange) plotted at
the time during a task they occur for those same four participants. Note the
variation in scales between participants. All scales are linear.
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Figure 4-4: Comparison of giving-up times, longest between-item time and
mean times between items (thinking times) for each of the conditions in study
2.
Overall, the giving-up time data supports H3. Too many tasks had between-item times that
were longer than giving-up times to support a simple giving-up time heuristic. However,
giving-up times were typically longer than between-item times, as are times to generate
the last two items. This supports the operation of a rate-based heuristic such as Green’s
rule, where quit decisions are typically made when ideas are becoming harder to find. At
the same time, some giving-up times were brief, which supports the idea of a two-process
strategy: occasionally participants quit a task on sub-goal completion.
The effects of task difficulty
Due to participants’ varying interest in, and motivation to respond to, each of the questions,
we tested a range of measures to assess subjective difficulty. It is problematic to answer
questions about the effects of task difficulty in this experiment, as most indices of difficulty
for a participant are to some extent under strategic control. In earlier work (e.g. Payne,
Duggan and Neth, 2007), tasks were purposefully designed to manipulate difficulty, and its
effects could therefore be investigated. That is perhaps not impossible to do for ideation
tasks, but the high variance of fluency in the studies in the literature is suggestive that
difficulty of different tasks will vary among participants.
In this experiment, it is tempting to assume that if a participant generates ideas at a
higher rate in some tasks than in others then that task is easier for that participant - but
because participants can choose to persist with some tasks for longer than others that is not
necessarily a reasonable approach. Nevertheless, in Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007), the
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Figure 4-5: The distribution of giving-up times, compared with the mean
between-item thinking times (M=10.28, SD=5.23) in study 2.
reliable finding that people spent longer in more rewarding tasks, and that giving-up times
were higher in the more difficult task were both informative about participants strategies.
It does not seem possible to test the first of these relationships, for the reasons mentioned
immediately above, however, this first finding supports the suggestion that foragers are
adaptive. The second reliable effect supports a particular heuristic, i.e. Green’s rule. As
(Payne, Duggan and Neth, 2007, p.377) argue:
’[According to Green’s rule,] In richer patches, the visits are longer, but items
occur more densely within that time period. Therefore, the chances of an item
occurring shortly before the leave decision (producing a short giving-up time)
are increased. Shorter giving-up times in richer patches (easier tasks) thus
occur as a probabilistic effect.’
To test whether giving-up times are shorter in richer patches in the current experiment
required a model of richness that is completely independent of giving-up times. Clearly
rate of return was not such an index, but fluency was: participants generated more ideas
on tasks that were easier for them.
Note that all tasks with 0 ideas submitted were removed for the purpose of this analysis,
leaving us with 206 tasks performed by 30 participants. A median split was performed on
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Figure 4-6: Comparison of giving-up times of subjectively easy and hard tasks
in study 2, against the median split on number of ideas generated, for each
participant individually.
the number of ideas per task for each participant: providing a set of difficult versus easy
tasks for each individual participant, and the means of giving-up time were then calculated
for the two halves of the data. Some participants’ datapoints could not be calculated as
performing a median split on number of ideas on datasets of 2,2,2,3 yielded no clear split.
Figure 4-6 shows two data points per participant, one for mean giving-up time in the easy
questions and one for mean giving-up time in hard questions.
Giving-up time in the tasks identified to be easy (M=13.55, SD=12.29) by the median
split was found to be significantly smaller than giving-up time in the tasks identified as
hard (M=23.17, SD=19.31) (t(27) = −2.466, p = .020, d = −.47). This confirms the
relation between giving-up time and patch richness and is supportive of the hypothesis that
participants are making giving-up decisions according to Green’s rule (H2).
Self-reported strategies
Questionnaire responses showed that most participants were using a switch strategy based
on failure (feeling stuck, generating duplicate ideas, being unable to think of new ideas).
We read through the qualitative responses on the questionnaire and analysed this for key
words or strategies. These were coded into 5 different strategies, shown in table 4.2.
No significant differences in the means of any scale question in the post-experimental ques-
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tionnaire was found in comparison with the self-reported switch strategy - an interesting
result in itself, as it shows that despite a person being aware they are using a specific strat-
egy, they still might not recognise the questions as being representative of their strategies.
Strategy Summary
Failure (F) 20
Time since last idea (t) 8
Time on question (Tq) 0
Number of ideas (N) 2
Other (O) 6
Table 4.2: Self-reported switching strategies (N=30) from study 2 participant
questionnaire. Note that the numbers don’t add up to 30, this is due to 6
people reporting multiple strategies (e.g. using an aggregate strategy involving
time since last idea and a failure (N=5) or number of ideas generated (N=1)).
Intercorrelation analysis between questionnaire responses showed little evidence of corre-
lations. There was a positive moderate correlation between the responses to number of
ideas generated being a switch cue and time spent on current question being a switch cue
(r = .576, p < .01) and low negative correlation between ”It was very difficult to think of
new ideas” and number of ideas as a cue (r = −.494, p < .01), as well as time spent on
question as a cue (r = −.499, p < .01). ”I only pressed next question when I felt stuck”
and feeling stuck on current question as a cue to switch had a low positive correlation
(r = .493, p < .01).
Low positive correlation was found for the questions ”I continuously switched between the
feelings of being stuck and un-stuck” and ”I only pressed ’new question’ when I felt stuck”
(r = .362, p < .05). A low positive correlation was also found between the former question
and ”the same idea occurred to me several times” (r = .388, p < .05).
No correlation was found between ”Number of ideas generated on current question” as a
cue to switch, and the variance in number of ideas generated per task (r = −.265, p > .1)
4.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented a study in which ideators were given a practically unlimited
number of questions to respond to in a time-bound setting. This approach allowed us to
treat the sequence of ideation problems as a sequence of patches, in order to investigate
what rules might govern ideation behaviour and the decision to switch from one problem to
the next. As in the previous study, which was a replication of the studies presented in Nijstad
and Stroebe (2006), we explored the behaviour of non-expert ideators. In contrast to the
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previous study, for this study we provided a financial incentive to the generation of many
ideas. Whilst it is not wholly possible to measure the impact of this due to the different
structure of this study, the rate of generation of ideas is comparable to other paid single
question ideation studies. Interestingly, the rate of idea generation is also comparable to
that found in the environment question in study 1a, but markedly higher than that found in
the health question study 1b. The high rate of idea generation in the environment question
could potentially show an overall higher interest from the participant group in that question,
or it could simply be coincidence, affected by the small number of participants.
By presenting ideators with a sequence of ideation tasks and allowing them to choose when
to abandon any task to move on to the next, we have been able to test the extent to which
patch-leaving rules from foraging theory are able to explain ideators’ decisions to switch
tasks.
First, by manipulating a time-cost invoked at every change of task (comparable to travel
time between patches), we have found support for generally adaptive behaviours as predicted
by Charnov et al.’s (1976) Marginal Value Theorem: ideators will attempt less tasks if the
time cost of accessing the next task is larger. This is a simple but fundamental support
for our proposal that foraging theory might speak to time management in ideation tasks.
We then turned to investigate simple patch-leaving heuristics as potential explanations of
this adaptive behaviour. Analysis of the variation in rates of idea generation, quite clearly
appear to rule out very simple rules such as switching after a fixed time, or after a fixed
number of ideas. This is not surprising: these heuristics have not been shown to operate in
any study of human foraging, whether externally, or internally (Payne, Duggan and Neth,
2007; Wilke et al., 2009; Hills, Jones and Todd, 2012).
More interestingly, analyses of giving-up times show that a simple giving-up time rule
is also a poor candidate for explaining ideators’ switch behaviour. It is very common for
participants to have thinking times between items within a task that are longer than giving-
up times. Furthermore, giving-up times are reliably longer on less productive tasks. Again,
this replicates the findings in the information foraging literature, and extends them to this
more creative foraging task using creative thinking as a tool for foraging for ideas.
Finally, the distribution of thinking times is quite strikingly similar, in certain ways, to that
found by Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) in their study of a Scrabble-like task. Thinking
times are longer in general for ideas occurring later in the task than at the start of the task.
Giving-up times in general are longer than between-item times, and (as above) longer for
more difficult tasks, but sometimes are very short, shorter than the average thinking time.
In all these respects the data suggest that ideators are sensitive to the within-task rate of
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generation of ideas, and quit when this is poor, but also might sometimes prefer to quit
immediately after completing a subgoal – i.e. generating an idea.
As noted by Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007), this two-factor account of task switching
is quite compatible with observations of multi-tasking in complex office environments (e.g.
González and Mark, 2004).
Our original motivation for this study was to investigate what rules ideators might apply
when deciding to switch from one question to another. We found a two factor account of
task switching as has been shown in other types of task such as a Scrabble-task. Considering
the iterative ideation-evaluation process of creative problem solving, and our speculations in
Chapter 3 (study 1) that ideators evaluate their own ideas as they write them down - could
it be the case that ideators use some self-judged quality of their ideas as a prompt to give
up on a task? Indeed if people use subjective quality of ideas as a measure of giving-up, this
might give further insight into the decision to switch immediately after submitting an idea
versus after a longer period of idle time. In the next chapter, we present a short analysis of
the data from the current study, originally setting out to explore this phenomenon further.
Unfortunately, methodological issues with the quality coding exercise itself became clear
early in the analysis, changing the focus of the analysis away from the quality of the ideas
themselves, towards an investigation of the properties of the ideas themselves; properties
that might be having a negative impact on independent coder agreements.
109
Chapter 5
Judging the quality of ideas:
novelty and value
In the previous chapter, we presented a study in which ideators were given a seemingly
unlimited number of questions to respond to within a 30-minute time limit. We looked
at the time-span of ideation across multiple ideation tasks and found evidence of a two
factor account of task switching, a sensitivity to rate of return and the tendency to switch
immediately upon submission of an idea, suggesting that we might be able to apply classic
foraging theories to our understanding of ideation behaviour.
The analyses of patch leaving strategies in the study presented in Chapter 4 assume that
participants are sensitive to the number of ideas they are generating, and the rate of
generation. As a results of the ideation-evaluation nature of creative problem solving, it
seems possible, additionally or alternatively, that participants will care about idea quality,
and will prefer to stay in patches that are yielding the best rate of high-quality ideas rather
than ideas per se (RO4). The quality of ideas in ideation tasks like the ones used in these
studies is quite a challenging concept, with some discrepant suggestions in the literature.
Having reviewed the different methods of assessing quality in Chapter 2, it was decided
to focus on two independent qualities, namely novelty and value. We asked independent
coders to rate these properties, using definitions and instructions often used in the literature
(e.g. Ye and Robert Jr, 2017; Dennis et al., 1999; Dennis, Minas and Bhagwatwar, 2013;
Diehl and Stroebe, 1987).
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5.1 Method
Three coders were hired through word of mouth. As in study 1, it was decided to hire
external coders unfamiliar with the research goals to avoid bias. All three coders, 1 male
and 2 female, aged 20-21, were native English speaking third year undergraduate students
in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Bath. All 3 coders individually
rated all 1264 ideas given in response to the 17 questions by all 30 participants. The coders
were each paid £60 for the entire coding exercise. Due to a lack of access to professional
coders, we hired coders with no prior experience in coding this type of data. Consequently,
prior to coding the full datasets, each of the coders received thorough instructions and were
asked to talk through their coding to show understanding.
The work itself took place in 3 stages. First the independent coders had an introductory
session in which they met in person with the experimenter individually. They were explained
the purpose of the research, but not the goals of the analysis, trained on how to perform
the ratings and asked to talk through how they would rate a set of ideas in order to verify
they had understood the brief.
The coders were asked to individually rate every idea on two metrics: value and novelty.
They were asked not to meet or discuss their ratings as this would invalidate the ratings
being independent. These were to be rated on a scale of 1-10, 1 being ’no value/not
novel’ and 10 being ’high value/very novel’ (for full written instructions given to coders,
see appendix B.5). These were for the purpose of this study defined as:
• Novelty: how original and surprising is the idea?
• Value: how useful and practical is this idea and does it make sense as a solution to
the problem?
Training in the use of the novelty and value scales consisted of verbally going through each
point on the scale, assigning this to an idea in a sample of the data, with each coder. Once
each point on the scale had been explained, the coder was asked to rate a sample of the data
and talk through their thinking, in order to show they had understood how to use the scales.
Separate samples were used for each coder to avoid influencing the agreement scores. They
were given an estimate of three hours to complete the task, although were allowed to spend
more time should they need to do so. They were allowed to complete this in their own time.
They were told that although the work was quite simple they should ensure they focus on
it rather than have distractions in the background. Each question’s response set was listed
on individual tabs, resulting in 17 tabs in total. Coders were instructed to work on one
question at a time by initially reading through all ideas for that single question, without
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making any judgements. They were then asked to go back to the top and give ”novelty”
and ”value” scores to each individual idea. Coders were specifically reminded that novelty
and value were meant to be treated as two separate scores and they should not use one
idea’s novelty score as a cue for the value score. Coders were asked to use the notes field
in case they found some difficult to rate, such that these could be discussed in the final
stage, the debrief.
After completing the quality coding, coders individually attended a 30-minute debrief session
with the experimenter, in which they talked through some of the ideas they found difficult
to code. Once the debrief session was over, coders were thanked for their time and paid
the £60 fee for completing the work.
5.2 Results and discussion
In the following section we present the results of the quality coding performed by three
coders. In the first part, we discuss the characteristics of the coders and the ratings of
novelty and value that they have submitted. In the second part we present the correlation
between coder ratings per metric and per participant and question.
Due to low inter-rater agreement, we present a quick overview of analyses done on each of
the set of ratings. These can only be seen as tentative conclusions as the low agreement
rules out certainty in the conclusions we make. The following results highlight the analyses
we would be performing had we had a higher agreement level between coders.
5.2.1 Coder and rating characteristics
Table 5.1 shows a summary of the means and standard deviations of ratings done by each
coder, as well as the range of the 10-point scale used. In figure 5-1 we show the distribution
of the rating given by all three coders (individually).
Correlation between novelty and value for each individual coder revealed no correlation
for coder 1 (r(1257) = −.047, p = .096). A weak negative correlation was found between
novelty and value scores for coder 2 (r(1262) = −.205, p = .000) as well as a weak negative
correlation in the same scores for coder 3 (r(1253) = −.233, p = .000). Note that the
differing degrees of freedom are due to coders 1 and 3 leaving some responses blank.
Coders were asked to leave comments in case they wished to elaborate on their response
or highlight the reason for a specific response. Only one comment was left by coder 1,
whereas there were 95 comments left by coder 2. Among the comments left by coder
2, comments such as ”not practical/possible”, ”socially unacceptable” and ”not enough
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Mean SD Min Max Left Blank
Coder 1
Novelty 5.11 2.71 1 10 5
Value 6.64 2.20 1 10 5
Coder 2
Novelty 3.18 1.64 1 9 0
Value 6.32 1.75 1 10 0
Coder 3
Novelty 4.13 1.71 1 10 11
Value 5.54 1.30 1 9 11
Table 5.1: Table showing mean ratings for novelty and value as given by each
individual coder; data coded is from study 2.
Novelty Value
Coder 1 Coder 2 Coder 3 Coder 1 Coder 2 Coder 3
Coder 1 - .511 .384 - .360 .228
Coder 2 - - .470 - - .282
Table 5.2: Correlations of coder scores for novelty and value; data coded is
from study 2.
detail” appeared multiple times. Coder 3 left 19 comments. The majority of these were
about the idea not being applicable (and subsequently, ”not an idea to [solve the key
problem in the question]”).
Pearson correlations between the two coders were all significant, however, the correlations
showed mostly weak and moderate agreement between ratings (see table 5.2). Running
Krippendorff’s alpha1 (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007) (ordinal) analysis on novelty agree-
ments between the 3 coders resulted in a disagreement rate of a = 0.316 (3776 decisions
across 1264 cases). Running Krippendorff’s alpha (ordinal) analysis on value agreements
between the 3 coders resulted in a disagreement rate of a = 0.163 (3776 decisions across
1264 cases).
1Krippendorff’s alpha compares ’observed’ disagreement with the ’expected’ disagreement. Expected
disagreement is strongly influenced by the ratio of values, 1-10.
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(a) Coder 1 Ratings
(b) Coder 2 Ratings
(c) Coder 3 Ratings
Figure 5-1: Distribution of novelty and value ratings as given by each individual
coder; data coded is from study 2.
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Coder 1 Coder 2 Coder 3




0.023 0.101 -0.054 0.04 -0.063 -0.057
Giving- up
times (s)
0.121 0.126 0.056 0.055 0.075 -0.017
LN of Giving-up
times
0.133 0.133 0.06 0.01 0.062 0.011
Time spent
ideating (s)




0.152 0.033 0.089 -0.009 0.137 -0.097
Time on
task (s)
0.179 0.075 0.093 0.011 0.146 -0.108
LN of time
on task (s)
0.189 0.058 0.101 -0.01 0.094 -0.11
Table 5.3: Correlations between timing measurements for each participant×
question pair. No significant correlations were found between any of these
metrics and the novelty and value scores given by any of the coders.
5.2.2 Quality coding
Due to the low agreement level between the coders, analyses on quality per participant
have not been calculated. Although stated that it is not fair to calculate quality as mean
quality (due to 1 great idea and 3 bad ones scoring lower than a mediocre idea), we are
interested here in looking at the mean quality per idea set and seeing if this had an influence
on the ideators choice to move on to another question. For this, tasks that had 0 ideas
(e.g. abandoned tasks) were removed leaving us with 206 sets of ideas across 17 tasks by
30 participants. We calculated the correlations between novelty and value ratings, given by
all 3 coders separately, against a number of metrics in order to see if a measure of quality
was used by participants in study 2 to decide when to give up, how much time to spend on
the task and whether number of ideas correlated with the value/novelty of the set. None of
these correlations were significant (see table 5.3). Interpreting this as being evidence that
quality is not a part of the strategy to give up on a question would be imprudent considering
the disagreement between our coders. Instead we look to the data in order to see whether
these disagreements (also found in study 1 category codings) could be attributed to the
properties of the ideas themselves.
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5.2.3 The properties of agreed-good v agreed-bad v no-agreement ideas
Faced with the problem of very poor inter-rater agreement of judged value and novelty, we
wondered if this might be an effect of the variable specificity with which ideas are expressed.
We conducted two exploratory analyses to investigate this speculation. One analysis used
a very coarse measure of specificity, namely the word length of ideas. The second analysis
instead considered the thematic roles that were present in ideas.
The themes used are from classic case grammar. The ideas are generally speaking sentences
and therefore typically exhibit the classic sentence structure. It seemed plausible to wonder
whether better formed ideas have more of these thematic categories in their expression and
whether the worst formed ideas are reduced sentences that only hold an action or theme.
A subset of the judged ideas was inspected to find out whether ideas rated as overall
agreed good (between our three coders) stated explicit roles, themes or goals of the ideas,
in comparison to overall agree bad ideas.
We analysed the top 20 agreed good ideas (aggregate found by calculating the means of
all three novelty and value ratings) as well as the lowest 20 agreed ratings, looking at the
number of words in the ideas. The following are examples of the low and high agreed
quality ideas:
• Low: ”Have less things”
• Low: ”Do the things you want to”
• High: ”Have a partnership with the city council of Bath for building houses which
would serve not only for students but can be for example temporary houses for tourists
during the summer.”
• High: ”Your phone could warn you of known areas with poor cell data coverage, to
help you avoid such areas if you are streaming music for example”
The number of words in agreed low ideas (M=11.00, SD=6.00) was significantly lower than
that in agreed high (M=18.30, SD=8.72) (t(38) = −3.083, p = .004). For reference, the
20 ideas that had the highest disagreement between coders, a mean word length of 13.35
(SD=9.34) was found.
We performed a thematic analysis, using a variation of the thematic roles set out by Berk
(1999), to see whether we could account for the difference in idea lengths by observing
differences in specificity of the ideas. A sample of the 20 agreed highest scores, 20 agreed
lowest scores and 20 highest disagreement sets were coded with the set of thematic roles
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listed. We found the following thematic roles explicitly or implicitly specified in the agreed
good ideas:
• Agent: who is performing this action?
• Action: what are they doing?
• Instrument: what are they using (e.g. phone, a map)
• Recipient: who is benefiting from this action?2
• Purpose: why is this being done, what is the goal of this?3
In the agreed-highest scores set (M=6.15, SD=0.96), the number of thematic roles occur-
ring was higher than in the overall agreed-lowest scores set (M=3.75, SD=1.22). T-tests
revealed that this was a significant effect (t(38) = 6.73, p < .001). For reference the aver-
age number of thematic categories in the highest disagreement set (M=3.70, SD=1.76).
We used the concept of these thematic roles in order to inform our third and final study,
in which we used prompts as a method of improving the overall length (and presumably
specificity) of ideas. We furthermore applied this manipulation in order to understand if
longer ideas might have an effect on the agreement between coders in the different coding
methods we have used (categorisation, semantic differences and novelty/value ratings)
through the previous 2 studies in this thesis.
5.3 Chapter Summary
Unfortunately, despite training and testing that coders understood the task, the inter-rater
agreements for value and novelty ranged between 23%-51%, much lower than we would
have expected to see. According to Krippendorff (2018, p.241), a values higher than .800
are the standard agreed acceptable value. When a tentative conclusion is acceptable, a
values of higher than .667 is the lowest limit. Unfortunately, our scores were closer to 0
and we could therefore not accept these ratings as being reliable as moderate agreement
had not been found.
Inter-rater disagreement may have been due to inadequate instructions – despite our care
with this aspect of the procedure and it being modelled on published studies. Showing
coders good and bad ideas, with accompanying rationale, might be another instruction
2Recipient and beneficiary were two separate roles, however, for the purpose of this analysis, these were
combined into simply one role.
3Similarly, purpose, benefit, and goal were separate roles, however, these were found to be similar as well
and therefore combined into one role for the purpose of our study.
117
Chapter 5. Judging the quality of ideas: novelty and value
method to avoid such high disagreement. Further coder training seems to be needed on
the basis of these results.
Alternatively, or additionally, we might consider again the issue of well-formedness of ideas
that was raised in Chapter 3. Our attempts to find indices of ideas that separate agreed-
good from agreed-bad and from ideas where coders disagreed have shown two simple,
related and promising patterns: well-formed ideas are longer (in terms of number of words)
and contain more thematic roles. In the next study, this finding is used as the basis for
an experimental manipulation of prompts for ideators, and the effects of these prompts on
timing and number of ideas as well as judged idea quality are tested.
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Supporting the well-formedness of
ideas
In the studies presented in our previous two chapters, we attempted to understand the
time-course of ideation across a single task and across multiple tasks. We are interested
in both single and multiple task paradigms as both are encountered in everyday lives.
Performing a single ideation task is comparable to being given a problem at work and
needing to brainstorm ideas to solve this particular problem, whereas multiple tasks might
be encountered on a day to day basis when performing knowledge work. We likened ideation
tasks to knowledge work, as opposed to simple rote tasks such as puzzle tasks. Presumably,
people do in fact switch between multiple knowledge tasks in work settings. Both of these
paradigms were therefore found worthwhile studying in order to gain more evidence for
appropriate methods of supporting ideation task performance.
Our findings for a single ideation tasks showed promising results in relation to ideators
generating ideas in a categorical structure in two different questions, a result we were at-
tempting to replicate from the studies in Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2002), Nijstad,
Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003), and Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). We found some evidence
of a categorical structure to thinking, however, despite generating ideas within similar cate-
gories, ideators showed evidence of switching often between categories. Fluency, presumably
affected by categorisation of ideas, was not correlated with the Adjusted Ratio of Clustering
scores, indicating that clustering was not having an effect on productivity. A variation we
performed on the original study was to split thinking and typing times. We were interested
mostly in seeing the effect of category switches on idle times between ideas rather than the
full response latency. Our variation was successful and showed that typing times remained
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unaffected and therefore thinking times were an appropriate measure of idle times. Think-
ing times were successfully shown to be significantly longer when an idea followed one in
another category (between category timings) than when an idea followed ideas in the same
category (within category timings).
We found some inherent problems in the study design itself. Initially, we did not observe
a decline in productivity as might be expected in a longer ideation task, which may be
attributed to the short length of the task itself. A major limitation in the study was en-
countered when we received the results from independent coders of the data. We had access
to a pre-determined set of categories, developed by Diehl (1991) and verified by Nijstad and
Stroebe (2006), however, the independent coders expressed concern with both the vague-
ness of the category system itself as well as with the ideas being categorised. Performing
inter-rater agreement scores reaffirmed these concerns. It is therefore important that we
take the results evidencing a categorical structure as tentative results as our hypothesis
was not possible to accept with certainty based on the low coder agreement scores. In our
second study on multiple ideation tasks, we moved away from relying on subtle category
switches as a method of understanding decision making in ideation tasks and towards more
explicit task switching in order to understand decision making. This study was likened
with foraging studies such as Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) and Wilke et al. (2009) in
order to show that the decision to give up on a patch in ideation can be likened to that
of giving up on patches in more rote tasks. An average of 32% of the participant-question
idea-sets submitted had longer between idea thinking times than giving-up times, ruling out
the possibility of a simple giving-up time strategy for leaving a question. Similarly, more
simple strategies were shown not to be used as no correlations were found between number
of items and giving-up times, as well as time on task and giving-up times. We were able
to verify that giving-up times follow a fairly bi-modal distribution, that there are a high
number of higher giving-up times, however, a spike in giving-up times is found in the 1-3
second span. This is indicative of ideation being subject to what Payne, Duggan and Neth
(2007) calls sub-goal completion.
We furthermore found that longer delay times resulted in a tendency to stay on questions
rather than attempt more questions, indicative that an awareness of long switching costs
is a deterrent to moving on to another question. Rate of return for a task was found to
be strongly related to the time taken to generate the two first ideas in that task. Despite
this, median split analyses on time taken to generate first ideas did not show significant
differences in giving-up times and time spent on task. This indicates that ideators were not
using initial generation rate as a cue to allocating time efficiently.
With a stronger understanding of the time-course of sequential ideation tasks, we were
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further interested in analysing the effect of quality of ideas on the decision to give up. We
encountered similar problems in this study design to that of the design in study 1, despite
training of coders and verifying they had understood the task. On both metrics such as
value and novelty, coders had a fairly low agreement, leaving us again with the ability to
only make tentative conclusions about the data. The comments from coders remained the
same as in the individual ideation task, that the ideas were vague and at times were open
to interpretation.
In this chapter we address the problems encountered in our first two studies with a particular
focus on increasing the well-formedness of ideas generated. We aim to discover whether the
problems encountered of agreements between coders may be attributed to the fact that the
ideas generated were too non-specific, making it difficult to understand what the ideator
actually meant.
6.1 Chapter background
In an attempt to support higher agreement between coders in both quality as well as
categorisation of ideas, we look to the concepts of generalisation and specificity of the
ideas themselves. It is conceivable that the vagueness of the ideas, and therefore, the need
for subjective interpretation has a negative effect on the ability to judge the set of ideas
somewhat consistently.
Very little research in ideation focuses on the specificity of ideas. In fact, in a review by
Dean et al. (2006), they found that out of 51 studies looking at the quality of ideas, only
10% spoke about the concept of specificity, described in a variety of terms such as generality
(Taylor, Berry and Block, 1958), detail and clarity (Durand and VanHuss, 1992), abstraction
(Reinig, Briggs and Nunamaker, 2007) and thoroughness of description (MacCrimmon and
Wagner, 1994; Cady and Valentine, 1999).
The rest of this chapter describes the ideation study run with ideators individually, per-
forming a singular ideation task by typing out as many solutions as possible to one of the
following questions: ”What can the individual do to increase their general level of health?”
and ”Your phone can tell you exactly where you are, come up with functions or apps that
can use this.” This was a between participants study looking at the effect of different levels
of prompt on the length of ideas, quality of ideas and ultimately, the ease at which ideas
were rated.
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6.2 Study 3: Prompting increased specificity of ideas in an
online ideation task
In this section, we present our third study in which we explored the effect of two different
methods of prompting on the specificity of ideas and whether we could help ideators pro-
duce more well-formed ideas in comparison to a no prompt condition (RO5). Our main
motivation was to look at whether we were able to improve coder agreements across quality
ratings as well as categorisation of ideas (RO6)1. This between participants study com-
pared three conditions: no prompt, implicit prompt by example, and explicit prompt by
providing a list of thematic roles to include in the idea. Each condition was run over two
questions in order to rule out question specific results.
6.2.1 Method
Design
An online experiment run on the Gorilla platform (Anwyl-Irvine et al., 2018) was conducted.
This followed a similar paradigm to that in study 1 in that each participant was given a
singular question, however, the time was increased to 25 minutes to generate as many
ideas as they could that would serve to solve the given problem. Online ideation studies are
often run in 15-minute sessions. However, in study 1, we found that a 15-minute timespan
was not enough to exhaust ideators stock of ideas. We therefore decided to increase the
ideation time substantially in order to see if we could observe a diminishing returns curve.
The study followed a 3x2 between participants design. The independent variables consisted
of prompt type (no prompt, implicit prompt and explicit prompt) and question (health
question, phone question). The questions were chosen as appropriate tasks for this as they
were successfully used before in the previous two studies. Question one was adapted from
our first two studies: ”What can the individual do to increase their general level of health?”.
It was selected as it had the highest average number of responses in study 2, with a range of
responses between 4 and 34 ideas, e.g. a difference of 30 where most other ideas had a range
of 5-17. This had the added benefit of being comparable the category coding we performed
in the first study, in which the agreement between independent coders for category coding
was good but unfortunately not as high as expected. Question two was taken from study
2: ”Your phone can tell you exactly where you are, come up with functions or apps that
can use this.” This question was selected due to the perceived narrower technical context
in comparison to the broad context of personal health.
1Note that we are only performing categorisation of ideas in the health question. This is partly due to
the lack of a pre-set category system for the phone question.
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 6 groups by the Gorilla application,
answering only one question in one of the prompt conditions. In the no prompt condition,
participants were electronically given the same instructions as in the previous two studies:
to generate ideas according to Osborn (1957)’s brainstorming rules. On the main ideation
screen they simply saw the question, the text entry box and a list being populated as they
submit their ideas.
In addition to being given Osborn’s (1957) brainstorming rules, participants in the example
prompt condition were further offered a list of 3 examples on the main ideation entry page
(but not in their instructions). The examples chosen were previously submitted ideas to the
relevant questions from study 2. These ideas were chosen based on the following criteria:
they feature in the top 10 highest overall scores given by all 3 coders in study 2 and include
at least 4 of the identified thematic roles (such as ”Use apps or fitness trackers which can
help keep you on track and motivate you, e.g. you can compare number of steps walked on
each day.”). The concept of presenting example ideas has been reviewed in the literature.
Type and timing of ideas as well as semantic similarity have been shown to cause fixation
(e.g. Agogué et al., 2014; Jansson and Smith, 1991). It is with an awareness of these
findings that we have chosen simply to present a few ideas of high specificity throughout
the study and rather than the ideas themselves presenting inspiration for the ideator, the
structure of the ideas themselves might inspire the ideator to structure their own ideas
accordingly. To this effect we had originally designed this condition to present good and
bad ideas to the ideator, however, this suffers from logic drawbacks. We specifically instruct
ideators not to evaluate or judge the ideas they are writing down. The use of the words
”examples of good ideas” and ”examples of bad ideas” goes against the brainstorming rules
by Osborn (1957) that state that you should not evaluate or judge the ideas you are writing
down.
In the thematic roles (explicit) condition, ideators were given the same brainstorming rule
instructions as well as instructions to generate ideas by incorporating all or many of the
thematic roles. These instructions were given to the participants on both the instruction
page as well as on the main ideation page, such that they could easily refer to these.
They were given the instruction to generate as many well-formed ideas using the following
structure as a method of producing well-formulated ideas:
• Who is performing...
• What action...
• With what instrument or object and...
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• Whom is receiving or benefiting from this action and...
• Why is this being done.
They were told to incorporate all or most of the above elements into their idea in order to
construct well-formed ideas. We were interested a few different findings. Firstly, whether
the manipulation of prompts has worked. We did so by looking at the length of ideas in
each of the three conditions to see whether we could find significantly longer ideas. We
therefore performed this study with the following hypotheses in mind:
H1 : Prompting an ideation task explicitly with thematic roles increases the
well-formedness of the ideas generated, measured in the number of words
in the idea.
H2 : Prompting an ideation task implicitly with examples increases the well-
formedness of the ideas generated, measured in the number of words in
the idea in comparison to no-prompts, but not in comparison to explicit
prompts.
H3 : Prompting an ideation task explicitly with thematic roles decreases fluency
in a set of ideas in comparison to no prompt conditions.
H4 : Prompting an ideation task implicitly with examples decreases fluency in a
set of ideas in comparison to no prompt conditions, but not in comparison
to explicit prompts.
Granted the manipulation worked and the above hypotheses would be accepted, we hoped
to show that the well-formedness of an idea has a significant impact on quality ratings for
both the phone question and the health question, and a significant impact on our category
coding scores for the health question. For these goals, we had the following hypotheses:
H5: Inter-rater agreement on novelty and value will be higher in the explicit
prompt condition than in the no prompt condition.
H6: Inter-rater agreement on novelty and value will be higher in the implicit
prompt condition than in the no prompt condition.
H7 : Independent coder agreements of category classification will be higher in
the explicit prompt condition than in no prompt conditions.
H8 : Independent coder agreements of category classification will be higher in
the implicit prompt condition than in no prompt conditions.
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We did not make hypotheses about semantic difference score coding as this has already
been shown to have a high inter-rater agreement. We performed this analysis nonetheless
to explore whether this was still true for our conditions.
Participants
107 participants (58 female), age range 18 to 60 (M=29.44, SD=10.002), were recruited
from the online crowd sourcing website Prolific Academic3. Participants were pre-screened
to ensure they were aged over 18 and fluent in English. Pre-screening further ensured
that only participants using a laptop or desktop could access the study, in order to avoid
any effect a mobile on-screen keyboard might have on thinking and typing times. 93%
of participants were educated at A-level (or equivalent) or above. 56% of participants
were educated at University undergraduate level or above. No further profiling constraints
were applied to recruitment for this study; including whether or not the participants were
experienced ideators, as this was not a pre-screening option. Participants were paid £2.81
for their time (approximately £5.00/hr, given average completion times of 33-34 minutes).
Materials
The study was designed in Gorilla (Anwyl-Irvine et al., 2018), an online cognitive psychology
experiment environment. The input to the study consisted of a consent form, demographics
questionnaire, main ideation screen and a three question post-experiment questionnaire (see
all screenshots in appendix C).
Figure 6-1 shows the logic flow of the study. All participants started at the same node and
completed the consent form and demographics questionnaire. The experiment then split
all participants into three groups: no prompt, implicit prompt and explicit prompt. Once a
participant was allocated, they were further allocated to one of the two questions - health or
phone. Participants were given different instructions depending on the condition as well as
different ideation screens (see figure 6-2). Depending on the condition they were assigned
to they would either receive no additional information on the ideation screen (figure 6-2a),
example ideas permanently staying on the screen (figure 6-2b), or a list of thematic roles
to include in the idea (figure 6-2c). Once complete, all participants were directed to the
same post-experiment questionnaire and thanked for their time. The experiment in Gorilla
automatically redirected participants back to Prolific Academic for completion of study and
payment.
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Figure 6-1: Study flow in Gorilla. Orange nodes represent randomisers that split
participants first into prompt type then into question. Blue nodes represent
the study screens themselves. Green nodes are questionnaire elements. Grey
nodes control experiment logic (e.g. checkpoints verify that participants have
not left the study before completion).
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(a) Ideation page for No Prompt condition
(b) Ideation page for implicit example prompt condition
(c) Ideation page for explicit thematic role condition
Figure 6-2: Ideation page in study 3, variation in prompts between the three
conditions across health and phone question (note the question in these screen-
shots is that from the practice session.)
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Procedure
Each participant was recruited through Prolific Academic and was redirected to the study
hosted by Gorilla. Participants first saw a brief introduction to the study, what was going
to happen, and the time commitment expected from them. Participants could then choose
to consent to take part or not consent and exit the study. Once consent was given, the
participant was asked for demographics: age range, gender and level of education.
Once demographics were submitted, they were shown full instructions for the study. These
varied depending on prompt condition. Participants in the no prompt and implicit prompt
were shown the same instructions (see figure C-4a in appendix C). These instructions
matched how we instructed participants in the previous 2 studies. Participants were ex-
plicitly asked to generate ideas for 25 minutes according to Osborn’s (1957) brainstorming
rules. For the third condition, explicit prompts, participants were given the same instruc-
tion but elaborated with the 5 thematic roles we identified in Chapter 5 (see figure C-4b
in appendix C); for each idea they were asked to consider ”Who is performing...”, ”What
action...”, ”With what instrument or object and...”, ”Whom is receiving or benefiting from
this action and...”, ”Why is this being done?”.
Once read, they were taken to a 2 minute practice task asking: ”What can the individual
do to preserve the environment?”. Once they had completed the 2 minute practice task,
they were shown the instructions again and asked to press enter when ready.
Each participant had 25 minutes to come up with as many ideas as they could in relation
to the question they were given. The question (health, phone) was fully randomised by
the application itself, as well as the condition they were in (no prompt, implicit example
prompt, explicit thematic roles prompt). Once the 25 minutes were over, participants were
asked to rate three questions (from Nijstad and Stroebe (2006)) on a scale of 1-10 about
their ideation experience. These were the questions used in our first study, in order to gage
the ideators self-awareness of failures (impasses). Despite not being able to replicate the
results from Nijstad and Stroebe (2006), we included this questionnaire in the current study
for consistency. The study questions were:
• ”How difficult was it to keep on generating ideas?”
• ”How often were you unable to generate ideas?”
• ”How often did an idea you previously generated occur to you again?”
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Health Question Phone Question
No Prompt 22 17
Implicit Example 19 20
Explicit Example 15 14
Table 6.1: Table showing uneven split of participants between conditions due
to issues with the integration between the Gorilla-Prolific platforms.
Once the study was over, they were thanked for their time. Participants had a maximum
completion time of 50 minutes, so as to not have them spend too long on any of the
questionnaire pages. All results were screened, and participants were paid through Prolific
Academic within 48 hours.
General analytic approach
The random assignment mechanism on Gorilla was designed to balance participants evenly
across the 6 conditions, however it failed to do so. This was due to the integration between
Prolific and Gorilla. Referring to the study flow in figure 6-1, Gorilla allows for checkpoints
at different stages of the study. Should a participant not give consent or not pass the
demographic checkpoint, Gorilla will immediately send back their information to Prolific,
stating that no data was collected. In this instance, no money is taken from the experimenter
account on either platform.
Should a participant successfully submit consent and demographics, they are allocated
to a condition in Gorilla. After being allocated to a condition, if participants abandon
the experiment before completion, the 50 minute experiment timer4 will have to run out
before Prolific is informed to recruit more participants. No money is taken from the Prolific
experimenter account. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Gorilla, in which the participant
has taken up a space in one of the 6 conditions, and money is taken from the experimenter
account.
Due to the speed at which participants are acquired through Prolific, all 6 conditions
were filled before the 50-minute experiment timer. As it was not possible to see which
participants had abandoned the task before this, we ended up with an uneven split across
conditions (see table 6.1). Due to financial- and time-constraints it was not possible to
collect more data to rectify this issue.
The datasets were screened to see if all participants had followed instructions. In total, 13
4The amount of 50 minutes was set to allow participants to complete the ideation task and the ques-
tionnaire without being interrupted.
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Health Question Phone Question
No Prompt 20 15
Implicit Example 18 17
Explicit Example 12 12
Table 6.2: Table showing split of participants between conditions after removal
of 13 datasets in which participants had not followed instruction.
participants were removed from the final dataset. Some submitted ideas in other languages5.
Others were not answering the question and solely submitted text irrelevant to the question
or failed to press enter between ideas, therefore submitting a long string of ideas with no
timestamps. Whilst these types of data are interesting in themselves, they did not adhere
to the instructions and we were therefore not able to apply the same types of analysis as
performed on the remaining participants data. The final total number of participants was
94 (see table 6.2).
2316 ideas were generated by 94 participants across the 6 conditions. 32 ideas were removed
as they were either not ideas or they were duplicates of ideas6. Exclusion of these ideas left
us with a final number of 2284 ideas. The entire dataset was summarised by fluency, mean
number of words per idea per participant, thinking time, typing time, and response latency
for each condition. The effect of the prompt manipulation was then tested by implementing
two-way ANOVAs with significance level set at p < .05. The difference in productivity in
the last five minutes versus the first five minutes was calculated per participant and then
compared using paired-samples t-tests.
To verify the manipulation had an effect on coder agreement, we performed the three
different coding tasks used in studies 1 and 2: category coding (of the health question
only), semantic difference coding of both health and phone questions, and quality coding
of both health and phone question. All independent coders for this study were selected
as they were external to the process, in line with our previous two studies. The coders
were volunteers and received no payment for their participation. Although all of the coders
for this were familiar with other methods of analysis, all but one had no experience in
coding this type of data before. The one with experience had coded ideas into categories
in our first study. Prior to coding the full datasets, each coder, including the experienced
coder, received full instructions. The coding was done on a sample of the data due to time
5This was flagged to Prolific as this goes against the profiling criteria
6Examples of submissions that were not ideas include clarifications on previous ideas such as self-
correcting spelling, single letter ideas (one idea entered was simply ”t”) and submissions like ”done” and
”finished”. Repeated ideas were adjacent ideas that were listed multiple times (e.g. one participant wrote
”robots” 3 times in their trial).
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constraints. It was not deemed necessary to code all the data in order to see whether there
was agreement between coders.
For the category coding, a sample of 15 participants were selected, 5 from each condition
in the health question. The mean number of words per idea was calculated for each of the
three conditions, the 5 participants then chosen for being the closest to the mean in their
condition. This resulted in a set of 480 ideas across 15 participants in the three prompt
conditions. For the semantic difference coding and the quality (novelty / value) coding,
the same sample of 15 participants from the health question was selected, as well as 15
participants from the phone question, selected on the same criteria. This resulted in a set
of 480 ideas for the health question and 227 ideas for the phone question, or 707 ideas in
total from 30 participants in the three prompt conditions. In the next section we present
the results of these analyses.
6.2.2 Results and discussion
In the following section we present data from our study in six parts. The first is an overview
of the data gathered with a summary of number of words per idea, number of ideas, thinking
times, typing times, and response latencies for all ideas across each of the six conditions
in our study. We furthermore present correlations of the post-experiment questionnaire
responses with fluency. In the second part, we analyse our data using factorial ANOVAs, in
order to see whether our manipulation of the prompt type and question had an effect on the
fluency, length of ideas, and log transformed thinking times. The threshold for significance
was set at (p < .05). The third part presents the productivity over time per participant. We
show a visual representation of the time-course of the ideation tasks in all 6 conditions. In
the fourth part, we are interested in the categorisation scores performed by two independent
coders for the health question only, and whether agreement scores (Cohen’s k) have been
positively improved as a result of the prompt manipulation. In the fifth part we show the
inter-rater agreement scores between semantic difference score coders, to show that this
method of rating ideas is reliable independent of the specificity of ideas. Finally, we show
the agreement between two coders on the novelty and value scores for sampled data from
all 6 conditions. Our goal is to show that whilst novelty and value are accepted methods of
judging the quality of ideas, the subjectivity of the method may decrease with the length
of the ideas themselves.
In table 6.3 we present an overview of the results for all 3x2 conditions. Mean values of
fluency, number of words per idea, thinking times, typing times, and response latencies are
calculated as the mean of means across participants in each condition. As in our first study,
the high variance in fluency might be explained by the individual differences in ideators.
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Table 6.3: Summary data from each of the 6 conditions in experiment 3. Num-
ber of words per idea, thinking times, typing times and response latencies are
presented as the mean of means across participants, then condition. Standard
deviations shown in brackets.
Looking at the mean fluency in the first 15 minutes of the task (M=30.52, SD=14.14),
giving a rate of return of 2.04 ideas per minute, we might suppose that the financial incentive
given to ideators in the current study has had an effect on the motivation to generate ideas
faster. It would not be fair to compare to the full 25 minutes in this condition due to the
likelihood of diminishing returns. Indeed, data from the full 25-minute set show a mean
fluency of M=41.5 (SD=23.53), resulting in a 1.66 ideas per minute rate of return.
Comparing fluency to post-experiment questionnaire responses, no significant correlations
were found between fluency and any question responses (Q1-fluency: r(92) = −.05, p =
.65. Q2-fluency: r(92) = −.12, p = .24. Q3-fluency: r(92) = −.10, p = .32). This
replicates our finding from both questions in study 1 and rules out the finding being due to
small participant numbers. Interestingly, low positive but significant internal correlations
were found: Q1-Q2: r(92) = .28, p = .006; Q1-Q3: r(92) = .28, p = .006; Q2-Q3:
r(92) = .18, p = .075. Although Q1 was found to have a low correlation to Q2 and Q3,
these were unfortunately not very highly correlated and we can therefore not report that
we have been able to replicate the finding from Nijstad and Stroebe (2006) in any of our
studies in relation to these questionnaire questions.
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Effects of prompting ideation on fluency and specificity
A main interest and motivation for the manipulation done in this study was to see whether
these firstly have an effect on the behaviour of ideators. The no prompt condition was
comparable to studies 1 and 2. We hoped to find an improvement in the well-formedness
of ideas in both the more implicit example driven prompt condition and the explicitly
stated thematic roles driven prompt condition. In addition to the well-formedness of ideas,
we were interested in seeing whether the formulation of these ideas (thinking times) varied
with question or prompt conditions.
Conducting a two-way ANOVA comparing the effects of PromptType × Question on
mean number of words per idea, per participant yielded a main significant effect for
Prompt Type (F2,900.959 = 3.478, p = .035). Tukey LSD post hoc tests showed that
mean number of words was lower in the no prompt condition (M=11.31, SD=15.25)
than in the explicit prompt condition (M=19.64, SD=8.71; p=.010) but not in the im-
plicit prompt condition (M=17.47, SD=9.84; p=.066). This evidence allows us to ac-
cept H1, as our manipulation had a positive significant effect on the well-formedness of
ideas, but not H2 as the implicit condition did not differ from the no prompt condition.
The implicit and explicit prompt conditions did not differ. A main effect was similarly
found for Question (F1,1066.657 = 8.236, p = .005). No interaction effect was found for
PromptType×Question (F2,336.470 = 1.299, p = .278). Figure 6-3 shows the estimated
marginal means of mean number of words in each of the 3 by 2 conditions.
Given that ideas were longer in the prompted conditions, we might assume that our ma-
nipulation had a negative influence on the fluency, as participants may have been spend-
ing longer formulating individual ideas in the implicit and explicit prompt conditions. A
two-way ANOVA was conducted comparing the effects of PromptType × Question on
overall fluency per participant. A significant main effect was found for Prompt Type
(F2,4378.431 = 11.338, p < .001). Tukey LSD post hoc tests showed that fluency was higher
in the no prompt condition (M=33.80, SD=20.26) than in the implicit prompt condition
(M=20.06, SD=13.30; p < .001) and the explicit prompt condition (M=16.63, SD=7.86;
p < .001), whereas the implicit and explicit prompt conditions did not differ. Again, we
accept hypotheses H3 and H4 as this evidences a significant effect of the prompt conditions
on fluency. A main effect was similarly found for Question (F1,3354.162 = 17.371, p < .001).
No interaction effect was found for PromptType×Question (F2,526.845 = 1.364, p = .261).
Figure 6-4 shows the estimated marginal means of fluency in each of the 3 by 2 conditions.
Conducting a two-way ANOVA comparing the effects of PromptType×Question on log
transformed thinking time per idea, per participant yielded no significant effect for Prompt
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Figure 6-3: Estimated marginal means of mean number of words, averaged
across ideas then participants, per prompt condition in each of the two ques-
tions in study 3.
Figure 6-4: Estimated marginal means of fluency per prompt condition in each
of the two questions in study 3.
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Type (F2,3.986 = 2.797, p = .066). A main effect was found for Question (F1,11.360 =
15.946, p < .001) suggesting participants may have found the phone question more difficult
than the health question, a result also reflected in the difference in fluency across the
two questions. No interaction effect was found for PromptType × Question (F2,.049 =
.035, p = .966). Figure 6-5 shows the estimated marginal means of average thinking time
per idea in each of the 3 by 2 conditions.
Figure 6-5: Estimated marginal means of log transformed thinking times per
prompt condition in each of the two questions in study 3. A main effect
for question is found, indicating people found the health question easier to
generate ideas for in comparison to the phone question.
Time-course of productivity of ideation task
The cumulative productivity over time for each condition is shown in figure 6-6. The shapes
of the curves suggest a slight diminishing returns as expected. These are seen more evenly
in the health question cumulative productivity (left panel) in comparison to the phone
question (right panel). In the latter, the overall returns appear to be decreasing over time,
however, there are quite a few sudden jumps, possibly attributed to the lower number of
ideas generated in these conditions.
The overall productivity per participant in the first five minutes of the task (M=8.28,
SD=6.19) was significantly higher than that in the last five minutes of the task (M=3.85,
SD=3.28) (t(93) = 7.677, p < .001, d = .79).
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Figure 6-6: Cumulative productivity for each participant in the 6 conditions
in study 3. All 6 conditions show a diminishing returns curve. Graphs on the
left represent the health question in the three conditions: (a) no prompt, (c)
implicit prompt, (e) explicit prompt. Graphs on the right represent the gain
curves for the phone question in those same corresponding conditions.
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Coding ideas by category: agreement between coders
Two independent coders were asked to categorise all 480 ideas, submitted for the health
question by 15 participants across all three prompt conditions, 5 in each condition. Coder
1 is male aged 28, postgraduate student in the Department of Mechanical Engineering.
This coder had performed this type of analysis earlier in our work. Coder 2 is female aged
26, postgraduate student in the Department of Computer Science, both coders from the
University of Bath. This coder had no prior experience coding this type of data before.
Prior to coding the full datasets, both coders received the following instructions (the same
that were used in study 1):
They were instructed to classify each idea to a category using the means by goal matrix
developed by Diehl (1991), also used in study 1 (see table 3.7 for full category matrix).
For the health question, this consisted of a matrix of 11 goals and 9 means, resulting in
99 categories. Note that not all categories will be used by ideators. Coders were asked to
enter the codes into three separate columns in a spreadsheet: the first being the goal, the
second being the means and the third being any notes or additional goals/means they felt
an idea could fall into. Each independent coder was sent the data and the means by goal
matrix, coded a subset individually and met with the experimenter to discuss. Once the
coders had shown full understanding of the meaning of the goals and means in the matrix,
they were asked to categorise all 480 ideas.
Cohen’s k was run to determine if there was agreement between the two independent
coders. Overall across all three prompt conditions there was a fair agreement, Cohen’s
k = .45, p < .001, although lower than that in our first experiment for the health question.
Unfortunately, the prompt manipulation did not increase the kappa value for any of the
three conditions (refuting H7 and H8). Cohen’s k of the no prompt condition (N=217)
was .45, in the implicit prompt condition (N=152) was .47, and in the explicit prompt
condition (N=110) it was .42. We can therefore not say it is the length of ideas that affect
the inter-rater agreement scores for the categorisation system.
Interestingly, comparing the coding protocol of coder 1 versus coder 2, it was possible to
pick out apparent flaws in the coding system itself, the vagueness and overlap in the schema.
Short ideas, such as ”Donate blood” was assumed as mental health (feeling good about
yourself) by one and health prevention by another. ”Eat more fruit” was coded differently
as well, where the same mean applied (food intake) but no explicit goal is expressed, leaving
it up to the coder to assess whether the ideator meant ”avoid weight problems”, ”optimize
metabolism”, or ”practice health prevention”. A longer idea ”[replace] fizzy drinks with
water to help improve her health as well as improve her teeth and general lifestyle” was
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coded as generic health prevention by one but maintain healthy teeth by another. The idea
was specific enough to be clear about the goals, but did not follow the schema in such a
way that it could be easily coded into a single category. Finally, ”Do not overwork yourself”
was seen as a mental health goal by coder 1 whereas coder 2 saw this as an avoidance of
physical strain goal; both goals seem plausible.
These findings replicate our findings from study 1b and underpin the issue that whilst
people might ideate within categories, these are not well defined. Indeed, the definition of
these categories might vary from person to person, depending on what they consider as
being connected. This does not negate the SIAM model, it simply reinforces the notion
that the connections made from an image in semantic memory might differ dependent on
experience.
Coding ideas by semantic distance: agreement between coders
Two independent coders were asked to rate the difference between adjacent ideas (e.g.
ideas that follow each other) on a 10-point scale. They were asked to rate the same subset
of ideas as rated in the categorisation section. Coder 3 male aged 62, professor in the
Department of Computer Science at the University of Bath, coder 4 was female aged 30,
postgraduate student in the Department of Psychology at the University of Bath. Whilst
both coders were familiar with data analysis methods, neither coder had prior experience
in coding this type of data. Both coders were given all 707 sample responses, from 30
participants, across the 6 conditions. This resulted in N − 1 datapoints per participant,
where N is the number of ideas in the participant’s dataset, due to the difference score
being between two adjacent ideas and not for every idea. Both coders were blind to prompt
condition but informed of that there were 2 questions, as they were shown the responses for
the two questions separately. They were given the same instructions, including examples,
as were given in study 1 (see section 3.4.1):
The following would score a 1 or 2, as they are essentially touching on the same concepts:
recycling and plastic materials.
• Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
• Idea 2: ”recycle plastic bags”
These would score a 5-6 as they have something in common but aren’t quite the same.
• Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
• Idea 2: ”teach people why recycling plastic bottles saves the planet”
138
Chapter 6. Supporting the well-formedness of ideas
The following would score a 10 as they have nothing in common:
• Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
• Idea 2: ”support an organisation that protects pandas”
Coders were asked to individually talk through the first 10 semantic difference ratings
they performed with the experimenter. Once the coders showed full understanding of the
process, they were asked to complete the remainder of the difference ratings themselves.
As difference score rating of the ideas was done on a scale, not categorically as in the
previous study, inter-rater agreement was calculated using Pearson’s correlation between
the responses of the two coders.
Overall agreement between the two coders was positive and fairly high r(675) = .645, p <
.001. Figure 6-7 shows the mean difference ratings submitted by coder 4 compared to the
ratings submitted by coder 3.
Figure 6-7: Summary of coder 4 difference ratings against each of coder 3’s
difference ratings on the 10-point scale for sample data in study 3.
Table 6.4 shows the correlations between coder scores for each of the conditions. This
shows a decreased correlation in the implicit example prompt. Overall, correlation remains
distinctly high and comparable in all 3 prompt conditions, showing that semantic difference
scores remain unaffected by the well-formedness of ideas.
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Health Phone Total
No prompt .736 .695 .686
Implicit example prompt .602 .570 .593
Explicit thematic role prompt .771 .586 .669
Total .669 .636
Table 6.4: Correlations between coder 3 and coder 4 on each of the 6 conditions
in study 3. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Coding ideas by novelty and value: agreement between coders
In the following section we present the results of quality coding performed by 2 coders, in
order to observe whether the manipulation intended to affect specificity has had an effect
on inter-rater agreement. Two independent coders were sent the same sample of data
(707 ideas across 30 participants in the 6 conditions) used in the difference scores section
and asked to rate the novelty and value on a 10-point scale. Coder 5 was male aged
28, postgraduate student in the Department of Computer Science. Coder 5 had no prior
experience in coding this type of data. The other coder for this task was coder 1, male
aged 28 and postgraduate student in the Department of Mechanical Engineering, who had
previously coded the set of the data into categories.
The coders were asked to individually rate every idea on two metrics: value and novelty.
They were asked not to meet or discuss their ratings as this would invalidate the ratings
being independent. These were to be rated on a scale of 1-10, 1 being ”no value/not novel”
and 10 being ”high value/very novel” (full written instructions were the same as in study
2, see appendix B.5). These were for the purpose of this study defined as:
• Novelty: how original and surprising is the idea?
• Value: how useful and practical is this idea and does it make sense as a solution to
the problem?
Prior to coding the full datasets, the two coders received thorough instructions and were
asked to talk through their coding to show understanding. Training in the use of the novelty
and value scales consisted of verbally going through each point on the scale, just as was
done for study 2 data in Chapter 5. Each point was assigned to an idea in the data sample.
Training was done with each coder individually. Once each point on the scale had been
explained, the coder was asked to rate a sample of the data and talk through their choices,
in order to show that they had understood how to use the scales.
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In table 6.5 we show the overall correlations between the two coders across all 30 sampled
participants for novelty and value. These correlations are further broken down by condition.
Interestingly, novelty correlations were considerably higher in all 3 conditions, and in the free
input condition, these have particularly improved, in comparison to the novelty agreements
found in study 2 (r values ranged from .38-.51). No difference in ratings between prompt
conditions was seen, refuting H5 and H6. Value ratings did not increase in comparison to
the ratings in study 2 (r values ranged from .23-.36). We theorise that this lack of variation
in agreements across conditions could be due to a priming effect on coders from having
access to the full set of well-formed and abstract ideas. Although no consideration was
given to order effects in coding these, coders were instructed to read through all ideas first
to get a sense of the domain before judging novelty.
We were interested in observing an increase in the quality of ideas in the conditions in
which we offer prompts. We observed novelty and value separately and that well-formed
ideas will have higher mean novelty and value scores. We also predicted a higher variance
of qualities due to ideas being more thought through than lower quality ideas, which we
would presume may have a lower range of quality scores due to the abstract nature of the
idea.
Conducting a two-way ANOVA comparing the effects of PromptType×Question on mean
value per idea, per participant yielded a main effect for Prompt Type (F2,5.656 = 3.533, p =
.045) where mean value for explicit prompts = 7.23 (SD=.66), implicit prompts = 6.22
(SD=.89), and no prompt = 6.41 (SD=1.02). No main effect was found for Question (F <









Novelty .744* .592* .583* .665*
Value .355* .402* .148 .329*
Table 6.5: Correlations between the two quality coders on novelty and value.
Novelty correlations have increased in comparison to previous study data, how-
ever, this has increased across all 3 conditions in the current study. *denotes
correlations significant at the P < .01 level.
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Conducting a two-way ANOVA comparing the effects of PromptType×Question on the
standard deviation of value per idea, per participant yielded a main effect for Prompt Type
(F2,.900 = 4.979, p = .016) where SD value for explicit prompts = 1.17 (SD=.22), implicit
prompts = 1.57 (SD=.23), and no prompt = 1.53 (SD=.42). No main effect was found
for Question (F < 1). No interaction effect was found for PromptType × Question
(F2,.215 = 1.08, p = .355).
Whilst we recognise this is a small sample, this evidence of higher mean value and lower
variation in value in the explicit prompt condition is indeed a promising finding, as it shows
prompting ideators with thematic roles as a small device for supporting ideation.
Conducting a two-way ANOVA comparing the effects of PromptType×Question on mean
novelty per idea, per participant, we do not find the same effects. No effect for Prompt Type
(F2,4.978 = 1.931, p = .167) where mean novelty for explicit prompts = 4.35 (SD=1.02),
implicit prompts = 5.20 (SD=.89), and no prompt = 4.32 (SD=1.41). No main effect
was found for Question (F1,3.127 = 2.426, p = .132). No interaction effect was found for
PromptType×Question (F < 1).
A similar lack of effects was found of PromptType×Question on variance in novelty per
idea, per participant. No effect for Prompt Type (F2,.467 = 1.077, p = .357) where mean
novelty for explicit prompts = 4.35 (SD=1.02), implicit prompts = 5.20 (SD=.89), and no
prompt = 4.32 (SD=1.41). No main effect was found for Question (F1,.032 = 1.479, p =
.236). No interaction effect was found for PromptType×Question (F < 1).
6.3 Chapter summary and conclusions
In this chapter an experiment was reported that manipulated the way ideators were prompted
on the screen where they enter and list ideas generated as solutions to the specified single
problem. To test the idea that unprompted ideas tend to vary in level of specificity and
that this causes problems of quality and the judgement of quality, we compared these with
ideas prompted by (1) examples of well-formed ideas and (2) a list of the thematic roles
that our earlier work has shown were more present in good and agreed high value ideas.
This manipulation was successful in showing that the prompts led to longer thinking times
and thus fewer ideas, but longer ideas. Unfortunately, the effects of the manipulations on
the judgements of the properties of the ideas was harder to understand.
First, assigning ideas to categories was done even more weakly than in the earlier studies
(on the same question). This result was hard to interpret but might suggest that the
problem lies with the categories themselves rather than the varying length of ideas. Second,
judgements of semantic difference were, if anything, slightly reduced although remained at
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an acceptable level. Finally, judgements of novelty did show the hoped for improvement in
agreement between coders. However, this improvement was not limited to the prompted
groups. We speculate, perhaps optimistically, that the presence of longer and better formed
ideas facilitate the judgement of all ideas. There were no such effects on value judgements.
The value of ideas as measured as the average of the two coders ratings was significantly
positively affected by the prompts, the highest value ideas were generated in the thematic
role prompted condition. Given the size of the sample analysed by coders, this is a limited





In this chapter we summarise the progress made during the thesis as well as noting the
limitations of the work done and possibilities for future work. The investigations of this
thesis were originally aimed toward developing theory in support of applications that could
assist in the ideation process. By investigating the time-course of an ideation task, whether
continuous ideation in response to a single question or ideation in response to multiple
sequential questions, and how people allocate their time, we hoped to develop a stronger
understanding of the concept of impasse and whether people in general use reasonable
strategies to overcome this cognitive state (e.g. switching to a different semantic space
or category, in the case of a single task, or a more productive question in the sequential
ideation task). In the studies performed to inform this theory, we encountered methodolog-
ical difficulties inherent in the measurement of ideation, essentially thwarting the original
intentions of this research. Addressing these methodological issues became an end in itself.
The results of the studies in this thesis weakly support the notion of Search for Ideas in As-
sociative Memory (SIAM) and show promising results towards our hypotheses that ideation
follows a two factor information foraging style heuristic, involving giving-up times and the
tendency to switch upon sub-goal completion. We were, however, unable to fully inform
ideation theory, due to the methodological problems encountered. Through this research,
the concept of impasse still remains a question to be answered. The method of ideation
research has come into question as it does not seem as straightforward to analyse data
that does not conform to a specific format. This methodological worry has itself led to
suggestions for a design intervention primarily for methodological reasons, but which may
also have practical relevance. Although these have not been developed, results from our
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analysis of study 2’s data and the manipulations done in study 3 offer intermediate-level
knowledge, knowledge that sits between theory and specific instance (Höök and Löwgren,
2012). These manifest in the form of design insights into the development of ideation
tools that we may draw upon to support the increased value in ideas generated, as well as
methodological insights involving asking ideators to self-rate and reformulate their ideas.
This chapter is split into three sections. In the first section, we discuss the studies pre-
sented in this thesis, the most prominent results and how these contribute to the overall
literature on creative problem solving and ideation. We present the overall limitations of
our studies and highlight how some design decisions made throughout these studies might
have impacted the ideation and coding processes themselves. In the second section, we
highlight the practical relevance of our key findings, and present the implications for the de-
sign of ideation tools. In the third section, we offer a summary of the thesis and concluding
remarks.
7.1 General discussion
In this section, we discuss the work performed in this thesis as a whole and the contribution
of each chapter. Throughout, we reason for the design choices in the studies and explicitly
highlight the wider limitations of this thesis and how future work might address these.
This thesis began with a literature review, which expanded the definition of ideation tasks
with respect to various empirical literatures in Psychology, before considering recent work
in Human Computer Interaction research with concerns very much in line with those of
this thesis. Ideation tasks, defined as the process of coming up with ideas in response to
a loosely constrained and ill-defined problem, are identified as being an important part of
everyday life. The significance of supporting such tasks is seen in a range of literature
in Psychology, Engineering, Management and Human Computer Interaction. Ideation is
recognised as a key step in creative problem solving, in which we perform several iterations
of ideation-evaluation. We do this as a way of widening the number of possible solutions to
a problem (ideation) and then narrowing these down to a few viable options (evaluation)
(e.g. Basadur, 1995; Dennett, 2017; Ochse, 1990).
Among the main lessons from this literature review is that support for ideation may be
informed by better understanding the time-course of ideation – in order to better understand
cognitive processes underlying creative problem solving. The concepts of impasse and
failures have been studied in an attempt to understand how we might better support ideators
increase their productivity. Whilst not explicitly stated in the literature reviewed, the ability
to offer support when ideators run out of ideas is beneficial in time-bound ideation tasks.
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Indeed, in more recent research on methods of supporting ideation, Chan et al. (2017)
studied the concept of impasse, as a way of understanding what types of support we might
offer. One of the primary theories of ideation, Search for Ideas in Associative Memory
(SIAM) makes the claim that ideas generated in an ideation task will be organised in clusters
by semantic categories. Additionally, that these will be temporally clustered in such a way
that time to formulate ideas within a cluster will be shorter than the time to formulate
ideas between clusters. We covered the close relation of this theory to information foraging
theories in the literature review. Information foraging theory, derived from optimal foraging
theory, is widely influential in Psychology and Human Computer Interaction research, but
has not, to our knowledge, been applied to any work in ideation, including those in HCI.
Its application to understanding the time-course of ideation is one of the primary novel
aspects of this thesis. Having reasoned for an information foraging perspective (through
its link with the SIAM model of idea generation) on the time-course of ideation, three main
experimental studies were reported, in which individual ideators produce lists of ideas on a
computer. An understanding of the cognitive processes that take place during ideation, and
specifically when ideation becomes less productive, might help us understand the occurrence
of impasses better, as well as how to better support ideators when this happens.
Prior to our discussion of the studies performed in this thesis, their contributions and
overall limitations, it is worth pointing out the choice made for the design of these studies.
Ideation and creativity research brings a certain level of complexity; there is a wide range
of ideation styles, methods for structuring solutions, existing support tools, and settings
in which ideation can be performed. The work in this thesis sits within the research on
ideation that takes an experimental approach to this type of creative thinking task. Whilst
we need to acknowledge that this approach to ideation may have a negative effect on
the spontaneity of creative thought, detailed experimental analysis allows us a certain
level of control over the variables involved in the complexity of creativity. As in much
of the reviewed literature (e.g. Chan, Dang and Dow, 2016; Ye and Robert Jr, 2017;
Oviatt and Cohen, 2010; Runco and Sakamoto, 1999), we treat ideation here as a time-
constrained task in isolation. Whilst it might be argued that this takes ideation away
from its broader context, some studies point out that this is not wholly void of validity as
time-constraints often present themselves in the real world (Allen and Thomas, 2011). As a
result of taking this approach, we are able to develop a general understanding of the thought
processes that occur during ideation. The studies presented here focused on time-bound
ideation tasks in which individuals electronically generate ideas by brainstorming in relation
to an open ended question. The choice to study individual ideation was partly founded
in the idea that we may be better able to control certain variables that affect ideation.
Group ideation offers the benefits of multiple view-points and the ability for ideators to
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synthesise and build on each other’s ideas. Indeed, under certain conditions, brainstorming
in groups may result in increased productivity (see e.g. Dennis and Valacich (1993), in
which computer-mediated electronic brainstorming in groups of 12 or more resulted in
better performance than individual brainstorming). Group ideation may unfortunately also
suffer from the effects of evaluation apprehension, production blocking and free riding
(Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006); all factors that could affect the flow of idea generation.
Controlling for such influences was vital in order to perform a more focused analysis of
the occurrence of impasses. Whilst our work looks at individual brainstorming, we also
inform the research on nominal group brainstorming, in which ideas generated separately
by ideators are pooled together as though they were generated in a group (Taylor, Berry
and Block, 1958; Goldenberg, Larson Jr and Wiley, 2013).
We further acknowledge that ideation itself can be done in many different ways, with
brainstorming being one of the most popular methods, possibly due to experimenters strong
control over variables in this method. We use brainstorming as a representative method
of ideation, however, as covered in the literature, there exists a range ideation methods
that can be used such as analogy to existing systems (Silverstein, Samuel and DeCarlo,
2013), SCAMPER (Eberle, 2008) and mind-mapping (Buzan and Harrison, 2010). Each of
these methods themselves have benefits for specific use in design ideation, as each of them
offer different tools to help guide thinking (e.g. mind-mapping affords a hierarchical way of
structuring ideas; analogy brings in design ideas from an external source as inspiration). We
will discuss this further in this chapter in the discussion of the results of the manipulation
performed in study 3.
7.1.1 The time-course of ideation and support for well-formed ideas
In this section, we summarise the studies performed in this thesis and highlight key findings
and contributions. Our first study, the environment and health questions in studies 1a and
1b (Chapter 3), was a replication of the studies run by Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx
(2002) (and subsequently Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003) and Nijstad and Stroebe
(2006)) in which we attempted to replicate SIAM’s fundamental prediction, i.e. that the
list of ideas produced by an ideator in response to a problem will tend to be categorically
organised, with adjacent ideas more likely to belong the same category than more distant
ideas. In addition to the study replication, in which the original authors of this study
recorded solely the overall response latency for each answer given, we provided a further
depth to the measure of timing. Our split of response latency into thinking and typing times
provide a novel (if simple) contribution to our knowledge. We analysed these in accordance
with the categorical structures laid out by SIAM model in order to test the predictions that
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foraging theory could somewhat explain the time-course across ideas.
These studies exposed a methodological problem - the first of several in the thesis which
forced additional investigations somewhat away from the original plan of work. The method-
ological problem presented itself in the disagreements between independent coders who did
not agree on the category allocation of the expressed ideas. Comparing this finding to
Nijstad and Stroebe (2006), this is surprising as they performed the same study with the
same questions and identical category scoring. Our version of their study was not devoid of
limitations. In the first instance, we are unable to make comparisons to the ideators in the
original study as profiling constraints were not reported. The ideators recruited in our study
were not professional designers; the noisiness in the data might possibly have been avoided
by the inclusion of professional designers who are aware of the need to generate many ideas
over evaluation and self-censoring. Additionally, our data was coded by non-expert coders.
Finally, although this might not have had an effect on the noisiness of the data, we ran this
study using a 15-minute time-limit, rather than the 20 minutes stipulated in the original
study. We will address these general limitations later in this chapter, as they relate to all
three studies.
Despite the disagreements between the coders, who categorised ideas into previously gen-
erated categories, if we analyse the category coding for all four coders individually, we
do find weak evidence for categorical structure in participants’ protocols (IC1 and IC3), a
replication of the results in the original study by Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). In addition
to this finding, we observed further that our novel split of thinking and typing time was
successful in showing that the categorical structure affects participants’ thinking times (but
not typing times), with category switching taking longer on average than generating ideas
from the same category (within category thinking times). Whilst response latency might
be significantly different between and within categories, our results suggest that thinking
time might be a more refined way of showing that we indeed do spend time switching to
new images in our mind.
The category judgement problem prompted us to formulate a new and, as it transpired,
more reliable approach to measuring the thought process during an ideation task: i.e.
asking coders to rate the semantic distance between adjacent ideas. This method was
performed much more reliably by independent coders, with agreement scores over 70%,
offering a promising alternative for analysing semantic effects in ideation. In addition to
this positive finding, we observe that semantic differences predict the temporal intervals
between ideas well. This observation offers a novel contribution to the understanding of
cognitive processes in ideation. Our finding is somewhat in support of the SIAM model,
but makes a shift from the rather binary view of ideating within categories. Instead, it is
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suggestive of a more fluid associative ideation method, in which an idea within the same
image might have associations to the next idea, but not be within the exact same semantic
category.
Our second experiment was designed specifically to allow a more refined test of patch-
leaving rules. The sequential-idea design of this study has not been formulated in ideation
studies before, to our knowledge. This style of study is often used in Psychology literature
for accomplishment-style tasks such as Scrabble tasks, in order to study foraging theories in
relation to task-performance (e.g. Wilke et al., 2009). The timing effects in the data from
study 1 allowed some limited, speculative insight into the foraging rules that may underpin
category switching (under the analogy that a category is a patch that an ideator chooses
to abandon). However, the noisy nature of category switching compromised our ability to
perform reliable analyses of this. Participants were asked to generate ideas in response to
multiple sequential distinct problems. The sequence and therefore potential of the problems
was not known in advance; participants were free to decide when to abandon any problem
and move on to the next. This design allows us to measure giving-up times and to test
whether any of the foraging theory heuristics might underpin the ideators decisions to quit
tasks.
Analyses of the time-course of ideas in this second experiment followed quite closely the
analyses of anagram solutions in Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) and conclude similarly
that participants’ switch decisions are not governed simply by the number of items or the
time on a task. Neither are they governed solely by the giving-up time (i.e. a kind of
patience threshold of time since the last idea came to mind). Rather, participants seem
to be sensitive to the rate of generation of ideas on a task. Furthermore, participants
occasionally switched to a new task immediately on generating an idea: a finding which
directly mirrors Payne, Duggan and Neth (2007) model of discretionary task switching.
This is an interesting finding in itself as, although these are two different types of task,
the concept of sub-goal completion applies as a prompt for leaving a task in ideation tasks
as well. Indeed some participants indicated that they did make a switch as a result of
submission of what they believed was a really good idea. These are in striking contrast to
those who said they eventually just switched question because they felt they couldn’t think
of anymore good ideas. The insights from the initial timing analysis of study 2 give us a
novel contribution to ideation research, namely that we might be able to explain ideator
behaviour, of switching from one task to another, using foraging theory. This might not be
that surprising a finding, as these theories have been able to offer insight into other types
of task, for example accomplishment-style tasks. A positive outcome of this finding is that
it suggest we could further study the lessons from the research on other problem solving
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style tasks in order to understand the cognitive processes that take place during ideation.
All the analyses of experiment 2 depended simply on the number of ideas and their time-
course. In addition to these simple measures, we considered other measures that might
have an effect on switching strategies. Surely, quality of ideas might also matter, both
for participants who monitor their own successes and for researchers who would wish to
support ideation. In trying to analyse quality, a second major methodological awkwardness
was uncovered. Three coders were asked to judge the novelty and the value of ideas - two
aspects of quality that are widely thought to be important and independent. On neither
aspect did the coders agree very closely (they did agree significantly, but the correlation
between coders’ scores was only around 0.3).
Rather than regard this as merely a methodological nuisance, we reasoned that it likely
exposed a general difficulty with ideation tasks: they leave it up to participants to choose
how specific or vague they choose to be in their description of the proposed solutions
(generated ideas). Indeed, the style of ideation task often used in this type of question is
an open-ended, fairly broad, question that requires little to no subject specific knowledge
- the openness of these types of question do not afford a specific length or elaboration in
response. If specificity is low, it is hardly surprising to find that judged quality is variable.
Founded in comments from coders and from looking at the data, this hypothesis was
speculative, but it suggested a design intervention that seemed important for the practical
ambitions of the thesis - to support ideation - as well as for the theoretical aims - to
understand it.
Some simple and limited exploratory analyses were conducted to test the speculation that
specificity or well-formedness might explain the low agreement in the quality ratings. We
analysed the 20 highest agreed, 20 lowest agreed and 20 most disagreed quality scores,
discovering that ideas which coders agreed were good were significantly longer and con-
tained significantly more thematic roles than low-quality ideas or those that coders disagreed
about.
These findings suggest that ideation might be improved by a user interface which encour-
ages ideators to construct better-formed ideas. The third main experiment tested a rather
simple implementation of this idea in a between-groups experiment. This experiment, and
the variations therein, was of our own formulation, specifically designed to test the hypothe-
ses that 1) we could increase the specificity of the ideas and 2) that better formulated ideas
increases the agreement between coders - essentially making the ideas less ambiguous and
less open to personal interpretation. The general study involving a single open-ended task
followed a similar structure to that of regular electronic brainstorming studies, however, the
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instruction was manipulated in order to test our hypotheses. One group of participants pro-
duced ideas under instructions identical with those of the first studies. A second group was
presented with well-formed example ideas above the ideation window, visible throughout
the ideation process. These well-formed ideas were selected as they contained 4 or more
of the thematic roles found in agreed good ideas, however, they did not explicitly mention
these anywhere during the experiment for this group. A third group were asked explicitly to
construct ideas which included all or many of a list of thematic roles that remained visible
throughout. The list of semantic roles was transformed from ”agent, theme, instrument,
etc” to easier, non-technical constructs (”who is performing”, ”what action”, etc). De-
spite the simplicity of this manipulation, these prompts had significant effects on ideation:
prompted participants produced fewer and longer ideas.
The quality of the ideas generated by a subset of participants (10 per prompt condition)
was rated for quality (novelty and value) by two coders. Agreement scores for these coders
showed higher agreement than in experiment 2, but perplexingly this improvement was not
limited to the prompted conditions. The improvement might have been a chance effect,
but it is also possible that the presence of longer, better-formed ideas somehow moderated
or influenced the judgment of all ideas. Indeed, the coders were informed to read through
the entire set of ideas before beginning the novelty and value ratings, an instruction often
used in these judgement tasks.
The judged novelty of ideas did not vary across the three prompt conditions. However,
the ideas of those participants who were prompted with thematic roles were judged to be
of significantly more value (and significantly less variable value) than those of the other
conditions. This effect should be treated as suggestive rather than definitive as it is a small
study (due to the high time-cost of judging quality, we limited the sample of judged ideas
to those from only 30 participants), but we hope that it illustrates the main ambition of
the thesis: through experimental analysis we may gain insights into interface interventions
through which ideators might be supported. Referring back to our discussion of different
types of ideation, brainstorming need not solely be a tool to generate many ideas, regardless
of quality. Indeed, we may be more interested in the value of an idea than its novelty (e.g.
Reinig, Briggs and Nunamaker, 2007; Briggs and Reinig, 2010; Howard-Jones and Murray,
2003), and if this is the case, our work suggests that we may be able to offer methods of
support for more valuable ideas to be generated.
7.1.2 Limitations and considerations for future work
The studies in this thesis are not without limitations. We recognise that the selected
participants do not fully represent the average population. However, despite their affiliation
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with a university, they may be somewhat representative of the average inexperienced ideator.
More experienced ideators, for example Engineers with training in methods like Triz and
SCAMPER, professional designers and people who ideate for a living will likely perform
differently on ideations tasks such as these. Whilst we have attempted to understand general
cognitive processes with little attention to individual differences, it is worth mentioning
here that these results might have looked very different had we used experienced ideators.
We might have found ourselves with less noisy data consisting of well-formulated ideas.
Considering this, it would be interesting to see these studies performed using expert ideators.
At the very start, we ran into methodological issues with the categorical schema and the
noisiness of the data. Whilst we have discussed the possible issues with the pre-determined
categorical schema, we continued to experience issues with coders when rating the novelty
and value of ideas. We therefore need to bring attention to another limitation in our
work: the coders recruited for this study. Coders were selected based on availability, as we
unfortunately did not have access to experienced coders. Additionally some of the coders
from early studies were not included in subsequent studies. This was due to a range of
reasons: these studies were performed over a long period of time and some were simply no
longer accessible; coding for all but the novelty/value ratings was done on good will and
therefore not paid; some coders were unable to provide more time than coding a single set
of data would take. We highlight this as a serious limitation as this may have affected a
large part of the work performed in this thesis. As before, it would be interesting to see
these codings performed using expert coders.
A further prominent limitation of these studies is the use of coding schema and novelty and
value ratings. The categorical schema was possibly too vague and not appropriate for use
in these tasks, despite having been used successfully in other studies. An obvious questions
this raises might be: why do we not simply create a new schema? This would be interesting,
and has been done in other studies (e.g. Chan et al., 2017). In our work, an attempt at
a restructured schema was made, however, this took a turn from the main research goals
and eventually it was decided to move towards an analysis of the methodology itself. The
successful use of Diehl’s (1991) original categorical structure in other studies raises interest
in this area and we suggest a refinement of these for future researchers. Particularly, self-
assessment might be the way forward for this, in which ideators categorise their own ideas,
or a situation in which coders work together to formulate a coding schema for each set of
ideation data.
The novelty and value ratings are often-used measurements of idea quality (e.g. Boden,
2004; Ye and Robert Jr, 2017; De Dreu, Baas and Nijstad, 2008). The low agreement
between coders using these ratings suggests that the ambiguity of the definitions quality
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metrics might need to be refined. Take for example ”value: how useful and practical is this
idea and does it make sense as a solution to the problem?” Useful and practical are two very
different things. Might this complexity have had an impact on the quality ratings performed
by our coders? We suggest here that future research involving ratings like these consider
what is truly meant by value, and whether this metric should be split into components such
as feasibility, cost, impact, generalisability and scalability; or whether it should be clearly
define which of these components is represented by value.
We have previously discussed the reasoning for the choice of brainstorming as our ideation
task. We have also discussed the concept of brainstorming tasks in themselves as being a
very unconstrained, ill-defined tasks in which the goal and the steps necessary to produce
viable solutions is ambiguous (Chrysikou, 2006). We chose to use open-ended questions in
this thesis due to the inclusive nature of the types of question, requiring little to no subject
knowledge. The specific questions chosen for our first study were a replication of questions
used in other ideation studies by Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). The questions subsequently
used in our second study were developed with consideration for the initial questions - all
open-ended questions designed to be possible for a general audience to answer. It is worth
noting that some of our questions were designed with the participant population available
to us in mind: students and staff associated with the University of Bath. These questions
may have limited usage in other situations (e.g. ”How can we improve student housing?”).
Altering the type of ideation task might be a useful way of exploring the research questions
in this thesis with fewer inter-rater reliability issues. Using other methods of ideation, such
as SCAMPER or analogy to existing systems, which specify a structure or use exemplars to
guide how a solution should be formulated, we might find more specific or elaborated ideas.
Indeed, this brings up the question of whether ideas generated through a brainstorming
activity might not lend themselves to be objectively evaluated.
The task time-limits used in these studies varied quite a bit throughout the research. At
the outset, we were looking to eventually run our studies as online crowd-sourced ideation
tasks. Other studies (e.g. Siangliulue et al., 2015) that have been run on online platforms
offer ideators 15 minutes to generate as many ideas as possible to an open-ended question,
similar to those we have used in our research. We therefore set our first study time-limit
to 15 minutes. As our first study was an unpaid replication study, we ran this study in
a lab setting (not online). Unfortunately, the study we were replicating was a 20-minute
ideation task; this is an unfortunate design flaw, but did highlight the fact that an eventual
move to online studies could prove less productive than hoped. The 15 minute time-limit
did not yield as many ideas as anticipated. For our second study, the 30 minute time-
limit was a fairly arbitrary decision as there was no similar ideation study to compare to.
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For other accomplishment-style tasks we find varying lengths, such as Payne, Duggan and
Neth’s (2007) 15-minute scrabble task, or Wilke et al.’s (2009) 60-minute anagram task.
The 30 minutes worked well for us in this study as we were not interested in seeing the
overall generation of ideas across this time, but the generation of ideas within and between
each of the tasks. The time-limit for the third study was 25 minutes. Online ideation
studies are often run in 15-minute sessions, however, in our first study, we found that
a 15-minute timespan was not enough to exhaust ideators stock of ideas. We therefore
decided to increase the ideation time substantially in order to see if we were able to observe
a diminishing returns curve. Whilst this decision was grounded in our experience from the
first study, the limitation of this decision has to be acknowledged - particularly in relation
to the nature of online studies. Although the crowd-sourced ideators were informed of the
length and nature of the study in advance, we might attribute the high drop-out rate to
the length of the study. Indeed, some participants showed signs of not generating any
ideas in the last few minutes, suggesting that a time-limit of less than 25 minutes might be
preferable for online studies, and might explain the (often standard) choice of 15 minutes
made in other studies of this type.
We chose to run our third study on an online platform in order to make use of crowd-
sourcing data collection methods. This is an increasingly popular method in the literature,
due to quick response times, time and cost efficiency and access to a larger work-force than
might be possible in a lab-based setting (Eickhoff, 2018). Recent research in design studies
and creativity shows a strong interest in the use of online platforms as a way of generating
ideas for inspiration (Goucher-Lambert and Cagan, 2019), involving users in the generation
of ideas for new products (Schemmann et al., 2016), or even using crowd-sourced work
to asses the quality of ideas (Kudrowitz and Wallace, 2013). Among the aforementioned
benefits of crowd-sourcing participants, platforms such as Prolific Academic1, the one used
in our research, allow experimenters to perform specific profiling on participants. In terms
of time and cost efficiency, we were able to recruit 107 participants within two hours in
our third study. This is compared to the hour spent with each participant in the lab-based
first and second studies we performed. It is worth highlighting why the first studies were
not crowd-sourced. A trade-off when running online studies is that these require monetary
incentive. The initial study we ran, our replication study, was an unpaid 15-minute study
and it was therefore not possible to run this online. The second study was rewarded based
on performance (based on the number of distinct ideas generated), a mechanic not yet
supported by online platforms such as Prolific Academic. A further disadvantage of crowd-
sourcing is the weak supervision of these studies. This may increase the likelihood of
1https://www.prolific.ac/
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dropouts in which participants start a study but for unknown reasons choose to abandon
the study. Online studies might also be subject to low quality submissions from either
malicious participants, simply engaging in the study for monetary gain, or from unqualified
participants who have somehow slipped through the profiling constraints (Allahbakhsh et al.,
2013; Eickhoff and de Vries, 2013; Buchanan and Scofield, 2018). Indeed, a few of our
datasets from the online study did contain responses in a foreign language, suggesting
that the ’native English speaker’ constraint may not be 100% reliable. Despite the issues
inherent in the weak supervision of crowd-sourced data collection, there is no doubt that
the ability to access a large pool of participants, in a short amount of time, opens up
larger possibilities for ideation research, e.g. in relation not only to generation of ideas, but
in relation to possible crowd-sourced coding of ideas as well. Although counter-indicated
by the strong implication in our results that such coders require careful training, it is
worth exploring further how we can use crowd-sourcing platforms to recruit judges whilst
mitigating the effects of lack of careful training and no supervision.
Although the experiments reported in this thesis are fairly small in terms of participant
numbers, the number of ideas these participants generated is substantial. This is good
news for the statistical power of some of the within-subjects tests of effects, but also a
challenge in terms of the considerable workload required from volunteer and paid coders,
who are necessary for the analysis of semantics and quality. With respect to our original
goals of informing the design of ideation support systems, it must be admitted that the
final study in the thesis is too small-scale and exploratory to offer a major contribution to
theory-based design. However, it does hopefully show the potential of rather lightweight
but theoretically derived interventions at the user interface to shift ideators’ behaviour and
therefore, in principle, to improve that behaviour for practical purposes.
7.2 Implications for the design of ideation tools
The initial intention of the work in this thesis was to build a stronger understanding of
the time-course of ideation, in order to inform methods for supporting cognitive state
transitions. Throughout our studies we encountered methodological issues that steered
our work away from our original goals and towards the study of the methodology itself.
Despite this outcome, we might still make inferences from our data, offering insights into
possible design guidelines for ideation tools. In this section, we discuss the implications of
our results from two different viewpoints: (1) extensions to methodology in ideation studies
in support of experimenters, with focus on the coding difficulties we have encountered in
our own work; (2) general support for ideators and how we might influence the design of
ideation support tools.
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7.2.1 Design of ideation tools for the extension of methodology in support
of experimenters
Our first research question ”What influences the time-course pattern of ideas generated
in ideation tasks?” prompted the replication of an existing single task study in our first
study, and the development of our second (sequential task) study. Key learnings from
these studies included a weak replication of the findings by Nijstad and Stroebe (2006):
that ideas are generated in clusters of semantic similarity. As this finding provides a weak
verification of a categorical structure to thinking during ideation, we might look to the
methodological issues encountered for insights into how experimenters can better their
understanding of categorical ideation. Findings from these studies highlighted another,
fairly similar, methodological issue: difficulty in subjective novelty and value ratings of
ideas. We propose three main methodological extensions that may support experimenters
when designing these types of studies.
1. Self-categorisation of ideas generated by ideators themselves
Addressing the categorisation of ideas, we suggest the development of an interface that
allows for self-categorisation of ideas. This might take the form of a free-form interface,
rather than the often static list format used in simple brainstorming experiments. We sug-
gest offering ideators a number of different named category boxes or spaces within which
ideators might either enter ideas into a set of categories predetermined by the experimenter
(see figure 7-1), or we might imagine them generating the categories, naming them accord-
ing to their own categorical structure, then dragging and dropping ideas between these (see
figure 7-2). The number of spaces representing categories and whether these are labelled
might depend on the intended outcome of the ideation problem itself. If we are truly inter-
ested in observing ideators cognitive processes, we might leave the decision on number and
name of categories up to the ideators themselves. However, it would likewise be interesting
to see the effect pre-determined categories might have on the elaboration of ideas. Indeed,
studies have been run on the concept of priming people to certain categories, showing that
people are more likely to generate a depth of ideas within the few categories they are primed
with, rather than a breadth of categories (Rietzschel, Nijstad and Stroebe, 2007). It would
seem fair to say that varying constraints on number of categories and whether these can
be self-selected is an interesting topic for future work in itself.
Not only may support for explicit self-categorisation further our understanding of the SIAM
cognitive model, but also how ideators make semantic connections between the ideas they
generate themselves. It may give a stronger insight into how ideas are categorised, without
the need for post-experiment categorisation done by external coders, who may be unfamiliar
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with the thought-processes of the ideators themselves. The concept of self-categorisation
might further be an interesting area of future study, to observe whether the explicit knowl-
edge of the concept of categories helps ideators generate more ideas. Indeed, the concept
of an explicit structure of thinking is an often-used method of prompting creative thinking.
Consider for example mind-mapping, in which ideators are asked to structure ideas in a
hierarchical manner (Buzan and Harrison, 2010). The mere existence of a set of physical
categorical spaces to ideate within might support improved ideation flow. In addition to
this, it would seem plausible that encouraging self-categorisation would prompt a strong
awareness of strategies used in idea generation, which might be beneficial for ideators as
well as experimenters.
Figure 7-1: Suggested design of a free-form interface that supports categorical
ideation where categories are predetermined by the experimenter.
2. Self-evaluation of idea quality by ideators themselves
We can further extend the methodology by including an evaluation phase in electronic
brainstorming research. This is, again, not a new concept and has been done in previous
studies (e.g. Sowden, Pringle and Gabora, 2015). However, based on the ambiguity of
the meanings of novelty (surprising and original) and value (useful and practical, not to
mention feasibility, cost, impact, etc.) we propose an extension to the methodology in the
form of ideators evaluating their own ideas, similar to a heuristic evaluation. A finding from
our third study revealed a higher agreement on novelty ratings, possibly as a result of the
visibility of the set of well-formulated ideas. Whilst this finding requires additional research,
the use of exemplars might improve the ability of ideators themselves to perform ratings.
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Figure 7-2: Suggested design of free-form interface that supports categorical
ideation. The number and name of categories is determined by ideators, by se-
lecting ’new category’. Ideas can be dragged and dropped between categories.
Category boxes should resize dependent on number of ideas entered.
3. Ideators reformulation of own ideas and revisiting earlier ideas
The reformulation of ideators own ideas and revisiting earlier ideas is not a new concept in
ideation tools. The process of revisiting and reformulation is usually represented in conjunc-
tion with the evaluation stages of creative problem solving. In the IDEO Design Thinking2
process for creative problem solving, ideators are encouraged to brainstorm potential solu-
tions, then select and develop them to generate even better solutions to the problem, in an
iterative manner. Again, we might imagine that observation and careful recording of this
process can offer experimenters a stronger understanding of thought processes that take
place during ideation.
It is worth mentioning here that these methodological extensions go somewhat against
the original decision to treat ideation in isolation, separate to evaluation. Whilst studies
of ideation in isolation provide insights into aspects of ideation such as time-course, the
problems encountered in our studies suggest that it is likely that methodological extensions
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7.2.2 Design guidelines for the development of ideation support tools
Our second research question ”Can we support ideation in such a way that judgement of
ideas becomes more reliable?” was generated as a result of the methodological difficulties
encountered in our first two studies, and prompted the development of a simple manipu-
lation in our third and final single task study. Although a small manipulation, it allowed
us to make some interesting observations and inferences about how ideation interface de-
signs might impact different qualities of ideas generated. Overall, we found that an explicit
instruction on what thematic roles to consider when generating solutions to a problem
resulted in, on average, longer ideas. Whilst this also resulted in fewer ideas, these were
interestingly judged as being of higher value, with a focus on usefulness and practicality
as per our coding instructions. From these analyses we might offer two insights into the
design of ideation support tools looking to support increased value of ideas.
Before discussing these, we want to highlight that the suggested extensions to the method-
ology of ideation studies, discussed in the previous section, might have further positive
impacts on the quality of ideation itself. Perhaps not on ideation in isolation, but self-
categorisation, self-evaluation and reformulation of ideas all seem to fit into the ideation-
evaluation iterative model of creative problem solving. Indeed, a stronger self-awareness of
ideation strategies combined with iterative refinement of ideas might in itself be considered
a form of ideation support.
1. Constraints on the length of ideas
The result of our manipulations to instruction in the third study revealed significantly longer
ideas generated in the explicit prompt condition, in which ideators were explicitly asked to
include thematic roles in their solutions. Ideas generated in this condition were further
judged as having significantly higher value. Although this was a small finding, we propose
that a simple method supporting valuable ideation might involve setting constraints on
the length of ideas. In the first instance, by simply making the input field larger than a
single line input. Further designs might involve ways of guiding ”the length of a good
idea” by using simple visual cues such as a colour scales (see figure 7-3), or using smiley
(frown/smile) feedback styles. In addition to support for more elaborated ideas, this offers
the benefit of allowing ideators a visual way of tracking performance. Whilst the value of an
individual idea might not always be correlated to its length, explicitly showing ”expected”
idea length might prompt ideators to consider how ideas might be elaborated.
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(a) Idea too short (b) Idea elaborated (c) Idea well-formulated
Figure 7-3: Suggested design alternative for visually cued length constraints
on ideas, offering a multi-line box affording longer ideas than single line boxes.
Colour-cued feedback on idea length, with red meaning too short, yellow mean-
ing ok, green meaning well formulated. Alternatives to the standard traffic light
colours advised in design for accessibility (e.g. colour blindedness).
2. Template input explicitly specifying thematic roles
The analysis of the data from our second study suggests that agreed good (high value and
high novelty) ideas contained the following thematic roles:
• Agent: who is performing this action?
• Action: what are they doing?
• Instrument: what are they using (e.g. phone, a map)
• Recipient: who is benefiting from this action?
• Purpose: why is this being done, what is the goal of this?
Our simple manipulation further showed that prompting ideators to consider each of these
thematic roles might increase the value of the ideas generated. We therefore propose a
simplistic design guideline for ideation tools which offers a template input, offering several
distinct boxes each labelled with the thematic roles that we discovered were included in the
formulation of good ideas (see figure 7-4). Method cards3 are an existing tool in the IDEO
toolkit, which makes use of prompts such as learn, look, ask and try. A similar tool in the
IDEO toolkit are nature cards4, in which ideators are encouraged to take inspiration for
their designs from nature; designing by analogy by looking at outside sources of inspiration.
Our design suggestions contribute to existing tools like these by adding a structure to the
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Figure 7-4: Suggested design of template ideation tool that requires input into
thematic role fields to inspire well-formulated ideas.
7.3 Concluding remarks
In this thesis, we set out to understand the cognitive processes that take place during
ideation. Our original intent was to discover methods of supporting ideation through cog-
nitive states such as impasses. The emergence of methodological difficulties encountered
throughout the studies performed in this thesis steered the work towards a study of the
methodology itself. We performed three studies, looking at both continuous ideation across
a single ideation task, and continuous ideation across multiple sequential tasks. Whilst we
found evidence of semantic clustering of ideas, we encountered low inter-rater agreements
on category scores as well as novelty and value ratings of ideas. Our investigations of how
to address these issues revealed that the use of thematic roles as prompts during ideation
tasks have a positive effect on the length of ideas as well as on judged value of ideas.
As a result of the difficulties identified in our studies, we were able to identify insights
into how methodologies in ideation studies can be extended to include self-categorisation,
self-evaluation and reformulation of ideas. Although considered as the evaluative part
of creative problem solving, inclusion of these elements might offer experimenters further
insight into the cognitive processes that occur during ideation. We have additionally offered
suggestions for simple design interventions that may affect the value and specificity of ideas
generated: constraints on the length of ideas and explicit specification of thematic roles to
consider when generating ideas. Although more research is required to fully understand the
cognitive processes in ideation, we hope that this work shows that by detailed experimental
analysis of ideation, we might learn some possible interface interventions through which
ideators might be supported.
161
Bibliography
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 




You are being asked to take part in a research study on the process of idea generation. The aim is to 
explore how idea generation is performed by the individual. 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN 
In this study, you will be presented with a question and asked to generate as many ideas as possible 
within a time period of 15 minutes. You will type your answers into a form using a regular keyboard and 
mouse. After that, a brief questionnaire is given, asking you about your experience. 
When generating your ideas, consider following the standard brainstorming rules: avoid being too critical, 
generate many ‘wild’ ideas, combine and improve these. Try to expand your ideas to incorporate specific 
behaviours; e.g. instead of saying “manage electricity”, indicate how you would do so, e.g. “don’t overfill 
a kettle if you are only making a single cup of tea.” 
 
TIME COMMITMENT 
The study typically takes 20 minutes across 3 parts. An initial 3 minute practice period with an unrelated 
question will be given. This is followed by a 15 minute idea generation task. Upon completion of this, you 
will be asked to complete a short questionnaire on your experience of the idea generation task.  
 
PARTICIPANTS’ RIGHTS 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at 
any time without explanation. You have the right to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question 
that is asked of you. You have the right to have your questions about the procedures answered (unless 
answering these questions would interfere with the study’s outcome). If you have any questions as a 
result of reading this information sheet, you should ask the researcher before the study begins. 
 
BENEFITS AND RISKS 
There are no known benefits or risks for you in this study. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The data collected in this study remains anonymised. The responses you type during the session are 
recorded for further analysis but will not be linked to any identifying information you have supplied.  
 
DATA RETENTION AND PUBLICATION 
The data will be securely archived and retained after this study finishes for further research. Other 
researchers may be granted access to this preserved data for further analysis, providing they agree to 
preserve confidentiality. Subject to your consent, data extracted from the study may be used during 
presentation at conferences or published within academic papers.  
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Should you have any questions about this study at any time, you may contact Christina Keating at 
c.keating@bath.ac.uk. If you would like to be informed about the final results of this study, you can 
choose to provide your email address. The email will be used exclusively to inform you of the results in 
this study. 
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Participant number:___ 
University of Bath, Department of Computer Science, 2016 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
The process of generating ideas  
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
☐ I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet. 
☐ Questions about my participation in this study have been answered satisfactorily. 
☐ I am taking part in this study voluntarily. I understand that the collected data will be analysed. 
☐ I understand that my personal details such as email and name will not be revealed to anyone 
outside the project. 
 
 
CONSENT FOR DATA PUBLICATION, RETENTION AND SHARING 
 
☐ I understand that my written responses may be quoted in publications, reports, webpages, and 
other research outputs, providing that personal information such as name and email address will 
not be revealed. 
☐ I understand that the data will be securely preserved for additional research after the end of this 
study and that other researchers may: (1) have access to the collected data and (2) may use the 
written responses in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, but ONLY if 
they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form. 
☐ I agree to assign rights I hold in any materials collected during the study to the University of Bath. 
 
 
USE OF PARTICIPANT’S EMAIL ADDRESS 
 
☐ I would like to be informed of the final results of this study by email, providing my email is not 





____________________________________   ____________________________________ 









____________________________________     ____________________________________  
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IDEA GENERATION QUESTIONNAIRE 





HOW DIFFICULT WAS IT TO KEEP ON GENERATING IDEAS? 
Please indicate on a scale of 1-10, 1 being very easy, 10 being very difficult 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 





HOW OFTEN WERE YOU UNABLE TO GENERATE IDEAS? 
Please indicate on a scale of 1-10, 1 being never, 10 being all the time 
  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 





HOW OFTEN DID AN IDEA YOU PREVIOUSLY GENERATED OCCUR TO YOU AGAIN? 
Please indicate on a scale of 1-10, 1 being never, 10 being all the time 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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A.4 Semantic difference coding instructions
Background:
My first exploratory study asked 10 participants the following question: ”What can the
individual do to preserve the environment?” and 10 participants “What can a person do
to maintain or improve their health?”. They were asked to come up with as many ideas
as possible in the space of 15 minutes. The attached spreadsheet contains 20 tabs of raw
data from this study.
As part of my research, I am looking at the semantic difference between subsequent ideas
and whether people are grouping their ideas into categories or if each idea wildly varies
from the previous one. I need independent raters for this (you)!
My task for you:
The attached spreadsheet contains 20 tabs of ideas. Could I ask you to score, on a scale
from 1-10, how semantically different two adjacent ideas are?
Column B contains the ideas. Column A contains the area where you can input your score.
Just to give you an idea of how you can think about this:
I would score the following a 1 or 2, as they are essentially touching on the same concepts:
recycling and plastic materials.
Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
Idea 2: ”recycle plastic bags”
I would score this a 5-6 as they have something in common but aren’t quite the same.
Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
Idea 2: ”teach people why recycling plastic bottles saves the planet”
I would score the following a 10 as they have nothing in common (in my personal opinion!).
Idea 1: ”recycle plastic bottles”
Idea 2: ”support an organisation that protects pandas”
As this is not a study I do not have the usual consent form, however, just to let you know:




Appendices for study 2
B.1 Questions for study 2
The following questions were developed for study 2 in order to avoid any one participant
exhausting the number of questions available.
1. Your phone can tell you exactly where you are, come up with functions/apps that
can use this.
2. What can one do the preserve the environment?
3. What can the individual do to increase their general level of health?
4. How could we attract more women to study technology?
5. What can the individual do to be more productive?
6. How can we improve student housing?
7. What can society do to make the world safer for wild animals?
8. How can we make transportation/travel/driving safer?
9. What can the individual do for the community in their spare time?
10. How can we get children interested in science?
11. How can we be safer online? (Mentally, privacy, financial safety, security, cyber
bullying)
12. How can we facilitate world peace?
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13. What methods can we use to make more friends in a new city?
14. How can we address the problems of an ageing population?
15. How can the individual break an addiction?
16. How can the individual improve their ability to remember things?
17. How can you save space if you live in a small apartment?
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 




You are being asked to take part in a research study on the process of idea generation. The aim is to 
explore how idea generation is performed by the individual. 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN 
In this study, you will be presented with a question and asked to generate as many ideas as possible in 30 
minutes. You will type your answers into a form using a regular keyboard and mouse. If you feel you have 
run out of ideas, click the “new question” button to receive a new question on another topic. Your goal is 
to produce as many good and well formulated ideas as possible in total, i.e. across all the questions you 
attempt. It doesn’t matter how many questions you attempt or how many ideas you generate for any 
particular question, all that matters is the total. After the 30 minutes are up, a brief questionnaire is given, 
asking you about your experience. 
When generating your ideas, consider following the standard brainstorming rules: avoid being too critical, 
generate many ‘wild’ ideas, combine and improve these. Try to expand your ideas to incorporate specific 
behaviours; e.g. instead of saying “manage electricity”, indicate how you would do so, e.g. “don’t overfill 
a kettle if you are only making a single cup of tea.” 
 
TIME COMMITMENT 
The study typically takes 40 minutes across 3 parts. An initial 2-minute introduction to the form will be 
given. This is followed by a 30-minute idea generation task. Upon completion of this, you will be asked to 
complete a short questionnaire on your experience of the idea generation task.  
 
PARTICIPANTS’ RIGHTS 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at 
any time without explanation. You have the right to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question 
that is asked of you. You have the right to have your questions about the procedures answered (unless 
answering these questions would interfere with the study’s outcome). If you have any questions as a 
result of reading this information sheet, you should ask the researcher before the study begins. 
 
COMPENSATION 
As a thank you for your participation in this study, you will automatically be entered in a prize draw for 
two Amazon.co.uk voucher of £25 each. Additionally, you will receive 20p per coherent idea formed 
during the experiment (maximum £10). This will be paid within 1 week of completion of the study. 
 
BENEFITS AND RISKS 
There are no known benefits or risks for you in this study. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The data collected in this study remains anonymised. The responses you type during the session are 
recorded for further analysis but will not be linked to any identifying information you have supplied.  
 
DATA RETENTION AND PUBLICATION 
The data will be securely archived and retained after this study finishes for further research. Other 
researchers may be granted access to this preserved data for further analysis, providing they agree to 
preserve confidentiality. Subject to your consent, data extracted from the study may be used during 
presentation at conferences or published within academic papers.  
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Should you have any questions about this study at any time, you may contact Christina Keating at 
c.keating@bath.ac.uk.   
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
The process of generating ideas 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
☐ I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet. 
☐ Questions about my participation in this study have been answered satisfactorily. 
☐ I am taking part in this study voluntarily. I understand that the collected data will be analysed. 
☐ I understand that my personal details such as email and name will not be revealed to anyone 
outside the project. 
 
 
CONSENT FOR DATA PUBLICATION, RETENTION AND SHARING 
 
☐ I understand that my written responses may be quoted in publications, reports, webpages, and 
other research outputs, providing that personal information such as name and email address will 
not be revealed. 
☐ I understand that the data will be securely preserved for additional research after the end of this 
study and that other researchers may: (1) have access to the collected data and (2) may use the 
written responses in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, but ONLY if 
they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form. 
☐ I agree to assign rights I hold in any materials collected during the study to the University of Bath. 
 
 
USE OF PARTICIPANT’S EMAIL ADDRESS 
  
If you would like to take part in the prize draw for one of two £25 Amazon vouchers, please write your 




____________________________________   ____________________________________ 
Participant’s Name (printed)    Participant’s signature    
 
 
____________________________________                       





____________________________________     ____________________________________  
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IDEA GENERATION QUESTIONNAIRE 






DID YOU COME UP WITH A PARTICULAR STRATEGY TO DETERMINE WHEN TO SWITCH 
QUESTIONS?  
If YES, how would you describe this strategy, what cues did you use to decide when to give up on a 











HOW OFTEN DID YOU USE THE FOLLOWING CUES TO SWITCH TO A NEW QUESTION? 
  
Never 
        All the 
Time 
Number of ideas generated on  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
current question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Time spent on current question ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Time interval since previous ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
idea on current question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Feeling stuck on the current ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Fully 
Agree 
I only pressed “next question” 
when I felt stuck. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
During a question, I 
continuously switched 
between the feelings of being 






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It was very difficult to think of 
new ideas 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The same idea occurred to 
me several times 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 






Judgement of Ideas 
 
Background 
We have recently run a study looking at how people generate ideas. This was designed as an 
exploratory study – we are not just looking for pre-determined factors but also hoping that the data 
will tell us something we had not expected or anticipated.  
The study involved 29 participants, each was given 30 minutes to generate ideas. They were given a 
list of 17 questions. Participants were free to spend the 30 minutes as they liked, e.g they could spend 
all 30 minutes on one question, or try to answer all 17. As part of the analysis, we are interested in the 
quality of ideas. Commonly used metrics for measuring this are: 
• Novelty: How original and surprising is the idea? 




You have been provided with a spreadsheet of 1264 ideas, given in response to 17 questions. As 
participants were given the choice of what questions to answer, some questions will have a longer list 
of ideas than others.  
Each question is represented on its own tab. Please do one tab at a time, and try to take a break 
between each if you can in order to clear your mind. The overall payment for the work is £60 and will 
be paid upon completion of the debrief. The work should take approximately 3 hours. 
 
Instructions 
1) Select a single question (tab). 
2) Initially read through all the ideas for the question you have selected without making any 
judgements. 
3) Go back to the top, and then give a “novelty” and “value” score to each individual idea. 
Novelty and Value do not necessarily go hand in hand so treat them as two separate scores. 
Please score these on the below scale. 
4) You should not have the need to use the notes field, however if you do find some difficult, 
you are welcome to use this to enter your thoughts and we can discuss these in the debrief. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No Value /  
Not Novel 
      
High Value /  
Very Novel 
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Figure C-1: Study 3 consent form
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Appendix C. Appendices for study 3: screenshots of application built in Gorilla
Figure C-2: Study 3 demographics form
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Appendix C. Appendices for study 3: screenshots of application built in Gorilla
Figure C-3: Study 3 post-experiment questionnaire form
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Appendix C. Appendices for study 3: screenshots of application built in Gorilla
(a) Instructions to no prompt and implicit example prompt conditions
(b) Instructions to explicit thematic role prompt condition
Figure C-4: Instructions for ideators in the three different conditions in Gorilla
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(a) Ideation screen for no prompt condition
(b) Ideation screen for thematic role explicit prompt condition
Figure C-5: Ideation screens for no prompt and explicit conditions in Gorilla
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(a) Ideation screen for implicit example prompt (Health)
(b) Ideation screen for implicit example prompt (Phone)







Department of Computer Science
13-POINT ETHICS CHECK LIST
This document describes the 13 issues that need to be considered carefully before students
or staff involve other people (”participants”) for the collection of information as part of
their project or research.
1. Have you prepared a briefing script for volunteers? You must explain to people what
they will be required to do, the kind of data you will be collecting from them and
how it will be used.
2. Will the participants be using any non-standard hardware? Participants should not
be exposed to any risks associated with the use of non- standard equipment: anything
other than pen and paper or typical interaction with PCs on desks is considered non-
standard.
3. Is there any intentional deception of the participants? Withholding information
or misleading participants is unacceptable if participants are likely to object or show
unease when debriefed.
4. How will participants voluntarily give consent? If the results of the evaluation are
likely to be used beyond the term of the project (for example, the software is to be
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deployed, or the data is to be published), then signed consent is necessary. A separate
consent form should be signed by each participant.
5. Will the participants be exposed to any risks greater than those encountered in their
normal work life? Investigators have a responsibility to protect participants from
physical and mental harm during the investigation. The risk of harm must be no
greater than in ordinary life.
6. Are you offering any incentive to the participants? The payment of participants
must not be used to induce them to risk harm beyond that which they risk without
payment in their normal lifestyle.
7. Are any of your participants under the age of 16? Parental consent is required for
participants under the age of 16.
8. Do any of your participants have an impairment that will limit their understanding or
communication? Additional consent is required for participants with impairments.
9. Are you in a position of authority or influence over any of your participants? A posi-
tion of authority or influence over any participant must not be allowed to pressurise
participants to take part in, or remain in, any experiment.
10. Will the participants be informed that they could withdraw at any time? All partici-
pants have the right to withdraw at any time during the investigation. They should
be told this in the introductory script.
11. Will the participants be informed of your contact details? All participants must be
able to contact the investigator after the investigation. They should be given the
details of the Unit Lecturer or Supervisor as part of the debriefing.
12. Will participants be de-briefed? The student must provide the participants with
sufficient information in the debriefing to enable them to understand the nature of
the investigation.
13. Will the data collected from the participants be stored in an anonymous form? All
participant data (hard copy and soft copy) should be stored securely, and in anony-
mous form.
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